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A.  INTRODUCTION 
The  September  1990  Discussion Paper  and  reactions to  It 
1 •  The  Commission  issued  a  Discussion  Paper  entitled  "Making  11a,..nts  1t111r 
the  Internal  market ..  (COM(90)447)  on  26  September  1990.  Thls- paper -· 
out  Ideas  for  improvements  in  the  main  categories  of  cross-fronti..-
payments  and  invited  responses  from  interested organisations by  the ~ 
of  1990. 
2.  There  was  a  widespread  consensus  among  commentators  that  present  pa,wxa:U 
systems  did  not  provide  arrangements  for  retail  cross-border  pa,_nts 
(RCBP)  which  met  the  standards  of  speed,  certainty  and  econc.y  tllat 
characterised purely domestic  payment  systems,  and  which  wou•d  bene~ 
under  full  EMU.  (A  variety  of  factors  were  adduced  to  eaplain  tttts 
sltuat ion  Including  the  fact  that  domest lc  payment  syst- ln ... 
Member  States  were  significantly  less  efficient  than  in  otlters). S.. 
suggested  that  these  Inadequacies  typified  regular  (I.e.  recurrent" 
periodic)  as  wei  1  as  "one-off"  (i.e.  spontaneous>  remote  pa~ea 
(remote  signifying  that  only  the  payment  crosses  the  u..eer  Stat••·• 
border).  1  t  was  genera II y  _acknow I  edged  that  face-to-face  IICBP  - ...,_ 
the  user  from  one  Member  State  is  phys i ca I I  y  present  at  tllle  place  d 
payment  in  another  Member  State  - presented  fewer  probl•s.  at  -
difficult  to  forecast  the  demand  for  RCBP  services.  However,  tba 
complete  opening  of  frontiers  to  trade  in  goods  and  services and  to~ 
free movement  of  persons,  would  certainly be  accompanied  by  an  lncre8S~ 
demand  for  more  convenient  payment  services.  Wh I I  e  this de...·a would a. 
driven  primarily  by  the  growth  of  trade  in  goods  and  services  it CCJU;fd 
also  be  responsive  to  any  reduction  in  charges  and/or  the  time  taken~ 
effect  such  payments. 
3.  Consumer  groups  emphasized  the  need  to  strengthen  consumer  protecti~. 
by  e.g.  implementing  measures  to  increase  the  transparency  of  ~ 
conditions  (e.g.  charges,  time-spans)  associated  with  RCBP.  the  bank~ 
industry also  recognised  that  consumers  were  not  wei I  infor..a regarabnm 
the  merits  of  the  different  instruments  that  could  be  used  for  RCIF 
(e.g.  cards  and  cheques)  and  that  many  consumer  complaints  would  be 
eliminated  where  customers  to  be  better  advised  regarding  t~ diff.eremtt 
alternatives available  to  them. 
4.  A  series  of  issues  which  wou 1  d  have  to  be  addressed  int  order  fcur 
improvements  to  be  effected  in  RCBP  systems  (RCBPS)  - and  in some  caaeB 
domestic  payment  systems  were  identified,  including.  :.  leplt 
uncertainties,  the  lack  of  standardisation,  the dearth of data regardins 
current,  and  expected  future,  volumes  of  RCBP,  and  the  unp·redictabill\tt)y 
of  further  progress  towards  EMU ..  Several  of  these  related  to,  ctffferena~S 
in  public  policy  between  Member  States  and/or  could  only  be  removed~ 
5. 
public  intervention. 
Most  of  the  comments 
described  In  the  paper 
credit  transfer  orders 
generally  agreed  that 
systems  were  technically 
whether  the  substantial 
received  on  the  four  categories  of  pa·~ 
related  to  one  particular  means  of  remote~ 
(henceforth  referred  to  as  transfers).  Bantarna 
improvements  to  retai I  cross-border  transter 
feasible;  however,  several  were  sceptical  as~ 
investments  which  it  was  suggested were  ae~ - 2  -
for  this would  yield  a  sufficiently  high  rate  of  return,  given  the  low 
level  of  demand  In  the  foreseeable  future  for  such  transfers.  This 
viewpoint  was  questioned  by  other  commentators  who  pointed  to  the  fact 
that  some  banks<*>,  and  groups  of  banks,  were  a I ready  developIng,  or 
even  offering,  new  Improved  systems  for  them.  The  majority  of 
commentators  were  willing  to  work  with  the  Commission  on  a  detailed 
study of  the  technical,  and  economic  feasibi I ity of  various  improvements 
to retai I  cross-border  transfer  systems. 
6.  A Conlll.tnlcatlon  on  "Making  payments  in  the  Internal  Market"  was  then 
presented  by  Sir  Leon  Brittan and  Mr.  Van  Mlert  to  the  Commission  on  19 
March  1991.  This  recommended  that  the  expertise  of  both  public  and 
private  sectors  be  harnessed  In  order  to  ensure  rapId  and  effectIve 
fo I low-up  work.  In  order  that  this  work  be  effIcIent I  y  conducted,  It 
proposed  that  two  groups  be  established.  The  first  of  these  - the 
Payment  Systems  Techn I  ca I  Deve I  opment  Group  ( PSTDG)  - wou I  d  focus  on 
technical  Issues  relat lng  to  the  Infrastructures  used  for  RCBP,  while 
the  second  group  - the  Payment  Systems  Users  Liaison  Group  (PSULG)  -
would  consider  the  Questions  of  what  services,  and  forms  of  consumer 
protection,  would  be  reQuired  by  "users" within  the  Internal  Market. 
The  PSTDG,  Its goals  and  work  programme 
7.  The  PSTDG  started  Its  work  in  April  1991.  The  seventeen  members  of  the 
Group  were  drawn  from  the  credit  Industry  (4  from  commercial  banks,  2 
from  savings  banks,  and  I  each  from  the  cooperative  banks,  the 
Glrobanks,  and  third country  banks),  2  from  organisations related to the 
credit  - In  particular  the  payment  - sector  (APACS,  ECU  Bankers' 
Association)  and  from  central  banks  (6  members  nominated  by  the 
Committee  of  EC  Central  Bank  Governors).  The  Group  was  chaired  by  the 
Commission  which  also  held  the  secretariat.  The  Group  held  monthly 
meetings  until  February  1992  (9  meetings  altogether).  It  based  its 
discussions  on  working  papers  many  of  which  were  written  by  individual 
members  of  the  groups  or  organisations  represented  by  them.  Group 
members  participated  throughout  in  a  personal  capacity.  As  a  result  this 
report,  which  conveys  the  findings  of  the  Group  to  the  Commission,  does 
not  necessarily  reflect  the  positions  of  members'  organisations  on  the 
Issues  raised.  In  particular  the participation of  central  banks  does  not 
commit  specific  central  banks,  or  the  Committee  of  EC  Central  Banks  in 
any  way.  The  report  out I ines  the  consensus,  and  not  necessarIly  the 
unanimous,  view  of  th~  Group  on  the  topics  covered  and  it  cannot  be 
assumed  that  every  Group  member  agrees  wIth  each  cone I  us ion  reached 
therein. 
a.  The  Commission's  underlying  belief  is  that  in  the  long-run  the  payment 
systems  used  for  RCBP  in  the  Community,  should  be  as  efficient  as  the· 
most  efficient  systems  for  domestic  payments  within  Member  States  are. 
In  the  short-run,  the  aim  should  be  to  ensure  that  problems  with  RCBP 
systems  do  not  lead  to  such  systems  slowing  the  momentum  behind  the 
Single  Market  programme,  and  being  unable  to  adeQuately  cope  with  the 
Increased demands  for  RCBP  associated with  the progress  towards  EMU.  The  -~ 
function  of  the  PSTDG  was  therefore  to  advIse  the  Commission  on  the 
steps  that  could  be  taken  in  order  for  these objectives  to  be  realised. 
It  would  therefore  be  consulted,  in  the  words  of  the  Decision 
(*)  The  term  bank  is  taken  to  include  alI  Girobanks  in  this. report. 9. 
•. 
10. 
1 1 • 
12. 
• 
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establishing  the  Group  .. on  questions  relating  to  the  Integration  of 
payment  systems  of  the  technical  kind,  In  particular  on  the  feasibility 
of  and  requirements  for  I lnkages  between  clearing systems,  on  matters of 
organisation,  costs,  standardisation and  similar aspects". 
The  scope  of  the  Group's  work  was  defined  as  follows  It  would 
concentrate on  systems  used  for  retail  cross-border  payments,  and  the Ad 
Hoc  Working  Group  on  EC  Payment  Systems,  established by  the Committee  of 
EC  Central  Banks  Governors,  would  primarily  focus  on  large value payment 
systems  in  the Community  In  the  light of  the Single Market  programme  and 
EMU.  (The  latter  group  has  been  commissioned  to  report  to  EC  Central 
Bank  Governors  in  May  1992.)  It  was  considered  that  this  well-defined 
division  of  labour,  together  with  cross...membership  between  the  two 
groups,  would  avoid  any  unnecessary  duplication of work.  However,  It was 
acknowledged  that  certain  issues  e.g.  public  policy  regarding 
competition  and  access  - were  common  to both  groups  and  would  therefore 
be  discussed  in  both  fora.  It  was  noted  that  the  agreements  reached  In 
Maastricht  in  December  (towards  the  end  of  the  Group's  life) 
particularly  those  relating  to  the  role  of  the  European  Monetary 
Institute and  the  European  Central  Bank,  had  Important  implications  for 
the  future  involvement  of  particular  Community  institutions  in  the  area 
of  RCBPS.  Such  imp I I  cat ions  were  not  explored  by  the  Group,  which 
concentrated mainly  on  the  need  for  action  in  this  field  by  all  parties 
concerned,  and  less  on  the  allocation  of  responsibility  between 
institutions. 
Within  RCBP  It  would  focus  on  re110te  payments,  espec·ially  electronic 
funds  transfers,  rather  than  face-to-face  payments.  However,  all  RCBP 
would  be  covered  by  the  Group  to  some  extent,  e.g.  in  establishing  the 
size of  the  market  and  in  addressing  the  key  issues  I isted  in  paragraph 
12  below. 
The  Group's  work  programme  was  divided  into  three  parts.  The  first 
related  to  the  need  for  providers  of  RCBP  systems  to  have  better 
Information  on  the  size  of  the  overall  markets  that  they  were  serving 
and  the  I  nfrastructura I  developments  that  were  underway.  In  part leu lar 
the  Group  would  seek  to  ascertain  the  current  volume  and  value  of  the 
main  types  of  RCBP,  to  forecast  future  volumes  and  values,  and  to 
quantify  the  costs  associated with  such  payments.  It  would  also examine 
the  type  of  RCBPS  that  were  currently  In  use,  or  planned. 
Second,  the  Group  would  consider  a  series of  key  Issues whfch  would  need 
to be  addressed  if  RCBPS  were  to be  significantly  improved.  These  issues 
related  to  : 
- the standards used  In  RCBPS; 
-telecommunication  infrastructures; 
-differences  between  Member  States'  national  legislation  regarding 
payments; 
-European Community  (EC)  competition pol icy; 
- EC  legislation concerning  access  to,  and  membership  of,  RCBPS; 
-the systemic  risk  in,  and  reflecting this,  the  regulation of,  RCBPS; 
-the  distinction  in  most  Member  States  between  resident.  and  non-
resident  accounts,  for  reporting purposes; 
-the Commission's  proposed  legislation on  data  protection. 
Each  of  these  issues  is  discussed  below.  Several  of  them,  e.g. 
standards,  have  an  important  third  country  dimension,  which  is referred 
to  in  the sections on  these particular  issues. - 4  -
The  Identification  of  promising  ways  of  Improving  RCBP  systems  -
Including  the possibility of  linking auta.ated clearing hoUses  (ACHs)  or 
eQUivalent  syst ..  s  - was  viewed  as  the  third  component  of  the  Group's 
work  programme. 
13.  Three  of  the papers submitted by  Group  members  In  the  light of  this work 
programme- I.e.  those  on  Infrastructures,  standards  and  legal  Issues-
are  included  as  Appendices  to  this  report,  together  with  three  by  the 
Commission  on  terminology,  guidelines  on  competition  and  reporting 
reQuirements.  Other  papers  submitted  to  the  Group  on  systemic  risk  and 
telecommunications  are available from  the Commission. 
• ' 
~ 
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B.  STOCK-TAKING  EXERCISE 
Volumes 
14.  Data  relating  to  RCBP  are  collected  neither  by  the  public  authorities 
nor  the  banks  that  facilitate  such  payments.  Thus,  th~exercise by  the 
European  Banking  Feder at ion  to  collect  data  on  such  payments  - In 
response  to  the  Commission's  Invitation  to  do  so  - represented  a  path-
breaking  step.  Paragraph  15  spells out  the  health  warnings  attached  to 
the  figures  that  they  produced  - which  are  set  out  In  Tables  1  to  3  -
while  paragraphs  16-19  sets  out  the  tentative  conclusions  that  can  be 
drawn  from  them. 
caveats 
15.  The  data  provided  are  not  strictly  comparable  across,  and  SOIHtl•s 
within,  Member  States,  due  to  differences  In  the  definitions used  (e.g. 
that  for  retail)  the  absence  of  a  breakdown  between  EC  and  non-EC  data 
in  some  cases,  and  differences  in  the  rei iabl I lty of  the data  (e.g.  some 
are  merely  estimates).  Finally,  It  should  be  noted  that  as  each  country 
Includes  both  remittances and  receipts amongst  its own  figures for  RCBP. 
any  est I  mate  of  tot  a 1  Commun 1  ty  RCBP  shou I  d  be  ha If  the  swa  of  such 
individual  Member  State totals,  and  not  their  aggregate. 
16.  Table  1  shows  the  volumes  of  remote,  and  face-to-face,  retail  pa,..nta 
from,  and  to,  four  large  Uember  States.  Face-to-face  payments  dominate 
such  payments,  accounting  for  three  Quarters  of  their  total.  Within 
face-to-face  payments,  cards  are  much  more  important  than  EurocheQues, 
except  in  Germany  where  Eurocheques  are  widely  used.  Total  RCBP 
represent  less  than  1X  of  domestic  payments  in  France  and  the  UK,  but 
about  2X  in  Italy. 
TA8LE  1  ;  MAIN  CHANNELS  OF  INTRA-EC  RETAIL  CROSS-BORDER  PAYMEN!S 
(mns  of  transactions unless otherwise stated) 
Remote 
Threahold  Credit  Oaequea 
tranafera 
F'ace  to  face 
Eurochequea  Carda 
Total 
retai I 
Addendum 
A  I I  croa..,.or  dar  PGJIILI 
all -...atic ~- ~) 
F'rance  10  KF'  3.8  3.7  8.0  22.9  38.1  0.1 
0.5 • 
1.8 
0.8 
Germany  ow  5.000  6.2  1.9  18.4  11.8  38.1 
Italy  Lira 3  mn  2.4  n/a  3.3  8.7  14.4 
tJ(  [.f  1.000]  4.8  5.8  5.0  24.8  40.2 
•  All  intro-EC croaa-border  payment•  form  the  numerator. 
17.  Table  2  overleaf  shows  intra-EC  cross-border  payments  by  cheQUes,  cards 
and  transfers as a  proportion of  domestic  payments  using  the sa.e media. 
(Where  an  lntra-EC  figure  is  not  available  total  cross-border  payments 
have  been  used.)  The  final  column  shows  total  intra-EC  cross-border 
payments  as  a  proportion  of  tot  a 1  domestic  payments.  The  figures  are 
markedly  higher  in  the  smaller  Member  States- e.g.  Belgium  and  Greece-
than  in  the  larger  ones  such  as  the  Uk  and  France. - 6  -
IMLE 2  ;  MAIN  CHANNELS  OF  I  NJRA-EC  CROSS-BORDER  PAYMENJS 
(proportion of  lntra-EC,  In  total  (Including domestic)  payments  via 
the channel  In  Question- brackets  Indicate  that  lntra-EC data are 
unavailable and  all  cross-border  used  Instead) 
All  figures are percentages 
Transfers  CheQues  Cards  Total 
Belgium  3.<4  [ 1.  5]  [10]  <4 
France  0.5  0.1  1.9  0.6 
Greece  15  12  12  12 
Italy  0.8  0.5  [2<4]  n/a 
Netherlands  [0.17]  [8.6]  [53]  [2.8] 
Portugal  141.7  1.  5  21.3  1.8 
UK  0.5  0.<4  2.7  0.8 
18.  Finally,  Table  3  focusses  on  retail  cross-border  transfers  In  the  EC. 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
The  def In 1  t I  on  of  ret  a II  that  Is  used  var les  between  Member  States, 
ranging  from  1.4100  to  2.500  ecu.  The  aggregate  of  such  transfers  Ia 
around  35  mill ion  for  the 7  Member  States concerned.  Retail  cross-border 
transfers  in  the  EC  account  for  a  high  proportion- I.e.  around  a  half-
of  all  cross-border  transfers  involving  these  Member  States.  However, 
they  are dwarfed  by.total  domestic  transfers,  amounting  for  only  0.2X to 
o.ss of  domestic  transfers  In  the  41  largest  countries  In  Table  3,  though 
higher  proportions  in  smaller  Member  States  (e.g.  2.3S  In  Belgium).  The 
figures  in  the  final  column  of  Table  3  are  of  some  global  ones  and 
conceal  the  fact  that  transfers  between  contiguous  regions of  different 
Member  States  are  often  a  significantly  higher  proportion  of  total 
(including  domestic)  transfers  from  such  regions  than  the  figure  In  the 
final  column  for  the Member  State as a  whole.  This caveat  applies to all 
types of  RCBP. 
IA9LE  3  ;  INJRA-EC  RETAIL  CROSS-BORDER  TRANSFERS  CRCBTl 
Threshold  Volume  of  RCBT/a II*  CBT  RCBT/ 
(ecu  000)  RCBT  (mns)  (X)  all* transfers  (S) 
1 .4  4  ,. "  0.3  OJ \I 
2.5  8  65  0.2 
2.0  2  40  0.5 
Luxembourg  2.4  2  61  n/a 
Netherlands  2.1  41  40  0.3 
UK  1.  4  5  40  0.5 
Belgium  **  2.4  11  69  2.3 
*  AI  I,  not  simply  intra-EC,  cross-border  transfers. 
**  AI  I  retai I  cross-border  payments,  not  simply  intra-EC  payments  are  included 
for  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands. 
#J 
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19.  The  main  conclusions from  Tables  1  to 3  are  that  : 
-retail cross-border  pa,..nts within  the  EC  currently  represent  a  very 
low  proportion  of  total  transfers  In  these  countries,  especiaiiJ  In 
the  large u..ber States; 
retail  cross-border  transfers  within  the  EC  CQiaPr lse  a  subatantlal 
proportion- around half- of all  cross-border  transfers; 
- r..,te  cross-border  paYMnts  are  less  ce•on  than  face  to  face 
pa~nts; 
- face  to face cross-border  pa~nts Involve ..  lnly cards. 
20.  Tables  1  to  3  are  primarily  concerned  with  lntra-EC  payments.  The  data 
for  certain  countries  within  the  European  Economic  Area,  e.g.  SWeden. 
show  that  the  volume  of  RCBP  Involving  such  countr les  and  the  EC  is 
significant  and  would  therefore  form  a  significant  part  of  any  global 
estimate  of  the  volume  of  RCBP  Involving  EC  members.  Of  course,  any 
review  of  the  volume  of  EC  retail  cross-border  payments  would  include 
payments  Involving  all  third  countries  (whether  within  the  European 
Economic  Area  or  not)  but  such  data  are  scarcer  than  those  pertaining 
simply  to the  EC. 
21.  In  the extremely  short-timespan allowed,  the European  Banking  Federation 
and  Group  members  were  unable  to  collect  time-series  data  on  volu.es. 
However,  figures  suppl led  by  EurocheQue  show  a  slight  decline  in  cheques 
involving  both  EC  and  EFTA  countries  between  1988  and  1990.  The  main 
reason  for  this  was  the  cross-border  opening  of  ATMs  to  EurocheQUe 
cards.  Not  surpr 1  s 1  ng 1  y  the  number  of  cross-border  ATM  transact ions 
based  on  Eurocheque  cards  increased  markedly  over  this  period. 
Expenditure  by  Eurocard  and  Vi sa  card  ho 1  ders,  outside  the  country  of 
issue,  rose  sharply over  the  period  from  1988  to  1990. 
Forecasting future  volumes 
22.  It  is extremely difficult  to  forecast  future  volumes  for  various :reasons 
including  the  following  :  there  is  no  solid  base  (In  terms  of  existing 
volumes)  to build upon,  and  economic  forecasting models  focus  on  a ..all 
number  of  macro-economic  variables  and  therefore  do  not  pick  out 
variables  such  as  intra-EC  RCBP.  Notwithstanding  these  and  other 
difficulties,  the  Group  considered  what  might  happen  to  the  vo1ur.16  of 
such  payments.  Their  tentative  conclusions  were  as  follows  :  the  rapid 
growth  in  intra-EC  trade,  associated  with  the  Single  Market,  that  Js 
forecast  for  the  next  few  years  will  drive  upwards  the  volume  of  RCBP 
within  the  Convnunlty.  The  "Single Market  effect''  arises not  simply  front 
the  removal  of  existIng  barr I  ers  to  the  free  movement  of  goods  and 
services,  but  also  to  that  of  labour  and  capital.  A  further  stimulus 
will  come  from  the  move  towards  EMU,  especially  the  expected  reduction 
in  intra-EC  currency  risk  associated with  this,  and  the  removal  of  this 
risk  altogether  that  will  come  about  when  individual  EC  currencies  are 
replaced  by  a  single  EC  currency,  by  1999  at  the  latest.  However  certain 
factors,  such  as  tax  harmonisation,  will  serve  to  depress  the growth  of 
such  payments  and  there  is  therefore unlikely,  ceteris paribus,  to be a 
dramatic  surge  in  such  payments. - 8  -
23.  The  most  important  factor  missing  from  this  analysis  is  the  elasticity 
of  the  volume  of  RCBP  to  the  charges  made  for  them.  It  Is  considered 
likely  that  Improvements  In  infrastructure  which  reduce  such  charges, 
and  Indeed  Improve  the  other  terms  (e.g.  tIme-spans)  associ a ted  w  1  th 
them,  could  lead  to  a  rise  In  volu.es.  However,  It  Is  difficult  to 
Quantify with  confidence  how  large this effect would  be. 
Charges 
24.  Data  relating  to  charges  typically  levied  on  transfers of  ecu  1.000  In 
10  Member  States are  summarised  In  Table  4.  It  should  be  noted  that  the 
sample  of  banks  In  the  survey  was  small;  In  addition  Individual  banks 
are  free  In  most  countries  to set  their  own  charges  and  may  accordingly 
levy  charges  significantly  different  from  these.  What  emerges  Is  that 
these  charges  may  vary  markedly  between  banks- In  the  same,  as well  as 
In  different,  Member  States  - and  that  they  account  for  a  significant 
percentage  - I.e.  1X  to  4X  for  outgoing  payment  orders  depending  on 
whether  the  customary  or  the  urgent  procedure  Is  used  (see  Tab I  e  4 
below>  -of  the  value  of  such  payments.  By  contrast,  the  charges  for 
domestic  transfers of  the  same  magnitude  are  negligible.  The  charges  on 
cross-border  transfers  of  ecu  1. 000  are  divided  between  commission  to 
the  banks  concerned,  transmission  charges,  taxes  (VAT,  plus  in  some 
Member  States  fixed-rate  taxes)  and  foreign  exchange  commission.  The 
rate  currently  used  for  the  latter  component  of  the  charges  var les 
around  an  average  of  2"/""  on  the  amount  of  the  outgoing  order  and  a 
minimum  amount  of  between  ecu  2-5.  The  foreign  exchange  commission 
amounts  to  a  small  proportion only of  the overall  charge- with  regard  to 
such  transfers.  (This  component  will  of  course  disappear  in  the  case  of 
intra-EC cross-border  payments  when  a  single  EC  currency  Is  Introduced.) 
IA8LE  4  ;  CHARGES  IN  ECU  ON  OUTGQING  CROSS-BORDER  PAYMENT  ORDERS 
OF  ECU  1000  CALL  CHARGES  PAYA8LE  BY  THE  REMITTER> 
Customary  procedure  Urgent  procedure 
8  - 17  16  - 39 
Part of  charges 
represented  by 
foreign exchange 
commission 
2  - 5 
25 ..  During  the  Group's  discussion  it  was  noted  that  banks  are  Increasingly 
charging  their  customers  the  full  cost  of  providing  RCBP  (and  indeed  al 1 
other>  services.  Formerly  they  often  cross-subsidised  them  with  profits 
made  by  providing other  services. 
Infrastructures (see Appendix  2) 
26.  In  order  to  find  out  what  was  actually  happening,  or  being  planned,  in 
the  field  of  RCBP  systems,  the  Group  Invited  several  organisations 
active  In  this  field  to  make  presentations  to  the  Group.  These 
organisations  included  the  Confederation  lnternationale  du  Credit 
Populalre  (CICP)  Bank  of  Scotland,  Eurocard  International,  the  European 
Savings  Banks  Group,  the  Society  for  Worldwide  Interbank  Financial 
Telecommunications  (SWIFT)  and  Visa. 
) 
;  .. • 
... 
•  .. 
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27.  Paragraphs  28-34  below  summarise  the  Group's  discussions  on 
infrastructures  taking  Into  account,  inter  alia,  Appendix  2  on 
Infrastructures and  the  presentations made  to the  Group . 
Recent  developments 
28.  Several  new  systems  have  been  Introduced,  with  the  specific  purpose  of 
facilitating RCBP  in  recent  years.  The  TIPA  (Transfer  Interbank  Payments 
Automated)  system of  the Calsses Centrales des  Banques  Populalres  (CCBP) 
provides one  example.  This  Is  based  on  agreement  between  member  banks  on 
common  standards/formatting  arrangements  for  file  transfers  between 
different  countries,  a  payment  systems  "esperanto"  in  effect.  The  TIPA 
scheme  Is  essent Iaiiy  an  example  of  a  "bank  to  bank"  scheme  (see 
category  (c)  In  Append~x  2).  The  Bank  of  Scotland's  Trans-continental 
Automated  Payment  Service  (TAPS)  provides  another  example  of  an 
operational,  bank  to  bank,  system.  In  this  case  the  Bank  of  Scotland 
transfers  payment  orders  Into  the  shape  (format,  etc.)  required  by  the 
clearing  system  In  the  country  of  the  receiving  correspondent  bank, 
which  then  transfers funds  to  the beneficiary's account  In  that  country. 
29.  Both  these  schemes  - operat lonal  before  the  Commission's  Discussion 
Paper  appeared  in  September  1990  - involved  a  long  gestation  period. 
Neither  are  designed  simply  for  EC  Member  States,  but  aim  to  provide  a 
world-wide  service.  (The  Group  consider  that  Infrastructures  -.ast  be 
able  to  deal  with  RCBP  to,  and  from,  third countries,  if  they  are  to  be 
successful.)  Numerous  other  schemes,  e.g.  the  Royal  Bank  of  Scotland's 
IBOS,  exist,  which  are based  on  automated  correspondent  banking. 
Schemes  in  the pipe I ine 
30.  There  are  numerous  other  schemes  in  the  pipe I ine.  Some  involve  closed 
networks  which  offer  added  value  services  (e.g.  currency  conversion  and 
settlement).  The  Giro  network,  which  wi  I I  be  operational  in  1992, 
provides  such  an  example. 
31.  Both  Eurocard  and  Visa  are  investigating whether  it would  be  feasible  to 
adapt  infrastructures  used  for  card  operations  to  deal  with  remote 
retai I  cross-border  transfers.  Visa  e.g.  note  th:t  the  infrastructure 
underpinning  their  card operations  in  the  US  has  been  used  to establish 
an  ACH,  and  consider  that  it  might  be  possible  to  undertake  a  similar 
exercise  in  Europe.  However,  they  also  observe  that  the  European 
situation  is  significantly  different  to  that  In  the  US  (e.g.  twelve 
currencies  exist  as  against  one  in  the  US).  The  feasibility  of  an 
alternative  method  (to  that  of  setting  up  a  European  ACH)  of  utilising 
their  card  Infrastructure  for  remote  cross-border  transfers  Is  already 
being  examined  in  detail.  This  relates  to  the  possibility of  providing 
an  "International  Money  Transmission  service".  This  service,  which  could 
be  operational  by  late  1992,  would  not  require  the  beneficiary  Involved 
in  a  remote  transfer  to  have  a  Visa  card,  but  would  require  that  the 
paying  bank  was  informed  of  the  beneficiary's  name  and  account  number. 
The  intention  is  that  the  period  between  the  time  a  payment  order  is 
submitted  by  the  payer,  and  funds  subsequently  being  made  available  to 
the  beneficiary,  be  a  maximum  of  five  days.  This  service  wi  11  be 
especially  useful  for  non-urgent,  one-off,  low  value  (under  ecu  2.000 
approximately)  payments.  This  Visa  scheme  also high I ights  the  point  that 
s i  nee  there  are  var i  ous  types  of  RCBP,  the  demand  to  make  them  may 
optimally be  satisfied via  a  variety of systems,  each  designed  primarily 
for  a  particular  segment  of  the overal I market.  · - 10  -
32.  Other  work  in  train  includes  that  by  SWIFT,  which  is  investigating 
a I ternat I  ves  to  the  MT1 00  message  format  conunon I  y  used  for  RCBP,  in 
part lcular  faclll t les  for  bulk  messages  and  ED IFACT.  SWIFT's  work  In 
this area carries potential  benefits for  several  types of  RCBP  systems-
e.g.  It  could  lead  to  more  efficient  correspondent  banking,  or  be 
employed  In  any  system  based on  linking ACHs. 
33.  Various  other  organisations  are  considering  what  more  they  might  do  In 
the  area of  RCBP.  This  category  includes  Eurocard  International  and  the 
European  Sav 1  ngs  Banks  Group.  In  add It I  on  sever  a I  ScandInavIan  banks 
(Including  some  from  Denmark)  are  examining  a  proposal  to  offer  RCBP 
services,  using a  variant of  the  ACH  to ACH  model. 
34.  The  Group's  analysis,  and  recommendations,  concerning  the  factors  that 
Impede  the  private  sector's  efforts  to  provide  more  efficient 
Infrastructures  for  RCBP,  are set out  In  paragraphs  35-119  below.  There 
Is  unanimous  agreement  that  work  In  this  field,  by  Inter  alIa  the 
Commission,  will  be  conducive  to  the  cause  of  establishing  better  RCBP 
systems. 
• • 
.. 
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C.  KEY  ISSUES  TO  BE  AQDBESSED 
I ,  Standards {see Appendix  3) 
35.  In  order  to assess whether  the  I  ack  of approprIate standards present.s an 
obstacle  to  the  development  of  BCBP  systems  which  can  meet  the needs of 
the  post-1992  Internal  market  it  Is  helpful  to distinguish between  three 
types  of  standards  technical,  applications,  and  operational. 
standards. 
36.  Technical  standards  are  typically  Inter-sectoral,  i.e.  they  appty  to 
more  than  one  sector.  A technical  standard  can  be  set  at  a  number  of 
levels- International,  regional  or  national- but  at all  levels will be 
In  the  public  domain.  Essentially  a  technical  standard  relates  to  a 
generic  part  of  the  Infrastructure which  supports  payment  systems.  That 
Is  to  say  that  the  standard applies  to something  which  Is  not  on.ly  used 
In  payment  systems,  but  which  also applies  to systems  In  other  sectors. 
An  example  Is  the  standard  for  the  magnetic  stripe  material  used  as  a 
storage  medium  on  payment  cards,  and  other  plastic  cards.  There  may  be 
more  than  one  agreed  standard  for  any  part i  cuI ar  aspect  of  the •yst• 
and  users wi  II  decide  which  to apply. 
37.  App II cat ion  standards  are  not  i nter-sectora I,  but  can  be  agreed  .at  two 
levels.  The  first  relates  to  standards  that  cover  the  requirements  of 
one  sector  and  are  developed  by  that  sector  for  its use  alone.  Examples 
are  cheque  codeline  formats  or  magnetic  track  data  formats.  The  second 
level  is  a  system  specific  standard,  perhaps  better  known  as  a 
specification  developed  by  the  members  of  a  particular  system  for 
application only within  that  system. 
38.  Ope rat iona I  standards  cover  the  agreements  whIch  have  to  be  reached, 
upon  the operation of  individual  systems,  e.g.  relating to  legal  matters 
{e.g.  such  as  requirements  regarding  evidence)  and  issues  such  as 
procedures,  service  levels,  settlement,  membership  criteria,  etc  ..  Sue" 
standards are primarily  the concerns of members  of  each  payment  system. 
39.  Appendix  3 provides  a  description  how  each  type  of  standard  is created; 
it also  identifies the areas  in  which  changes  in  standards are eit'her  in 
train,  or  likely  to  be  needed,  for  each  of  the  main  channels  of  cross-
border  payment  are  identified.  The  focus  of  the  report  in  Appendix  3  is 
on  technical,  and  applications,  standards on  the  basis  that  operational 
standards  can  largely  be  left  to  the  members  of  specific  payment 
systems.  However,  several  Group  members  considered  that  certain 
operational  standards  could  usefully  be  agreed  at  a  wider,  e.g. 
European,  I  eve I . 
40.  The  main  European  Credit  Sector  Associations  have  set  up  a  Committ·ee  on 
European  Banking  Standards  (CEBS).  This  will  produce  proposals  to  CEH 
(Comite  European  de  Normalisation>  on  public domain  technical  standards, 
and  create  sectoral  application  standards- some  of  which  will  atso be 
in  the pub I ic  domain.  Its obJect lve  in  this wi  II  be  to meet  the needs  o·f 
the  European  banking  Industry,  taking  into  account  the  international 
situation  In  this area.  The  Group  considers  it appropriate and  important 
that  this body  be  accepted  as a  banking  sector  "Associated Standardising 
Body"  {ASB)  by  CEN,  once  such  acceptance  had  been  formally  requested by 
the  CEBS.  CEN's  response  to  such  requests  Is  determined  main.ly  oy  tbe 
advice  it  receives  from  DG  XIII  of  the  European  Commission. - 12  -
41.  The  participation of  the  European  banks  in  the  work  of  ISO,  UN/EDIFACT, 
CEN,  and  now  the CEBS  Indicates  that  the  Industry  Is  capable of ensuring 
that  the  standards  necessary  for  Improved  payment  systems  will  be 
produced  In  good  time. 
42.  our ing  the  discussion  of  Appendix  3,  var lous  additional  points  were 
made.  First,  the  Group  emphasizes  the  importance  of  securing  compatible 
wor ld-wlde  agreements  on  standards.  The  nature  of  the  I Iatson  between 
the  CEBS  <under  the  auspices  of  the  CEN)  and  ISO  would  be  crucial  In 
this regard.  The  ability of  European  banks  to achieve  this goal  would  be 
enhanced  considerably were  the  CEBS  to allow  the membership  of countries 
within the newly  established European  Economic  Area. 
43.  Second,  they  note  that  the  struggle  to  win  acceptance  for  those 
standards  used  for  transfers  is  less  commercially  sensitive  than  It  is 
in  the sphere of plastic <especially chip)  cards. 
44.  Third,  they observe  that  the  level  of  agreement  on  standards should also 
be  seen  in  conJunction  with  competition policy- e.g.  the  acceptance of 
one  bank•s/group  of  banks•  technical  and  applications  standards,  could 
put  It  at  a  competitive  advantage  over  its  rivals  and  thus  reduce 
competition. 
45.  Fourth,  regarding  the  Question  of  whether  to  concentrate  work  on 
technical  or  application  standards,  some  Group  members  assign  a  higher 
priority  to  securing  agreement  on  application,  than  on  technical, 
standards,  as  software  is  ava i I  ab I  e  whIch  can  I Ink  systems  based  on 
different  technical  standards.  However  they  also  note  that  such  linkage 
can  be  prohibitively costly. 
46.  The  ways  in  which  different  domestic  formats  can  be  reconciled  are 
explored  in  part  under  the  section on  ACH  linkage  below  and  Appendix  2 
on  infrastructures.  The  main  problem  Is  that  translation  Into  a  common 
international  format,  e.g.  SWIFT<*>,  reQuires  that  the  latter  format 
Includes  all  relevant  information  In  the  domestic  format,  and  vice 
versa.  SWIFT  is seeking  to widen  its format  to this end.  The  adoption of 
EDIFACT  Is  considered  a  long-term  solution  in  this  area,  which  Is  not 
relevant  to  the  Group's  main  goal  of  ident lfylng  short-,  to  MdiUit-, 
term,  means  of  improving  RCBP  systems. 
47.  There  was  a  consensus  that  while  further  agreements  on  standards are not 
a  sine  Qua  non  for  the  development  of  Improved  RCBP,  they  would  be 
extremely  conducive  to  such  developments.  Their  benefit  would  be 
magnified  to  the  extent  that  they  were  accompanied  by  improvements  in 
other  areas,  e.g.  clearing  and  settlement.  However,  even  without  such 
assistance  they  could  reduce  the  costs  of  RCBP.  Thus  the  cost  of  data 
capture/editing  which  represents  the  bulk  of  the  costs  of 
international  transfers,  partly· because  it  Is  done  manually  - could  be 
reduced  through  the  application  of  uniform  standards,  which  facilitate 
automation.  Early  agreement  on  standards concerning  : 
-bank  Identification  codes  (Including  any  necessary  consideration  of 
Individual  account  numbers; 
- message  formats; 
- and,  possibly,  a  "European  test  key"  that  at lowed  incoming  payments  to 
be  handled  automatically without  any  manual  input; 
would  be  especial IY  useful. 
(*)  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  SWIFT  exclude  certain Girobanks. 
• 
•  ,. • 
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The  suggestion  that  account  holders should  put  their  account  number  (and 
bank)  on  their  notepaper  was  also  put  forward,  however,  it  was  agreed 
that  this  particular  Idea  reQuired  further  examination  (e.g.  regarding 
Its  securIty  Imp II cat tons),  before  the  Group  cou I  d  take  a  collect tw 
view  on  it . 
conclusions 
48.  The  Group  concludes  that  while  the  Infrastructures  required  to  eecure 
the necessary degree of agr ....  nt on  technical/application standards are 
In  place,  certain  priorities  are  already  visible  and  ought  to  tae 
underlined.  These  related to those standards which  would  facilitate tbe 
auta.atlon of the routing,  and  processing, of  RCBP  Including  those : 
-allowing the custa.er,  his bank  and  the account,to be  Identified (bank 
Identifier codes); 
-used for credit transfers and  direct debiting. 
By  contrast,  the need  to standardise cheque  codellnes should be  accor~ 
a  low  priority. 
In  addition  the  CEBS  should  be  rapidly  accorded  ASB  status by  CEN  once 
It has  reQuested  such  status. 
11.  Telecommunications 
49.  The  cost  of  telecommunications  reQuired  in  order  to  facilitate  RCBP  can 
represent  a  significant  proportion of  the  total  costs of  such  payments-
for  example  lOX  to  20X  for  an  ecu  100  cross-border  transfer.  Tn1s 
proportion  is  much  higher  than  it  is  in  the  case  for  .oat  other 
financial  services  (Including  those  relating  to  the  provision of  large-
value,  cross-border  payment  services)  and  indeed  non-financlai  servJces. 
It  is  therefore clear  that  improved  efficiency  in  the  telecommunications 
sector  could  have  a  maJor  effect  on  the  cost  of  RCBP.  The  efficiency of 
the  sector  also  has  imp I teat Ions  for  the  time-spans  (Including  tu 
variability)  of  RCBP.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  efficiency  -
broadly  defined- of  a  particular  RCBP  systems,  may  be  significantly 
impaired  If  the  telecommunication  sector  :n  one  of  the  countries 
participating  in  the  system,  is  significantly  less  efficient  than  in 
other  participating countries.  For  this  reason,  there  is an  incentive to 
omit  such  ••laggard  ..  countries  from  participating  in  the  syst•  In  tfte 
first  place. 
50.  In  practice,  the market  for  telecommunication  services  is  far  from  being 
a  perfect one- in  reflection of  this 
•.  -costs  (tariffs)  for  users  vary  considerably  between  different 
categories  of  users  (e.g.  business  and  consumer  users>  ana  between 
countries; 
-it  is  sometimes  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  use  the  eQuipment 
that  is  most  appropriate  for  a  participant  in  a  particular  ACBP 
system; 
the  Quality  of  service  is  mixed  and  it  is  therefore  extreme:1y 
difficult  for  banks  to  know  the  costs/time-spans  of  facilitating ACBP 
in  advance; - 14  -
banks  must  deal  with  numerous  bodies  for  administrative purposes,  even 
though  it  would  be  much  more  efficient  for  them  to  interface  with  a 
single entity for  such  purposes; 
- governments  In  different  Member  States  levy  different  rates of  tax  on 
telecommunication  services,  exacerbating  disparities  in  costs  between 
such  States. 
51.  The  Question  therefore  is  what  can  be  done  to  produce  a  more  efficient 
market  in  telecommunication  services. 
Cone I  us Ions 
52.  The  Group  sees .ore cc:.petltlon,  Including deregulation,  as providing a 
large  part  of  the  answer.  certain  Group  ..-bera  attest  to  the 
beneficial  effect  of  those  liberalising  ateps  that  have  already  been 
taken  - often  at  the  Instigation  of  the  CO..Iaslon  - In  their 
countr lea.  They  are  encouraged  to  see  that  deregulatIon  cont lnuea  to 
represent  the  EC  official  policy  In  this  sector  - see  e.g.  the 
•Guidelines  on  the  Application  of  EEC  Competition  Rules  In  the 
Telecommunication  Sector•  (C(91)1437  final).  They  consider  It 
extremely  Important  that  EC  coaapet It I  on  policy  (enshrIned  In  Art lcles 
85,  86  and  90  of  the  Treaty)  Is effectively enforced.  Several  benefits 
wou 1  d  accrue  to  banks  were  such  poI I  c les  to  be  pursued;  they  wou I  d  be 
supplied  with  .are  appropriate  levels  of  technology  at  econo.lc 
pr 1  ces;  1  n  add 1  t I  on,  teleeaa..tn  I  cat I  on  provIders  wou I  d  be  prevented 
from  establishing  standards  syst ..  (e.g.  In  the  area· of  plastic  chip 
cards)  that  are.  lnCQIIPatlble  with  standards  used  by  banks,  and  thereby 
p  1  ace  such  prov 1  ders  at  an  unfa 1  r  advantage  over  banks  In  the  urket 
for  the  pa~nt services concerned. 
53.  Finally,  It  Is  Important  In  this area  of  payment  syst ..  s  (as  Indeed  In 
other  areas),  that  standards  are  agreed  on  as  early  as  possible,  If 
significant  cost  savings  are  to  be  realised.  The  changes  In  the 
Infrastructures  used  for  sett lng  standards  set  out  In  the  standard 
section of  this paper  - notably  the  acceptance of  the  CEBS  as  an  ASB  -
would  clearly be  helpful  In  this regard. 
54.  Looking  forward,  some  see  the  provision  of  a  public,  interlinked, 
i nternat iona I  te I  ecommun i cat Ions  network.  based  on  open  network 
provision  rules  (on  the  I ines  of  Directive 90/387)  as  being  the ultimate 
obJective. 
55.  As  well  as  supporting  the  broad  proposals  set  out  above,  some  Group 
members  reconvnend  that  a  code  of  conduct  be  estab II shed  for 
telecommunication  providers,  which  is  divided  into  a  general  section 
(recommending,  Inter  alia,  the  acceptance  of  ONP)  and  one  focussed  more 
particularly on  the needs  of  the  financial  sector. 
111.  Legal  Issues  (Appendix  4) 
Introduction 
56.  The  Group  considered  a  range  of  legal  issues which  might  to a  greater or 
lesser  extent  affect  the  creation of  cross-border  payment  systems.  This 
was  done  on  the basis of Appendix  4. 
• 
.• •  .. 
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57.  The  legal  Issues  examined  all  stem  from  the  fact  that  cross-border 
payments  Involve  the  legal  systems  of  at  least  two  countries.  Combined 
wl th  the  fact  that  a  number  of  dIfferences  ex 1st  between  the  1  awe  of 
Member  States,  affecting  payments,  this  means  that  there  is  scope  for 
problems  caused  by  legal  uncertainty  and  by  inconsistent  or  conflicting 
laws.  For  the  purpose  of analysis a  distinction  is drawn  between  payment 
Instruments  and  payment  systems. 
58.  A summary  of  the  Issues  Is set out  in  the  rest of  this paragraph. 
Payment  Instruments 
Cheques 
General  differences  exist  between  Member  States  adhering  to  the  Geneva 
Convention  1931  and  others and  (to a  lesser  extent)  differences between 
Geneva  Convention  Member  States on  certain questions. 
There  are  different  rules  concerning  the  rights  of  the  bearer  over  the 
funds  in  the  drawer's account. 
Different  rules on  stopping payment  of  cheques  by  drawers. 
Different  consequences  of  issuing cheques  uncovered  by  funds. 
Transfers 
Structural  differences  :  some  Member  States  have  a  comprehensive  legal 
framework  for  transfers,  others  operate  on  the  basis  of  general  legal 
doctrines and  case  law. 
Rules  on  the  time  of  irrevocability  (of  the  payment  order)  and  finality 
(when  the  underlying obi lgation  is extinguished)  differ. 
Payment  cards 
Different  levels  of  Implementation  of  the  Commission's  1987  and  1'988 
Recommendations. 
Differences  in  non-contractual  aspects,  e.g.  legal  tender,  finality of 
payments,  revocability,  proof,  etc. 
Debit  orders 
Absence  of specific  legal  provisions and  differences  in  Jurisprudence. 
Payment  systems 
Finality of settlement 
Differences as  to  the moment  when  settlement  between  the parties becomes 
final  ((1)  transaction  recorded  by  system;  (2)  declaration  of  clearing 
organisation;  (3)  entry  of  balances  onto  accounts  at  central  bank; 
(4)  end  of  accounting  day). 
Differences  in  bankruptcy  rules  affecting  a  participant  (and  thUs 
confl ictlng  with  the  above)  invalidating  payments  made  by  bankrupt 
participant with  effect  back  to  oo.oo  hours  on  date  of  declaration. - 16  -
Responsibilities of participants 
The  laws  on  responsibility  of  banks  as  between  themselves  and  towards  their 
customers  differ  as does  the scope  for  contractual  I imitations of  liability. 
Priorities 
59.  The  Group  considers  that  these  Issues  are  not  •preconditions•  to  the 
establishment  of  the  links  between  retail  payment  systems  for  which  the 
Group  Is  prepar lng  the  ground.  Several  exist lng  cross-border  payment 
systems  (e.~.  ATM  linkages)  are  operating  on  the  basis  of  contractual 
provisions  alone  and  the  sponsors  of  others  which  are  being  planned  do 
not  point  to  Insuperable  legal  obstacles.  Nevertheless,  It  is  recognised 
that  contractual  provlsrons cannot  resolve all  the  issues. 
60.  The  Group  therefore  takes  the view  that whilst  It would  In  the  long  term 
be  desirable  to work  on  all  of  these  areas,  the  priority at  this stage 
Is  to eliminate  those  differences which  endangered  the efficacy,  and  In 
particular  the security,  of  payments. 
61.  It was  agreed  that  three  Issues shoUld  be  treated as priority matters  : 
- the  legal  tender  effect  of  pa,..nts •ade  by  transfers,  payment  cards 
and  debit  Instruments; 
-the point  of  Irrevocability of  pa,..nts by  transfers,  cards  and  debit 
Instruments; 
-the moment  of  settle.ent  finality  within  a  payment  syst .. (Including 
bankruptcy  law  aspects). 
62.  These  issues  affect  not  only  retai I  payment  systems,  but  also  large 
value  systems,  and  It  would  be  Impractical  to establIsh different  rules 
for  these  categories.  It  Is  also  agreed  that  the  issue  of  settlement 
f Ina II ty  concerns  not  on I  y  the  part les  to  payment  systems,  but  the 
banking  supervisors;  indeed,  in  the  Lamfalussy  report's  minimum 
standards  for  netting  schemes  the  First  Principle  requires  ••a  well-
founded  legal  basis under  alI  relevant  Jurisdictions  ...  Clearly,  this can 
not  be  demonstrated  where  the  legal  bases  under  which  the  various 
parties operate  -which  override  the  contractual  rules  of  the  system-
are at  variance. 
63.  A  further  Quest ton  ar lses  as  to  whether  the  solution  would  reQuire 
harmonlsed  rules  for  all  payments  (within and  between  Member  States), or 
whether  it  wou I  d  be  necessary  on I  y  to  cover  cross-border  payments. 
Although  the  task  would  be  more  difficult,  the  Group  feels  that  In  the 
long-run  the  rules  should  be  the  same,  within  the  Community,  for 
domestic  as  for  cross-border  payments.  It  Is  also noted  that  It would  be 
desirable  to  ensure  as  far  as  possible  comparabi I ity  with  other  maJor 
financial  centres.  The  UNCITRAL  draft  model  law  was  a  promising 
international  attempt  to  achieve  a  harmonised  approach,  but  the  Group 
noted  that  further  work  would  be  reQuired  to  finalise  this and  that,  as 
presently drafted,  the model  law  presented a  problem  for  Germany.  _J \ 
l. 
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Possible approaches 
64.  The  Group  notes  that  the  UNCITRAL  draft  Model  Law  deals with  some  of  tbe 
problems.  Indeed,  it  Includes  provisions  on  the  three  priority ar-., 
Identified  above,  of  Irrevocability,  legal  tender,  and  final  settl..ant 
(Including  the  effect  of  bankruptcy  thereon).  Nevertheless,  the  Model 
Law  is not  a  ready-made  solution because 
- It only covers credit  transfers; 
-on the  three  priority  areas  the  UNCITRAL  provisions  are  probably  too 
Imprecise  to  take  precedence  over  other  specific  laws  (e.g.  on 
bankruptcy). 
65.  Although  the  Model  Law  Is  not  yet  adopted,  it  Is  likely  to ~  an 
Important  International  standard and  subject  to settling the outstanding· 
points  In  the  draft  to  the  satisfaction  of  all  Member  States  ahoUfd 
certainly  be  the  basis  for  any  Community  legislation  on  transfers 
(supplemented  as necessary  to deal  with  consumer  issues). 
Conclusion 
66.  The  Group  therefore  concludes  that  whilst  legal  disparities  ~ 
uncertainties  are  an  Inconvenient  factor  which  undoubtedly  adds  to tb8 
comp 1  ext ty  and  r 1  sk  of  cross-border  payment  syst•s,  they  can  In  tile 
short-ter•  for  the  1n0st  part  be  overcome  by  contractua I  or· ou.r 
arrangements.  Work  should  be  put  In  hand  nevertheless by  an  appraprlate 
group of specialists with a  view  to finding solutions  In  the .adlu.-tena 
and  dealing  In  part lcular  wl th  the  pr lor I ty  quest Ions  I  dent I fled  Ia 
paragraph  61.  The  need  to  begin  now  with  such  work  -which would  tate 
time  to complete -was reinforced by  the Maastricht  Treaty on  EMU.  Tbere 
should  be  an  effective  liaison  between  this  legal  work  and  work  on  t .. 
technical  aspects carried out within the CEBS. 
IV.  Competition policy  (see Appendix  5) 
67.  The  Commission  stated  in  Its  Green  Paper  that  there  is  ample  room  for 
and  much  to  be  gained  from  competItion  between  different  cross-border 
payment  systams.  Indeed,  one  of  the  criteria proposed  In  that  paper  f~ 
assessing  the  efficiency  of  systems  is  that  the  costs  for  those  using 
them  should  be  "subject  to  the  maximum  extent  to  competitive •rket 
forces". 
68.  At  the  same  time  it was  recognised  that  the development  of  and  efficient 
management  of  payment  systems  may  reQuire  a  substantial  level  of 
cooperation  among  banks  and  between  them  and  the  public  authorities  .. 
Such  co-oper at ion  may  we II  have  to  include  agreements  bet-
participants  and/or  between  them  and  a  central  body  on  such  matters as 
standards,  operating  rules  and  cost  sharing  as  well  as  rules  defining 
conditions  for  membership  or other  access  to  the system. 
69.  The  Group  considers  that  this  is  an  area  in  which  the  Commission  has • 
vital  role  to  play  by  indicating  in  advance  as  far  as  possible  how  tbe 
Treaty  competition  rules  would  be  appl led  to  the  cross-border  syst .. 
envisaged.  In  this  way  banks  and  others  which  are  considering  the ca .. 
for  making  the  necessary  investment  to  develop  them  will  not  be 
inhibited  by  feelings of  uncertainty about  the effect of  the competition 
rules.  The  key  principles  in  this  regard  are set out  in  Appendix  5. - 18  -
Access  to systems  :  membership  criteria 
70.  The  quest ion  of  access  to  payment  systems  is  governed  by  the  Treaty 
rules on  competition.  (Additionally,  if  the  payment  system  is controlled 
or  monitored  by  public authorities,  the  Treaty  principles on  freedom  of 
establishment  to  provide  services  will  apply.  These  latter  aspects  are 
separately  considered  In  paragraphs  76-92.)  The  general  rule  Is  that 
systems  should  : 
- be  non-exclusive and  thus open  for  further  membership; 
-apply objectively Justified access criteria. 
So  far  as the participation of non-banks  Is  concerned,  a  distinction may 
be  drawn  between  Joint  bodies of  the credit sector  and  others.  The  above 
mentioned  rules  do  of  course  apply  to non-banks,  but  the  fact  that  they 
are not  supervised will  be  relevant  <see  paragraph 93). 
Operation of  systems  :  standards 
71 .  Payment  systems  are  run  accord 1  ng  to  ru I  es  or  standards  whIch  may  be 
divided  into  technical,  applications,  and  operating,  standards  <see 
paragraphs  36-38  above  for  examples  of each  type). 
72.  Reference  should  be  made  to  paragraphs  35-48  as  a  whole  for  the 
discussion  of  standards.  For  the  purpose  of  competition  policy, 
operational  standards  are  particularly  relevant  as  they  Include  matters 
such  as  value-dating.  These  arrangements  are  in  general  legitimate  so 
long  as  they  do  not  lead  to concerted  value  dating practices with  regard 
to customers.  As  a  general  principle operating standards should  not  lead 
to  any  exclusive  arrangements;  customers  must  remain  free  to  change 
banks  or  to bank  with  several  banks. 
Operation of  systems  :  risk management 
73.  Arrangements  need  to  be  made  for  the  setting  of  minimum  security 
standards  and  for  the  management  of  risk  in  payment  systems.  These  will 
usually  need  to  take  into  account  certain  of  the  principles set  out  in 
the  Lamfalussy  report  of  November  1990.  They  may  include  rules  on 
collateral  or  the  setting  of  I imits  to  exposures  and  loss  sharing 
arrangements. 
Costs  and  prices 
.• 
74.  "Agreements  between  undertakings  ...  which  have  as  their  effect  the 
restriction of  competition and  in  particular  those which  ... directly or 
indirectly  fix  ...  prices  ...  are  prohibited"  (Article  85  EEC  Treaty).  ~1 
In  the context of  payment  systems,  a  distinction should  be  drawn  between 
three  types of  "prices" or  costs  : 
-prices charged  to customers  must  remain  completely unrestricted; 
-costs of  payment  systems  and  central  bodies,  whether  starting up  costs 
or  operating costs can  be  shared  among  participants at  fixed  rates; 
-Interchange  fees  in  multilateral  systems- whether  or  not  there  is  a 
central  body  must  leave  open  the  possibi I ity  of· bilateral 
negotiations  leading  to  lower  fees.  This  means  the  interchange  fees 
can  only  be  set  as maxima. 
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The  Group  recognise  that  within  this  third  category  a  furt~ 
distinction should  be  drawn,  between  large and  small  systems.  In  a  large 
one  It  Is  unlikely  that  bilaterally negotiated tariffs can  be  handled., 
the  system;  participants  could  however  achieve  the  desired  result  1aJ 
applying  rebates  to each  other, outside the system. 
COnclusion 
75.  The  Group  conclude  that  the existence of  a  diversity of  pa~t  ayat  ... 
and  a  variety  of  different  co.petlng  providers  would  be  hl~tr 
desirable.  Within  Individual  pa,..nt syst  ... hoWever  cooperation  In  tba 
for• of agreements  between  participants on  a  range of  Issues.  Indicated 
above,  Is  required.  In  particular  pricing,  which  Is  a  sensitive  1...-. 
had  to  be  viewed  by  the  CU..Isslon  In  a  practical  light.  It  Ia  agr  ... 
that  the  C:C:..Isslon's  revised  •Guidelines  on  ec.petltlon• •t out  •• 
Appendix  5  provide  a  reasonable  basis  on  which  further  progr- Ia 
developing cross-border pa,..nt syst  ... can be ..  de. 
v.  Access 
76.  If  a  payment  system  potentially  affects  trade  between  Member  States  t.t 
falls  under  the  ambit  of  articles 85,  86  and  90  of  the  EEC  Treaty. ta. 
implications  of  these  - competition  - articles,  are  explored  ta 
paragraphs  67-75  above  on  competition  pol icy.  This  section· first 
examines  whether  the  remainIng  corpus  of  EEC  I  egIs I  at ion  has 
lmpllcat Ions  for  the  access  rules  <Including  the  ongoing  memberabip 
conditions)  pertaining  to  RCBP  systems.  The  main  point  that  emerges  ia 
that  EEC  legislation- especially articles 52  and  59  of  the  EEC  Treaty-
has  Implications  for  the  access  conditions  relating  to syst ... In  wbt~ 
the  public  authorities  are  involved.  In  a  second  part  the  QUestion  of 
access  is  considered  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  banking  supervl.ar 
which  wil I  often  ,but  not  necessarily,  be  the  public  authority  referr  .. 
to above. 
Freedom  of  establishment  and  services 
77.  The  access  problem  in  terms  of  EEC  Treaty  rules  on  freedom  of  services 
and  establishment  and  those of  the Second  Banking  Coordination Directive 
arises  with  regard  to  payment  syst ... for  which  public  authorities .are 
either directly  responsible,  or  where  they  have  a  clear  influence on  t._ 
structure and  in  particular on  the  range  of participants of  the syatea_ 
78.  There  is  freQuently  a  public authority  involvement,  even  in  the  area~ 
ret  a II  payment  systems.  Indeed,  ·in  sever  a I ,  if  not  in  a II  Member  States. 
the  Central  Banks  satisfy  themselves  about  the  appropriateness  and  •• 
particular  the  security of  payment  systems;  In  most  cases  parttctpatta. 
in  the  system  w  i II  depend  amongst  other  conditIons  on  the  poss ib II tt,-
for  participants  to  open  settlement  accounts  with  the  central  bat*s  .. 
This  leads  to  the conclusion  that  the access  to payment  systems  tn  QUite 
a  number  of  cases  is,  at  least  indirectly,  under  control  of  ~ 
therefore  the  respons i b 1 1 i ty  of  pub II c  authorItIes,  so  that  the  EK 
Treaty  rules  on  freedom  of  establishment  and  services  and  the  seCGiilll 
Banking  Coordination Directive wi II  apply. - 20  -
79.  For  the  purposes  of  the  present  analysis,  two  situations  are 
distinguished,  one  in  which  a  credit  institution  from  another  Member 
State  ("EC  bank")  has  set  uP  a  branch  in  the  country  in  which  It 
reQuires  access  to  a  payment  system  and  the  other  one  In  which  an  EC 
Institution,  not  established  In  the  country,  wants  to participate,  from 
abroad,  In  a  payment  system  in  the country concerned. 
Establishment 
80.  This section deals with  the situation  In  which  an  EC  bank  has  a  presence 
In  the  form  of  a  branch  in  the  country  In  which  It  seeks  access  to  a 
payment  system.  It  Is  assumed  that  In  the  area  covered  by  this  paper 
subsidiaries  of  foreign  banks  are  in  any  case  treated  on  an  eQual 
footing with  domestic  Institutions. 
81.  In  this  case,  art lcle  18  paragraph  1,  art lcle  19  paragraph  4  and  the 
Annex,  point  4  ("Money  transmission  services")  of  the  Second  Banking 
Coordination  Directive  apply.  Read  in  conjunction  with  the  general 
provision  of  article  52  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  these  provisions  stipulate 
that  the  branch  of  an  EC  bank  is  entitled  to  carry  out  money 
transmission  services  in  the  host  country,  provided  that  the  credit 
institution  is  authorised  to  render  such  services  in  its  country  of 
origin.  The  branch  must  receive  full  national  treatment,  i.e.  It must  be 
treated  as  If  it  were  a  domestic  institution  <article 52  EEC).  However, 
it  is  obliged  to  accept  the  conditions  under  which  money  transmission 
services  must  be  carried  out  in  the  host  country  if  these  conditions 
serve  a  public  interest  (article  19  paragraph  4,  Second  Banking 
Coordination  Directive>.  The  integrity,  stab Ill ty  and  eff I  c Ieney  of 
payment  systems  are purposes which  may  lawfully be  pursued  in  the public 
Interest. 
82.  It  follows  from  the  above,  that  the  Second  Banking  Directive  by  Itself 
does  not  Imply  that  an  EC  bank  has  automatically  and  unconditionally  a 
right  to  participate  in  host  country  payment  systems,  Just  because  It 
participates  in  such  systems  In  Its  country  of  origin.  However,  It  can 
be  reQuired  that  obJective  criteria  are  met  by  candidates  wishing  to 
Jo 1  n  domest 1  c  payment  systems  <organ i sat lona I  structure  of  the 
institution,  technological  capability,  posting  of  collateral  in 
centralised  systems,  sharing of  costs  for  past  investments  necessary  to 
set  up  the system,  etc.).  The  size of  an  institution can  be  an  objective 
criterion,  but  can  pose  a  problem  for  newcomers  in  a  given market,  which 
inevitably  wi  II  not  immediately  have  the  same  volume  of  business  as 
long-standing  participants,  i.e.  objective criteria must  not  be  of  such 
a  kind  that,  while  formally  even-handed,  they  work  in  practice  to  the 
disadvantage of  incoming  foreign  institutions.  As  regards size criteria, 
It  may  be  possible  to  refer  back  to  the  size of  the  bank  Itself,  which 
has  set up  the  branch  In  Question.  If  this branch  is  likely  to have  very 
few  transactions  in  the  host  country  during  a  first  period,  the 
technological  and  cost  sharing  reQuirements  provided  for  in  a  given 
system  might  be  dissuasive;  this  in  itself should,  however,  not  be  seen 
to  be  discriminatory  (i.e.  profitability  considerations  of  a  payment 
system  need  not  be  set  aside  just  to  make  room  for  a  participant  from 
another  Member  State). 
l L 
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83.  As  regards  discretionary  conditions,  they  are  not  excluded  by  tfte 
CommunIty  provisions  Quoted  above.  Indeed,  If  pub I i  c  author it lea  have 
discretionary powers  (albeit often  in  conjunction with  the  body  actuallY 
responsible  for  the  system,  which  may  be  a  private sector organisation) 
In  admitting  domestic  banks  to  a  given  system  or  to  refuse  them,  these 
same  powers  can  be  exercised  with  regard  to  other  EC  banks  as  long  as 
the  use  of  such  dlscret lonary  powers  is  non-discriminatory.  Thus.  the 
discretion  must  not  be  used  In  such  a  way  that  It  works  to  the 
disadvantage  of  EC  banks,  either  In  its  inherent  objectives or  In  Its 
practical  effects.  The  fact  that  a  candidate member  of  a  payment  ayat .. 
is  •only"  a  branch  of  an  EC  bank  must  not  be  held  against  lt.  The 
monitoring· of  discretionary  decisions  under  Community  rules  can  even 
Include  •statistical"  considerations.  Here  again,  as  with  regard  to 
size,  the  discretionary  decision  might  be  based  on  elements  (standing. 
experience,  Quality  of·management,  credit  rating)  of  the  entire  bank. 
which  has  set up  the branch  In  Question. 
84.  Considerations  similar  to  those  on  discretionary  powers  will  apply  when 
it  comes  to  deciding  about  direct  or  Indirect  llellbershlp  In  certain 
systems  cr•sett lement  members"  and  "corresponding  members•,  the  latter 
havIng  access  to  the  system  vI a  a  set  t I  ement  member).  Branches  of  EC 
banks  must  not  systematically  be  excluded  from  becoming  settl ...  nt 
members.  On  the  other  hand,  the  same  pr tnciples  as  those  guiding  the 
authorities  when  deciding  whether  a  domestic  institution  can  become  a 
settlement  member,  or  whether  It  must  accept  the  status  of  a 
correspondent  member,  should  apply  with  regard  to  branches  of  EC  ~anka. 
Here  again,  discretionary decisions are not  per  se unlawful. 
Services 
85.  Under  article  59  EEC  and  article  16  paragraph  1  as  well  as  the  Annex. 
section 4,  of  the  Second  Banking  Coordination Directive,  freedom  for  the 
provision of  services must  also exist  in  this area. 
86.  In  practical  terms,  the  likely situation  is  that  an  EC  bank  may  want  to 
use  a  domestic  clearing mechanism  in  order  to  channel  payments  to banks 
in  the  host  country,  normally  to  the  benefit  of  Its  customers  in  that 
country,  or  to  receive  payments  from  such  customers  and  their  banks  via 
the  clearing system  of  the  host  country  in  Question.  In  other words.  one 
is  looking  at  the  direct,  albeit  remote  participation of  an  EC  bank  in a 
domestic  clearing  system;  "ACH-1 inkages",  which  are  a  way  of 
establishing  indirect  contacts  between  foreign  banks  and  a  domestic  ACH 
(via  a  foreign  ACH>  or  the  extension  of  ACH  services  beyond  the 
frontiers of one  country  (e.g.  the operation of  a  transnational  ACH)  are 
not  relevant  in  this context. 
87.  It  would  be  inconsistent  with  EEC  principles  if  a  host  country  were  to 
reQuire  that  only  Institutions established on  Its territory could beca.e 
members  of  a  payment  system  in  the  host  country  concerned.  In  other 
words,  the  geographic  location  of  a  credit  institution  wishing  to 
provide  payment  services  cannot  normally  be  considered  as  an  obJective 
criterion allowing  the authorities  to stop an  institution from  Joining a 
given  payment  system.  (It may  in  certain circumstances  be  permissible to 
reQuire  a  physical  presence,  in  some  cheque  clearing  systems  for 
example.)  However,  both  objective  criteria  and  discretionary  powers 
could,  in  the case of  services,  take  into account  alI  that  is necessary. 
in  the  public  interest,  to  make  domestic  payment  systems  safe  and 
efficient. - 22  -
88.  Therefore,  and  without  having  regard  to  the  pract teal  feasibility  of 
remote  membership  arrangements,  It  Is  clear  that  EC  banks  In  such  cases 
would  have  to meet  all  the  technical  and  legal  requirements  (technical 
and  operational  standards,  possibly  collateral,  operating  hours,  etc.) 
of  the  host  country  system  In  question.  They  would  have  to convert  their 
payment  messages  Into  the  message  format  applying  In  the  host  country; 
they  would  have  to  denominate  operations  In  the  currency  In  which  the 
other  country's system operates. 
The  central  bank  perspective on  access 
89.  From  the  central  bank  viewpoint  It  Is  extremely  Important  that 
membership  rules/conditions are sufficiently robust  In  each  Member  State 
to  uphold  the  integrity  of  the  payment  systems  In  question.  This 
underlines  the  need  for  a  close  surveillance  of  access  conditions 
(defined  to  include  ongoing  membership  requirements  for  such  systems) 
especially  for  non-collaterallsed,  net,  end  of  day,  systems.  A priori 
collaterallsed,  real-time gross settlement,  systems will  be  more  robust, 
though  the  trade-off  between  robustness  and  cost  should  always  be  taken 
into account  in  order  to maintain  the efficiency of  the system. 
90.  The  less  stringent  such  conditions  are,  the  greater  the  potential  risk 
to  the  payment  system  since  it  is  vulnerable  to  problems  In  a  wider 
population of  banks  than  in  a  tightly- restricted payment  system. 
91.  However,  it  may  be  that  part I  cuI ar,  "restr I  cted••  systems  are  no  more 
secure.  E.g.  the  "dlrect"/"ful I"  members  of  such  a  system  may  -
depending  on  the  structure  of  the  system  in  quest ton  - be  extremely 
sensitive to problems  In  "Indirect" members  of  the same  system.  If so  It 
may  be  important  that  these  authorities  charged  with  overseeing  the 
system,  undertake  some  form  of  ••monitoring••  role  in  relation  to  the 
system's  indirect  members.  (The  separate question of  what  should  be  done 
to  prevent  indirect  members  becomIng  excessIve I  y  dependent  on  dIrect 
members,  and  any  undesirable,  competitive consequences  resulting  from  of 
this,  is discussed  In  the section on  competition policy.) 
92.  Improved  RCBP  systems  based  on  linking  domestic  payment  systems  (e.g. 
that  based  on  ACH  I inkage)  may  need  to  be  carefully  supervised,  given 
the  danger  that  the  system  as  a  whole  could  only  be  a  strong  as  Its 
weakest  component  part.  One  solution  would  be  to  ensure  that  the  rules 
governing  members  of  such  a  system  are  such  as  to  insulate  each 
country's domestic  payment  system  from  the effects of  problems  elsewhere 
in  such  a  connected  system.  Another,  preferable,  solution  In  the  longer 
run  would  be  to harmonise  the access principles of  the  relevant  national 
systems.  clear I  y  the  Commission,  the  Counc i I  and  centra I  banks  would 
have  th~  overriding  responsibility  to  ensure  that  this  was  Indeed  the 
case. 
Non-banks'  access 
93.  The  operation of  a  payment  system  in  the  ful I  sense of  the  term  reQuires 
that  the  provider  can  arrange  for  final  settlement  over  an  account  at 
the  central  bank  for  the  currency  concerned.  In  order  to  provide  such 
settlement  it  Is  necessary,  though  not  sufficient,  to  be  a  bank.  Non-
banks  may,  of  course,  play  a  full  part  in  other  aspects  of  a  payment VI. 
94. 
95. 
96. 
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system.  They  may  e.g.  act  as  network  providers  or  be  I inked  to  banks 
fulfilling  a  settlement  ·function  and  thus  be  indirect  members  of  the 
system  <as  in  the  case of e.g.  VIsa  and  Eurocard).  It  is  Important  that 
the  risks  associated  with  indirect  members  are  adeQuately  appraised  by 
both  the  appropriate  direct  members,  and  by  the  authorities overseeing 
the system. 
Syst ..  lc risk and  supervision 
The  smooth  functioning  of  payment  systems  Is  a  crucial  reQuirement  for 
the  stability  and  efficiency  of  the  financial  system.  Given  central 
banks'  role  In  maintaining  the  stability  of  the  financial  system,  It 
follows  that  they  have  the  task  of  ensuring  that  It  Is  safeguarded 
against  the  risk  of  a  malfunctioning  of  the  payment  system.  The 
potential  risks arlslni  from  Interbank  netting  schemes  were  analysed  In 
the Lamfalussy  Report<  >. 
The  Group's  view  Is  that  due  to  the  limited  value  of  flows  proceeding 
via  RCBPS,  such  risks  might,  a  priori,  be  expected  to  be  lower  than  In 
the  case  of  large  value,  payment  systems.  In  reflection  of  this  the 
degree  of official  oversight  reQuired  for  such  systems  would  need  to be 
less  than  for  large value  systems.  This  was  not  to deny  that  problema  In 
RCBPS  could  be  extremely  serious  for- those  using  them  (e.g.  If  payMnts 
were  not  received on  time,  or  at  al 1). 
The  Group  also  identified  four  matters of  particular  concern  to central 
banks  in  the  context  of  RCBP  : 
-the conditions  for  access  to such  systems; 
- the  Quest ion  of  how  ret  a II  systems  - whether  organ I  sed  by  banks  or 
non-banks  - should  be  assessed  by  central  banks; 
- the  legal  framework  underpinning  such  systems; 
-the  risk  associated  with  linking  domestic  payment  systems,  In 
particular  ACHs. 
97.  The  first  three of  these  are  largely dealt  with  in  the sections on  legal 
issues  and  access  above,  and  the  fourth  in  the  section on  ACH  linkage. 
below,  in  this report. 
Conclusions 
98.  The  Group  note  that  rules  concerning  access  to  payment  syst-.  and 
Masures  taken  by  central  banks  to  IOnltor/ll•lt  syst•lc  risk,  are 
crucial  to the development  of  pa~nt syst ..  s.  It observes  that  work  Is 
already underway  In  central  banks  on  these  Issues and  recommend  that the 
COIIIIIsslon  continues  Its  work  on  access  criteria  In  this  context •.  The 
Group  agree  that  It  Is  desirable  for  the  view  of  banks  be  taken  Into 
account  In  all  this work. 
(*)  "Report  of  the  Committee  on  interbank  netting  schemes  of  the  centrat 
banks  of  the  Group  of  10 Countries",  Basle,  November  1990. - 24  -
VII.  Reporting requlr ...  nts (Appendix  6) 
99.  In  most  Member  States  there  are  spec I  a I  reportIng  requ 1  rements  for 
sending  transactions  to,  or  from,  non-resident  accounts.  For  example  In 
Spain  a  reporting obligation falls on  the  resident  account  holder.  These 
requirements  differ  from  one  Member  State  to  another  (see  Appendix  6). 
They  normally  apply  to  all  cross-border  payments  as  well  as  affecting 
others which  are  in  other  respects  "domestic".  This  means  that  the cost 
for  a  bank  of  processing  a  payment  to,  or  from,  a  non-resident  account, 
may  exceed  that  of  one  involving  a  resident  account.  This  affects  not 
only  the amount  of  fees,  but  also taxes and  value-dating;  Indeed  In  some 
Member  States  transactions  Involving  non-resident  accounts  are  passed 
through  different clearing systems  than other  transactions are. 
100.  To  the  extent  that  such  duties  raise  the  cost  of  making  those  cross-
border  payments  that  Involve  non-residents,  they  discourage  them, 
especially when  this additional  cost  can  represent  a  significant  amount 
of  the  value of  a  cross-border  payment. 
101.  The  main  alternative  mechanism  for  collecting  these  data  to  direct 
collection  - namely  by  way  of  surveys  - Is  viewed  by  the  statistical 
authorities  in  most  Member  .States  as  an  inferior  method,  though  the one 
Member  State that  uses  surveys  (the  UK)  rejects this assertion. 
102.  It  is  acknowledged  that  the  full  burden  of  reporting  requirements  does 
not  a I  ways  fa II  direct I  y  onto  the  banks,  but  somet lmes  onto  theIr 
customers.  However,  It  is  clear  that,  no  matter  who  is  obliged  to 
report,  these  requirements  increase  cost  of  cross-border  payments, 
especially their  retal I  component,  when  the  threshold  Is  low. 
103.  The  possibility of  relaxing  reporting  requirements  for  bulk  payments,  as 
long  as  the  average  payment  In  each  such  batches  fa I Is  under  the 
reporting  threshold,  was  explored  by  the  Group.  The  main  problem  they 
identified  was  that  any  relaxation  of  this  kind  would  prevent  the 
statisticians  from  finding  out  the  type  of  transaction  involved 
(Including  the  payee)  and  thus  from  accurately  constructing  their 
balance of  payments/monetary  frameworks. 
104.  Some  Group  members  Query  whether  it  is  right  for  the  banking  community 
to  bear  some,  or  all,  of  the  cost  of  reporting  requirements  in  certain 
Member  States,  when  the  benefits  of  this  information  do  not  accrue  to 
them,  but  have  instead  a  broader  soc i a I  utI I i ty.  However,  there  1  s 
general  acknowledgement  of,  and  support  for,  statisticians'  current 
efforts  to  reduce  reporting  costs,  regardless  of  their  incidence, 
particularly  their  investigation  of  the  possibility  of  paperless 
reporting  mechanisms  in  the  context  of  EDIFACT.  (The  Improved 
infrastructures  which  the  banks  are  now  considering  do  not  Involve 
EDIFACT.)  However,  in  the  longer-term  it  should  be  possible  via  EDIFACT 
to  Include  in  a  single message  both  a  payment  order  and  the  information 
required  for  official  reporting  purposes.  The  possibility of  electronic 
reporting  is  available  in  several  Member  States,  including  France, 
Germany,  Italy,  the  Netherlands  and  Spain. 
105.  The  Group  see  a  need  for  the  criteria  determining  the  choice  of 
reporting  thresholds,  and  the  reporting  mechanisms  used,  to  be 
clarified.  If  this  is  done,  there  wi  II  be  less  I ikel ihood  o(  arbitrary 
differences  In  the  thresholds,  and  reporting  procedures,  applied  in - 25  -
different  Member  States,  differences  which  tend,  ceteris  paribus,  to 
dIscourage  the  development  of  RCBPS.  It  wou I  d  be  desirable  for  the 
threshold  beyond  which  reporting  reQuirements  would  be  imposed,  and  the 
specific  procedures  associated  with  them,  should  be  harmonised  across 
the  EC. 
cone 1  us  Ions 
106.  The  Group  concludes  that  : 
- the •lnl.u. threshold  for  reporting  requlr  ...  nts should  be  as  high as 
possible,  and  at  least  ecu  10.000,  throughout  the  CC•~.~nlty  If  It 
cannot  now  be abolished; 
- the •thods used  to collect  such  data  should  be  as eff  lclent,  and  u 
consistent  across ue.ber  States,  as  possible,  Including  In particular 
electronic  reporting  with  a  view  to  using  EDIFACT  standards  In  the 
•diWI ter•. 
VIII.  Data protection 
107.  In  September  1990  the  Commission  proposed  a  Directive  concerning  the 
protection of  Individuals  In  relation to  the processing of  personal  data 
of  13  September  1990.  This  Directive  is presently  being examined  by  the 
European  Parliament.  Changes  in  the  text  of  the  Commission  proposal  can 
therefore  on I  y  be  decided  on,  once  the  Par I I  ament 's  posit ion  will  be 
known.  However,  the  Group  consider  It  important  to  take  a  clear  view  of 
what  the  effect of  the  rules of  the  Directive on  data  flows  required by 
payment  procedures might  actually be. 
108.  It  is  noted  that  the  DIrectIve,  in  many  respects,  provides  for  broad 
principles,  while  the  possible  interferences  with  payment  techniQues 
often  concern  specifIc  aspects  and  techn i ca I  interpretatIons  of  these 
principles.  In  particular,  the  following  aspects were  examined. 
Multiple  information of  the data subject  and  notifications  to authorities 
109.  If  articles  8,  9  and  11  of  the  proposal,  in  particular  article  9, 
paragraph  1,  are  read  strictly,  one  could  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  data  subject  must  be  informed  repeatedly  and  for  each  individual 
payment  process  (for  instance,  In  each  case  In  which  a  payment  C·ard 
transaction  is communicated  to an  authorisation centre). 
110.  Without  envisaging a  precise wording  to overcome  this problem,  the  PSTDG 
and  the  Commission  services  agree  on  the  objective  :  to  avoid  the  need 
for  repeated  information of  the data subject. 
111.  In  many  cases,  the problem  can  be  solved  by  making  use of  the concept  of 
contractual  or  Quasi-contractual  relationships  as  enshrined  in  article 
8(1)(a)  of  the  proposed  Directive;  in  certain  cases  the  concept  of 
''legit lmate  interests" as  referred  to  in  article 8(1 )(c),  too,  can  be  of 
relevance.  In  general  terms,  the  following  objective  was  shared  by  the 
PSTDG  and  the  Commission  services  :  when  a  person  is  provided  with 
payment  fac i I it I  es  (i.e.  by  openIng  a  bank  account  or  a  credIt  card 
account),  it  should  be  sufficient  to  give  the  information  regarding 
possible  communications  to  third  parties  global IY  at  the  time  of - 26  -
collection of  the data.  Where  a  chain of  Institutions must  Intervene  In 
order  to  transmit  payments,  o~ly  the  first  institution  should  be 
responsible  for  this  Information. 
112.  As  far  as  notifications  to  the  public  authorities  are  concerned, 
Intermediary  institutions  In  the  payment  chain  are  to  be  considered  to 
be  "controller  of  the  file"  regarding  the  sender  or  the  beneficiary of 
the  payment.  However,  article  11(1)  should  not  imply  that  each  such 
institution  would  have  to  notify  the  authorities  of  each  payment; 
Indeed,  notification  requirements  will  only  arise  globally,  I.e.  with 
regard  to the operation of  payment  systems  as  such.  The  Group  considered 
that  a  sensible  approach  would  be  to  consider  that  each  payment  order 
Initiated  by  a  customer  was  at  the  same  time  a  consent  to  the 
transmission of data. 
Automated  decisions 
113.  The  PSTDG  and  the Commission  services agree  that  the proposed Directive, 
and  In  particular  its  article  14,  paragraph  2,  will  not  prohibit 
•automated  decIsIons"  where  an  operatIon  wou I  d  exceed  the  contractua I 
limits  of  a  given  service  (e.g.  refusal  of  an  ATM  cash  withdrawal.over 
and  above  a  given  amount). 
114.  The  PSTDG  and  the  Commission  services  agree  that  aspects  of  this  kind 
should  be  taken  into  account  In  further  discussions  of  the  proposed 
Directive and  in  negotiations with  Pari lament  and  the Council. 
CredIt  scorIng 
115.  The  Commission  services  consider  that  the  Directive will  impose  certain 
I imits  without,  however,  making  .. credit  scoring"  impossible  altogether. 
The  lawfulness  of  "credit  scoring"  will  depend  on  the  criteria used  for 
the  pur poses  of  scor I  ng.  Wh I I  e  I  t  w  I I I  norma I I  y  be  I  awfu I  to  1  nc 1  ude 
among  the  criteria  payment  incidents  or  other  past  difficulties with  a 
customer,  limits  must  be  kept  with  regard  to  criteria  which  can  Imply 
arbitrary discrimination  (e.g.  nationality,  location of domicile,  etc.). 
The  Group  comments  that  restrictions on  credit-scoring would  lead  to an 
increase  in  the  cost  of making  RCBP,  particularly via payment  cards. 
116.  Negative  decisions  with  regard  to  a  customer  may  be  based  on  automated 
procedures  and  in  particular  on  automated  credit  scoring,  provided  that 
the  customer  has  the  possibility  of  contacting  the  bank  in  presenting 
further  explanations and  seeking a  redress  to a  negative decision. 
Transmission  to third countries 
117.  The  problem  which  article  24,  paragraph  2  of  the  proposed  Directive 
seems  to  pose  with  regard  to  communications  involving  third  countries, 
in  particular  in  the  context  of  payment  card  authorisations,  is 
acknowledged  by  the  Commission;  the  text  will  be  adapted.  Mechanisms  to 
take  account  of  appropriate  contractual  solutions  will  be  worked  out. 
These  could  be  applied  to payment  card  authorizations and  international 
transfers.  This  wi  II  be  done  on  the  basis  of,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
customer-bank  relationship  and,  on  the  other,  the  features  of 
international  interbank  networks. - 27  -
118.  The  Group  notes  that  other  more  general  aspects  of  the  proposed 
Directive  are  also  relevant  to,  and  can  pose  certain  probtecns  for  the 
activities of credit  Institutions.  These  broader  aspects are: 
-the use  of  "back-up",  and  other working,  flies; 
the creatIon of  "customer  prof Ilea•;  ,._...;.., 
- the  treatment  of  Information  concerning  criminal  offence•; 
-the treatment  of  "manual  flies"  kept  by  credit  lnstltutlor.. 
119.  The  GrouP  concludes  that  all  theee  aspects  will  have  to  be  nuclted 
further  1  n  the  context  of  work  on  the  proposal  of  the  data protect lon 
Direct lve  and  that  the  aolut  lone  out lined  above  should  be  takeft  Into 
account.  The  Group  also  notes  that  ..  tual  lnfor•tlcln  •t_._ 
supervisory  authorities will  not  be  hampered  by  the  propo••d Dll'ectlve 
<see  article 6,  paragraph  1  <a>. - 28  -
D.  pOSSIBLE  WAYS  AHEAD 
Deter•lnlng factors 
120.  The  future of  RCBPS  In  the Community  wll I  be  determined  by  a  combination 
of  market  forces  and  CommunIty  poI Icy.  The  demand  for  such  syst~ms 
should  Increase as progress  towards  a  Single Market  continues.  Meanwhile  ~ 
the  pr lvate  sector  Is  already  Invest lng  In  new  systems  to  meet  this 
demand.  A sample  of  those  already  In  operation,  or  In  the  pipeline/at 
the  drawlngboard,  were  described  In  paragraphs  28-34  above.  Several  of 
these  schemes  base  themselves  on  correspondent  banking  which  will 
continue  to  play  a  major  role  In  RCBP.  Others  seek  to  exploit  the 
availability  of  a  single  banking  I icence  from  end-1992,  which  creates~ 
the possibility of  banks ·Increasingly branching  Into other Member  States 
and  thence  acquiring  access  to  host  country,  domestic  payment  systems. 
On  the basis of  such  access  they would  then be  able to transfer  payments 
•1n-housen  (I .e.  from  a  branch  in  one  Member  State,  to  a  branch  In 
another  Member  State  for  subsequent  transfer  to  the  ultImate 
beneficiary. 
121.  The  argument  of  the  main  "key  issues"  section  of  this  report  is  that 
there  are  a  series  of  further  steps  that  need  ·-to  be  taken  and  can 
already  be  taken  in  the  near  future- mainly  by  the  public  authorities 
at  Community  level  -to facilitate  the  introduction of  efficient  RCBPS. 
However,  whilst  the  Community  remains  a  multi-currency  zone,  differences 
between  cross-border  and  domestic  payments  wi  II  remain. 
122.  Two  steps  which  have  already  been  taken  at  Community  level  will 
facilitate  the  lntroduct ion  of  efficient  RCBPS  In  the  years  to  come. 
First,  the entry  into  force of  the  Second  Banking  Coordination Directive 
(see  paragraphs  76-88  above)  wi  II  encourage  the  development  of  more 
efficient  RCBPS.  Second,  the  decision  on  the  adoption  of  a  single 
currency by  1999  at  the  latest. 
123.  The  rest  of  this  section  summarises  the  Group's  discussion  of  the 
following  three  items  : 
- correspondent  banking; 
- I inkages  between  ACHs  and  equivalent  systems; 
- the  poss i b i I i ty  of  fostering  direct  debiting  as  a  means  of  making 
RCBP. 
The  share  of  this  sect ion  on  "the  future"  allotted  to  each  of  them 
signifies  not  their  importance  relative  to  other  likely  future 
developments,  but  the  time  devoted  tot~  by  the Group  in the  framework 
of  the Commission's work  prograame  for  the Group. 
Correspondent  banking 
124.  The  long-established  technique of  correspondent  banking,  which  currently 
handles  most,  If  not  all,  retai I  cross-border  transfers,  wi  II  continue 
to  play  a  major  role  In  RCBP.  Improvements  of  various  kinds, 
particularly  using  electronic  technology,  are  being  developed,  some  by 
Individual  banks  with  their  correspondents  in  each  Member  State,  others 
by  groups  of  banks.  In  the  case of  groups  of  banks  the  arrangements  can 
be  regarded  as either  a  form  of multi lateral  correspondent  banking,  or - 29  -
as a  cross-border  payment  system.  The  Group  considered a  number  of these 
new  developments  during  the  course  of  Its  work  and  these  are  described 
In  paragraphs  28-34  above. 
125.  The  var lous  recommendatIons  made  In  the  key  issues  sect ion  of  this 
report,  would,  If  implemented,  markedly  Increase  thet  efficiency  of 
correspondent  banking  Cas  wei I  as  that  of  other  types  of  RCBPS). 
Progress  towards  agreed  Community-level,  technical  and  application 
standards would  be  especially  beneficial  since  It  would  provide  further 
Impetus  to  the  movement  towards  automated  correspondent  banking.  ca.mon 
standards  relating  to  credit  transfers  would,  for  example,  permit  end-
to-end,  automated  electronic processing,  bringing about  significant cost 
savings,  as  well  as  Increased  speed  and  rei iabll ity.  Certain  of  the 
other  steps  recommended  earlier,  such  as  an  increase  in  the  reporting 
threshold  to  a  minimum  of  10.000  ecu  and  changes  to  the  proposed  data 
protection directive would  also be  extremely  helpful. 
126.  In  order  for  the  benefit  of  all  these  steps  to  be  maximised.  It  is 
necessary  for  domestic  payments  in  Member  States to reach  a  common.  high 
level  of  efficiency,  equivalent  to  that  achieved  in  the  most  efficient 
domestic  systems  now. 
Linkages  between  ACHs  and  equivalent  systems 
127.  One  of  the  main  ideas  put  forward  in  the  Commission's  Discussion Paper 
on  "Making  Payments  In  the  Internal  Market"  concerned  the possibility of 
linking  "ACHs  and  equivalent  systems"  (henceforth  referred  to as ACHs). 
In  reflection  of  the  positive  feedback  on  this  particular  issue,  the 
Group  were  Invited  to  investigate  it  further.  The  response  of  CirOUP 
members  belonging  to  the  Banking  Federation  of  the  EEC  to  this 
challenge,  together  with  the  key  points  made  during  discussfon  of  the 
subject  (including contributions from  non-Group  members  who  testified to 
the  Group)  Is  set  out  below.  Recommendations  for  further  steps  Jn  this 
area are  then  out I ined  in  paragraph  150.  This  section describes the aain 
issues  associated  with  this  particular  form  of  RCBPS  - It  is  taken  as 
read  that  the  recommendations  made  earlier  regarding  key  issues  wiiJ 
apply  to  it,  as  wei 1  as  to  other  systems  <such  as  correspondent 
banking). 
Rationale  for  closer  analysis of  the  I lnkage  concept 
128.  There  are numerous  segments  In  the market  for  RCBP  and  different systems 
may  be  required  for  each  of  them.  From  a  competitive viewpoint,  reliance 
on  a  single system  for  a  particular  type  of  demand  Is  unhealthy,  unless 
the  returns  to  scale  are  substantial  and  pricing  policy  is  carefully 
contro lle'd;  the  quest ion  1  s  whether  a  system  based  on  I inking  ACHs.  or 
equivalent  systems,  is  different  In  any  significant  manner  from  other 
systems. 
129.  Many  of  the  aims  associated  with  it  are  attainable,  at  least  in  part. 
using alternative systems  such  as  those based  on  "improved  correspondent 
banking••.  The  cost  savings  resulting  from  automation  provide  one 
example,  though  the  amount  of  such  savings  may  be  less  for  the  latter  if 
e.g.  the  standards  used  by  such  "correspondent  groups"  differ. one  from 
another.  However,  In  principle  there  should  be  various  advantages  which 
are  specific  to,  or  else  particularly  closely  associated  with,  the 
"I I  nkage  concept".  F  1 rst,  the  number  of  banks  i  nvo I  ved  between  the 
ultimate  payer  and  payee  will  be  lower  for  many,  if  not  all,  payments. - 30-
This will  reduce  the overall  costs of making  a  payment  on  the assumption 
that  the  cost  of  going  through  the  ACHs  involved  will  be  tiny  due  to 
economies  of  scale,  automation,  etc.  Second,  there  will  be  more 
potent I  a I  for  bund II ng  together  payment  orders  Imp 1  y 1  ng  fewer 
International  •messages",  and  foreign  currency  conversion  cost  savings. 
Third,  the  linkage  concept  could  facilitate  greater  transparency  than 
that  attainable under  correspondent  banking  given  the  uncertainty  aboUt 
the  costa  to  be  lev led  by  and  the  t lmespana  Imposed  by  correspondent 
banks  that often occurs under  the  latter  system.  Fourth,  It  may  be  able 
to  better  cope  wl th  the  growth  In  RCBP  proJected  In  the  wake  of  the 
Single  Market  and  EMU.  Fifth,  there  Ia  less  danger  of  •all  banks 
becoming  excessively  dependent  on  the  large  banks  which  have  well-
developed  correspondent  relations. 
130.  However,  a  I  arge  amount  of  work  remaIns  to  be  comp I  eted  before  an 
Informed  decision  regarding  Its  economic/technical  feasibility,  can  be 
taken.  Included  In  this  Is  the  need  for  the central  banks  to assess  the 
risk  Implications  of  any  detailed  blue-print  for  linking  ACHs  that  Is 
drawn  up,  and  the necessity for  the  banks  to assess  the  Implications for 
the  business  case  for  such  linkage  of  a  move  to  a  single  currency  by 
1999 at  the  latest, and  the  likely  Increased use  of  the ecu  prior  to the 
Introduction of  the  single currency.  (Clearly  such  an  assessment  of  the 
possibility for  part. of  the· system  to become  obsolescent  due  to progress 
towards  monetary  union  Is  reQuired  before  any  proposed  RCBPS  Is  decided 
upon,  and  not  Just  the  linkage model.) 
Relationship with other  types of  RCBP  systems 
131.  It  should  be  emphasized  that  the mechanisms  which  the  banking  community 
has  developed  for  cross-border  payments,  such  as  the  SWIFT  network  for 
electronic  processing of  messages  and  the  traditional  Individual  banks' 
correspondent  banking  relationships  for  the  handling  of  the  flow  of 
funds,  would  co-exist  with  any  development  for  linking  ACHs,  as 
complementary,  or  competitive,  means  of  cross-border  payment. 
CompetItIon  is  an  essent I  a I  feature  of  bankIng  servIces  offered  to 
customers  and  It  is envisaged  that  ACH  linkage  would  be  one  of  a  number 
of  opt Ions  for  effect 1  ng  cross-border  payments.  In  thIs  compet 1  t 1  ve 
environment  it  wi  II  be  important  to  ensure  that  the  ACH  linkage 
mechanism  wl  II  be  cost efficient  for  banks  and  their  customers,  and  meet 
approprIate  securIty  and  risk  reQuirements.  To  thIs  end,  It  may  be 
easier  for  ACH  links  to  provide  a  framework  for  making  low  value, 
remote,  cross-border  payments  using,  wherever  possible,  existing 
Infrastructures  and  standards.  In  addition,  such  a  mechanism  should  be 
sufficiently flexible  to  : 
- accomodate  future changes,  Including  the  adoption of  a  single currency 
within  the  EEC; 
-allow the  relevant  part  of  any  Infrastructure  to  be  used  for  payments 
to non-EEC  countries; 
-ensure  that  originating  banks  have  the  opportunity  to  use  the  system 
of  their choice  when  effecting RCBP  orders.  ~ 
132."  If  ACH  (or  alternat lve  bodies>  1  inks  are  forged,  it  Is  likely  that  this 
will  be  by  means  of  bilateral  agreement.  The  linkage  will  be  to provide 
a  mechanism  for  those  payments  which  comply  with  the  description  that 
follows  In  paragraph  133.  · - 31  -
Type  of  payment 
133.  The  linkage  will  cater  for  low  value,  remote,  cross-border  pa~ts 
processed  In  batches.  It  Is  agreed  that  links  should  be  able to ~OC888 
both  cred 1  t  and  debIt  Items.  Low-va I  ue  payments  are  cons 1  de red taere  ·•• 
being  of  maximum  value  for  an  Individual  Item  of  the  order  of  10  .. 000  _., 
ecu.  This  ceiling  value  would  encompass  the  maJorlty_of  retalJ  cra.e-
border  transactions within  the COmmunity  generated by  Individual• and  ~7 
sma I I ,  and  med I  um-sl zed,  enterpr lses.  Consider at Ions  such  as  the  t •• 
period  associated with  the  linkage  mechanisms  could  militate agatnst  It 
being used  for  payments  in  excess of  10.000 ecu. 
Message  format 
134.  For  economic  automated  links,  It  Is  considered  that  agreement  sbouJd ~ 
reached  upon  a  common  message  format  for  the  Interchange.  Thl•  can•an 
Interchange  format  could  be  used  in  a  national  ACH,  but  until  this  Is 
available,  a  translation  out  of  and  into  national  ACH  formats  will  be 
necessary.  (Systems  to  do  this  - which  could  be  adapted  to  be :uMd  tn 
the  period  before  such  a  common  message  format  Is  developed,  under  tfte 
linkage  concept  - have  a·l ready  been  constructed  by  certain  u!tet 
participants.)  For  reasons  of  expediency  and  the  potential  to  Interface 
economically  Into  other  systems,  it  is  recognised  that  tbe  co.MOn 
Interchange  message  format  should  be  based  on  an  existing  a~eed 
International  standard.  As  a  starting  point  the  SWIFT  MT  100,  a  eubeet 
thereof,  or  the  proposed  SWIFT  BULK  PAYMENT  format  could  be  u.ed  wit~ 
eventual  migration  to  EDIFACT. 
Routing  identifier 
135.  One  possIble  rout lng  IdentIfier  Is  the  SWIFT  BankIng  I  dent I  f!ter  Code 
(BIC)  which  provides  a  country  Identifier  and  a  means  of  ldentlfyjng 
individual  banks  (with  the  exception  of  certain  girobanks)  :&n  •cfl 
country.  The  BIC- In  conJunction  with  domestic  sorting codes  f~ thoee 
countries where  the  BIC  does  not  give  sufficient  Information  - together 
with  account  numbers,  provides  the  necessary  routing  Information  for  the 
automated  Interchange.  This  routing  strategy  means  that  account 
numbering  can  remain  the  concern  of  each  n3tlonal  banking  sector  and 
need  not  be  consistent  throughout  the  Community.  The  validation of  the 
various  identifiers  including  those  necessary  for  the  domeat•c. 
preferably  automated  (In  view  of  the  cost  savings  from  auta.ation) 
postIng  of  accounts,  cou 1  d  be  fac Ill tated  by  a  European  test  Jcey  or 
check  digit, which  could  be  used  by  all  EC  banks. 
Carrier 
136.  The  communication  link  between  ACHs  wt II  be  a  matter  for  tJJ·Iateral 
agreement,  takIng  Into  account  criteria  such  as  reI I  ab I I I ty,  cost  and 
security.  The  parties could  choose  to use  existing networks  such as CDen 
networks  or  SWIFT,  or  other  media.  In  making  this  choice  constderatton 
wou I  d  need  to  be  given  to  issues  such  as  access  to  the  system  {for 
example,  whether  users  would  have  direct  access  into  the  communicat~on 
network)  and  the  rei lability and  number  of  Interfaces. - 32  -
Currency  conversion 
137.  The  bulk  of  RCBP  Involve  currency  conversion  at  some  stage  of  the 
payment  process  and  It  Is  therefore  Important  that  the  procedures 
governing  such  conversion  are  agreed  upon.  (It  is  of  course  also 
des 1  rab le  that  the  system  can  accomodate  RCBP  which  do  not  invo I  ve 
currency  conversion,  but  this may  not  be  possible  from  the outset.) 
138.  Such  procedures should,  in  the first  phase,  ensure  that,  when  remittance 
Is  by  an  AOH,  currency  conversion  takes  place  In  the  remitting country. 
In  addition  It  should  be  the  case  that  funds  "sent"  cross-border  by  an 
ACH  are  denominated  in  the  beneficiary's  currency,  with  those  received 
denominated  In  the  loca 1  currency.  The  costs  of  construct lng 
arrangements  ("modes••>  to embody  such  features  wi II  need  to be  carefully 
assessed,  particularly  In  view  of  their  relatively  short  working  life 
with  regard  to  lntra-EC  currency  conversion.  The  I lkellhood  Is  that  some 
such  modes  will  be  "redundant"  by  1999  at  the  latest.  However,  it  Is 
unlikely  that  this  would  have  a  maJor  Impact  on  the  economic  case  for 
ACH  linkage.  This  economic  case  Is  largely  independent  on  the  number  of 
currencies used  in  the system- Instead  it  rests mainly  on  the  fact  that 
national  payment  systems  within  the  EC  are  not  I Inked  together. 
Rate  of  conversion 
139.  This  Is  a  matter  for  decision  in  each  remitting  country.  Careful 
consideration  will  need  to  be  given  to  the  mode  of  operation  for  debit 
transfers. 
Settlement  arrangements 
140.  The  main  options  for  settlement  arrangements  - which  can  be  either 
direct or  Indirect  - are  as  follows 
- bl lateral  settlement  on  the  basis  of  correspondent  banking 
relationships; 
-settlement  through  central  banks  In  each  Member  State; 
-settlement between  the  ACHs  In  each  Member  State; 
-through a  single settlement  bank  in  each  Member  State which  Is  not  the 
central  bank;  and 
-through  a  single  settlement  Institution  in  Europe  (which  might  or 
might  not  be  a  European  Central  Bank). 
The  Implications  of  each  option  have  not  been  fully  explored  by  the 
Group.  However,  the  pre I iminary  view  of  some  Group  members  Is  that  a 
single  settlement  institution  should  be  used  In  each  country;  others 
would  however  prefer  to conduct  settlement  through  correspondent  banking 
relationships. 
141.  The  Issue  of  settlement  arrangements  should  be  based  upon  gross 
settlement  of  single  currencies  which,  together  with  the  low  value  of 
Items  which  may  be  handled,  significantly  reduces  the  risks  Involved  in 
the  ACH  Interchange.  One  implication of  this  is  that  central  banks  might 
need  to  open  more  foreign  currency  accounts  for  banks.  ThIs  may  be 
difficult  since  central  banks  are  unable  to  "create"/"destroy"  foreign 
currencies when  they  are  in  deficit/surplus,  respectively,  at  the end  of 
the day,  whereas  they  can  create/destroy  their  domestic  currencies. - 33  -
142.  The  settlement  issue  Is  a  complex  one,  requiring  very  careful 
consideration.  Aspects  such  as  the  criteria  for  the  creation  of 
settlement  accounts  and  the  Lamfalussy  principles will  need  to  be  borne 
In  mind,  not  least  by  the  central  banks  entrusted  with  the  task  of 
safeguarding  the  financial  system  against  the  risks  that  could  be 
asaoc I  a ted  with  II nked  RCBP  systems,  r I  aka  that  wou td  be  exacerbated 
were  large value payments  to migrate  to such  systems.  ---· 
MembershiP  and  access 
143.  In  eatabl iahing  any  I inks  between  ACHe,  It  would  be  necessary  for  the 
parties  to  agree  on  who  could  have  access  to  the  systems  and  Who  would 
be  eligible  to  be  direct  members;  who  participates  In  settlement;  and. 
hence,  who  takes  dlr.ect  financial  responsibility  for  lt .. they 
Introduce  to the system. 
144.  Access  to  payment  systems  may  be  indirect,  thus  offering  greater 
flexibility  and  choice  particularly  to  smaller  Institutions  who  do  not 
wish  to  take  on  the  operational  and  financial  duties  of  dtrect 
membership.  This  differentiation  is  acceptable  under  the  Second  Banking 
Directive. 
Time  cycle 
145.  It  is clear  that objectives should ultimately be  set  for  the  following  : 
-delivery time  for  items 
-settlement  time  cycle  (between  ACHs,  but  also  - in  the  longer  run-
between  end-users) 
- final lty of  payment 
-timetable for  handling errors 
- lrrevocabi llty of  payment 
146.  Of  these  criteria,  the  time  cycle  for  settlement  between  ACHs  Is  one 
upon  which  attention  has  already  concentrated.  This  criterion  could  be 
determined  on  a  bilateral  basis  between  ACHs  conducting  Interchange,  or 
collectively  if  there  were  a  number  of  participating  ACHs.  tt  Is 
incumbent  upon  those  who  operate  the  ACH  I ink  to  offer  an  efficient 
service  with  an  agreed  time  cycle  for  settlement.  In  addition.  banta 
will  be  seeking  to  agree  on  maximum  timescales  in  which  a  payment  will 
reach  the  beneficiary  bank.  It  Is  Inappropriate,  however,  for  the  .. 
operational  aspects  to  be  determined  In  advance  of  discussions  between 
participating  ACHs  who  will,  at  that  time,  be  able  to determine what  Ia 
practically  possible  when  the  automated,  and  manual,  aspects  of  t• 
links  in  their  respect lve  nat tonal  systems  have  been  assessed.  (The 
efficiency  of  domestic  payment  systems  has  of  course  implications  for 
other  characteristics  of  RCBP  under. the  ACH  linkage  <and  Indeed  for 
alternative  systems  for  RCBP.  E.g.  it  wi  II  Impact  on  the  cost. 
certainty.  and  security of  such  payments). 
Security and  error  handling 
147.  A minimum  common,  appropriate  level  of  cryptographic  security  will  be 
required  for  the  ACH  Interchange.  Operational  rules  for  the  handling of 
errors will  be  required,  but  these  cannot  be  agreed  until  the  str~cture 
of  interchange  arrangements  between  ACHs  is agreed. - 34  -
Interchange charges 
148.  The  need  for  a  charging  structure and  Its features  will  depend  upon  the 
Infrastructure  finally  selected  for  the  linkage  of  ACHs  and  the  volume 
of  cross-border  payments  processed.  It  shou I  d  be  stressed  that  these 
links do  not  provide a  public utility and  that  freedom  of competition  In 
pricing  Is  essential.  If  ACH  links  are  to  provide  a  cost-efficient 
cross-border mechanism  for  the customer  It  Is  Important  that  Interchange 
fees  are  allowed  to  reflect  changing  costs  In  the  provision  of  the 
service.  At  the  same  time  It  would  be  desirable  from  the  customer's 
viewpoint  for  It  to  be  possible  for  payment  to  be  made  net  of  charges 
and  It  should  be  an  objective  of  any  system  to  provide  for  this 
posa I  b I I I  t y • 
Discussion of  ACH  linkage 
149.  Group  members  stress  that  there  must  be  a  business  case  for  such  a 
system.  Second  a  modest  approach  to  the  establishment  of  such  linkage 
Involving  the  I inkage  of  a  small  number  of  ACHs  which  are  already 
largely  compatible  would  be  preferable  to  one  which  sought  to  embrace 
the  majority  of  Member  States  at  its  outset,  especially  given  the 
cur rent  absence  of  ACHs  or  eQuivalent  systems  In  some  Member  States. 
Third,  the  costs  involved  In  establishing  linkage  are  relatively  small 
in  those  Member  States where  ACHs  are already established. 
cone 1  us 1  ons 
150.  If  a  ayst .. based  on  ACH  linkage on  the  lines described  above  Is  to be 
developed  further,  It  will  be  necessary  for  a  series  of  steps  to  be 
taken.  First  agreement  on  certain  technical  and  applications  standards 
by  banks  Is required - this could be one of  the first tasks of  the CEBS. 
Second,  the •lnl.u. reporting  threshold  should  be  raised  to a  level  of 
10.000  ecu,  In  order  to  bolster  the  bUsiness  case  for  ACH  linkage. 
Third,  attempts should be ..  de  to  Involve  third countries - notably,  but 
not  only,  those  In  the  European  Econo~~lc  Area  - In  the  syst•.  (It 
should  be  reiterated  that  action on  the  above  lines will  benefit other 
types of  l•proved  RCBPS  as well  as ACH  linkage.) 
Direct debiting 
151.  The  essential  feature  of  direct  debiting  is  that  a  payer  authorises  the 
payee  to  collect  payments  from  the  account;  the  collection  Is  done  by 
the  payee's  bank.  The  basic difference of  this  techniQue  as  compared  to 
credit  transfers  If  that  the  payment  process  is  initiated  by  the 
beneficiary,  though  with  the payer's consent  (authorisation).  Instead of 
being  "pushed  through"  a  system  by  a  sender's payment  order,  the payment 
in  the  case  of  direct  debiting  is  .. pulled  through"  the  system  by  a 
collecting order  to  the payee. 
152.  The  infrastructures  of  systems  used  for  direct  debiting  are  basically 
the  same  as  those  used  for  transfers.  In  part i  cuI ar  the  exIst 1  ng  ACHs 
can  handle  domestic  direct  debiting  procedures  as  well  as  transfer 
procedures.  Accordingly,  both existing correspondent  banking  systems  and - 35  -
possible  future  links  between  ACHs  can  in  principle  provtde  the 
necessary  facll itles  for  cross-border  direct  debiting,  provided  tnt 
certain preconditions are met.  A number  of  Individual  banks  have  alreadr 
begun  to offer  their own  cross-border  direct debiting facilities  • 
. .I -
Key  Issues 
153.  The  key  issues discussed  In  section 35  to 119  of  the draft  report apptJ. 
mutatIs  mutandIs,  to  dIrect  debItIng  as  we II .  However,  the  standarde 
which  need  to  be  developed  for  International  direct  debiting  are 
specIfIc  and  dIfferent  from  standards  for  transfer  orders.  The  legal 
Issues  to  be  addressed  with  regard  to  direct  debiting  also  present  a 
number  of specificities. Thus,  before developing  standards,  for  lnat8ne8 
pre-established  formats  for  collecting orders,  It  would  be  necessary to 
analyse  and  compare  different  types  of  direct  debiting  Droc~  .. 
existing  In  various  Member  States.  There  are  differences,  for  Instance. 
In  the  procedures  for  prior  authorisation  of  or  obJecting  to  a  direct 
debit;  these  procedures  vary  from  system  to system  and  also fro. ~r 
State  to  Member  State.  All  this  requires  legal  analysis,  and  posai~&e 
harmonisation,  before  standardisation  In  a  technical  sense  can  te 
carried out. 
154.  The  EDIFACT  group  for  bank  message  development  CEDIFACT  MD  48)  and  in 
particular  the  direct  debit  working  group  of  EDIFACT  have  started to 
look  Into  these  Issues;  however,  some  Member  States  (Spa In,  lrela'ld, 
Portugal)  are  absent  from  this  group.  Moreover,  while  the  work  of  t•t• 
group  should  certainly  be  encouraged  and  should  cont lnue,  it  -
desirable  to  study  the  legal  Issues  In  particular  In  a  more  generally 
based  group.  The  European  BankIng  Feder at ion  is  a I  ready  taking  tftls 
Issue  forward.  A group  Is  being  set  up  under  the  Federation  to conai4ar 
procedural  and  legal  Issues.  Any  resulting  standard  matters  would  1ae 
cons I  de red  by  the  approprIate  standards  body,  be  It  ED I  FACT  or  tile 
Committee  for  European  Banking  Standards  being  established  by  l'-
European  Credit  Sector  Associations. 
CheQues  and  cards 
155.  The  future  ro I  e  of  cheQues  and  cards  in  the  area  of  RCBP  was  not 
discussed  In  depth  by  the Group.  This omission did not  reflect any  Group 
view  that  their  role  was  likely  to  be  unimportant,  or  unproblematic.  It 
signifies  Instead  that  this subJect  was  not  speclflcal ly  Included  In t._ 
Commission's  work  programme  for  the  Group,  coupled  with  the  fact  tbat 
the  short  life of  the  Group  precluded  It  from  exploring  Items  that -.re 
not  included  therein. - 36-
E.  NEXT  STEPS 
156.  In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  analysis,  a  ser les  of  steps  should  be 
taken  as soon  as possible  If significant  Improvements  In  RCBPS  are to be· 
effected.  Most  will  facilitate  Improvements  In  a  wide  variety of  RCBPS. 
Standards 
157.  Agreement  among  banks  on  certain key  standards used  In  payment  systa.s-
e.g.  bank  Identifier codes  should  be  secured.  The  soon-to---be  formed  CEBS 
will  play  a  major  role  In  this  and  should  be  given  every  encouragement 
from  the  Commission,  e.g.  when  It  comes  to  request  status  as  an 
Associated  Standardising  Body  (ASS).  A study  has  already  been  carried 
out  to determine  Ita  Immediate  work  programme. 
Legal  Issues 
158.  Work  on  various  legal  Issues  In  the  field  of  payments  should  commence 
forthwith  In  view  of  the  long  gestation  period  Involved.  A Commission 
working  party should  be  established to undertake  this task. 
Competition  policy 
159.  The  guidelines  on  Community  competItion  policy  with  regard  to  systa.s 
used  for  cross-border  transfers  that  are  set  out  In  Appendix  5,  should 
be  published and  consistently appl led.  Competition  policy should also be 
effectively  enforced  In  other  areas  such  as  the  telecommunications 
sector which  provide vital  inputs  for  RCBPS. 
Central  banks 
160.  Further  work  Is  needed  on  access  criteria  at  a  general  leve~.  by  the 
Commission  as  well  as  by  central  banks.  Central  banks  should  explain 
their  prudential  concerns with  specific payment  systems  as consistently, 
and  as expeditiously,  as  possible. 
Reporting  requirements 
161.  The  Commission  services  should  urgently  explore  with  the  competent 
authorities  the  feasibility  of  raising  the  minimum  threshold  for 
reporting cross-border  payments  In  the Community  to at  least  10.000 ecu, 
and  of  introducing  more  efficient,  electronic,  reporting  procedures  In 
those Member  States where  they  do  not  yet  exist. 
Data  protection 
162.  The  Commission  should  amend  those  features  of  its  proposed  Data 
Protection Directive which  have  been  identified  in  this report  as  likely 
to  Impede  the construction of more  efficient  RCBPS  without  advancing  the 
objectives of  the Directive,  when  It  comes  to  redraft  It  in  the  I lght  of 
Its forthcoming  first  reading  by  the  European  Pari lament. 
, ... 
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ACH  linkages 
163.  Further  Investigation of  the  possibility of  linking  ACHs  and  equlvalent 
systems  Is  required given  the potential  advantages  such  a  system holds. 
Third country  dimension 
164.  The  steps outlined  above,  and  others  recommended  In  this report,  Shaald 
be  coordinated where  possible,  and  appropriate,  with  those  taken outside 
the  community.  COntinued  dialogue,  and  liaison  with  key  third  country 
•players• and  International  organisations (e.g.  ISO,  G10,  UNCITRAL)  wial 
be  necessary  for  this to come  about. 
National  dimension 
165.  The  development  of  more  efficient  domestic  payment  systems  In  M•bef' 
States  which  currently  possess  relatively  Inefficient  syste  .. Is vital 
if  the  benefits  of  all  other  "action"  In  the  field  of  RCBP  Is  to • 
maximised. 
166.  The  Group  should  reconvene  for  one  meeting  In  March  1993- a  year after 
the  publication  of  this  report  - In  order  to  assess  whether  ~ 
proposals  recommended  therein  have  been  acted  upon,  and  If  not  ...._t 
should  be  done  about  it. APPENDIX  1 - TERMINQLQGY 
ACH  <Automated  Clearing H9usel:  an  electronic clearing system,  in  which 
data  on  payment  orders  are  exchanged  by  magnetic  media  or  via  a 
telecommunication  network  and  handled  by  a  data  processing  centre.  See 
also clearing. 
link.:  credit  Institution,  In  the  meaning  of  article  1  of  Directive 
77/780/EEC of  17/~2/1977. 
Batch:  the  transmission  or  processing  of  funds  and/or  securities 
transfer  Instructions as a  set at  a  single point  in  time. 
BeneficiarY:  means  the  person  designated  in  the  originator's  payment 
order  to  receive  funds. 
Cheque  guarantee  card:  a  card  issued  as  part  of  a  cheQue  guarantee 
system.  If  the  cheques  are  written  with  a  valid  guarantee  card,  they 
are,  up  to  a  specified  amount,  guaranteed  by  the  issuing/drawee  bank 
(may  sometimes  be  combined  wIth  another  function  e.g.  a  cash_  card  or 
debit  card). 
Clearing  <or  clearing  sYstem>:  a  set  of  procedures  whereby  financial 
institutions  present  and  exchange  data  and/or  documents  relating  to 
funds  or  securities  transfers  to  other  financial  Institutions  at  a 
single  location  (clearing  house).  The  procedures  often  also  contain  a 
mechanism  for  the  calculation  of  participants'  bilateral  and/or 
multilateral  net  positions  with  a  view  to  faci lltating  the  settlement 
of  their obi igations on  a  net  or  net  net  basis.  See  also netting. 
Qonflrmatlon:  the  process  by  which  a  market  participant  notifies  its 
customers of  the detai Is of  a  trade. 
CorresPOndent  banking:  an  arrangement  under  which  one  bank  provides 
payment  and  other  services  to  another  bank.  Payments  through 
correspondents  are  often  executed  through  reciprocal  accounts  (so-
called  nostro  and  vostro accounts),  to which  standing  credit  lines  may 
be  attached.  Correspondent  banking  services  are  primarily  provided 
across  i nternat lona I  boundarIes  but  are  a I  so  known  as  agency 
relationships  in  some  domestic  contexts. 
Credit card:  card  indicating  that  the  holder  has  been  granted  a  I ine  of 
credit.  It  enables  him  to make  purchases  and/or  draw  cash  up  to  a  pre-
arranged  ceiling;  the  credit  granted  can  be  settled  in  ful I  by  the  end 
of  a  specific period,  or  can  be  settled  in  part,  with  the  balance  taken 
as  extended  credit.  Interest  is  charged  on  the  amount  of  any  ex tended 
credit  and  the  holder  is  sometimes  charged  an  annual  fee. - 2  -
Credit  transfer:  one  or  more  payment  orders,  beginning  with  the 
originator's  payment  order,  made  for  the  purpose  of  placing  funds  at 
the  disposal  of  the  beneficiary.  In  the  course  of  a  credit  transfer, 
payment  orders  may  be  transmIt ted  through  separate  credIt  transfer 
systems. 
Qystq~~r:  Is  to be  clearly defined as originator  (the person  who  Issues 
the  transfer  order)  or  benefIcIary  (the  party  to  whom  the  funds  are 
allocated  through  the  crediting  on  his  account  or  through  the  sending 
of  a  statement  enabling  him  to  receive payment  of  the  funds). 
Debit  card:  card  enabling  the  holder  to  have  his  purchases  directly 
charged  to  funds  on  his  current  account  at  a  credit  institution  (may 
sometimes  be  combined  with  another  function e.g.  that of  a  cash  card or 
cheque  guarantee card). 
Direct  debit:  debit  on  the  debtor's  bank  account  initiated  by  the 
creditor,  based on  the  prior written agreement  of  the  debtor. 
Direct  oartlctoant:  participation  in  (or  membership  of)  an  interbank 
funds  transfer  system  or  a  securities  settlement  system  may  be  direct 
or  Indirect  either  as  regards  the  exchange  of  oayment  orders  and/or  as 
regards  settlement.  A  direct  participant  exchanges  payment  orders 
and/or  settles  directly  with  other  participants;  an  indirect 
part iclpant  uses  a  direct  participant  to  exchange  orders  and/or  to 
settle on  Its behalf.  See  also settlement  member. 
Electronic  Data  Interchange  CEDI>  and  EDIFACT:  electronic  exchange  of 
data  between  commercial  entities  (including  in  some  cases  public 
administrations)  on  the  basis  of  universally  accepted  standards  for 
both  the subject matter  and  the  format  of  the messages.  Data  pertain  to 
a  wide  spectrum  of  message  categories  such  as  ordering,  invoicing, 
customs  documents,  remittance  advises  and  payments. 
The  standardisation  process  is  carried  out  under  the  umbrella  of  a 
United  Nations  body  called  EDIFACT  (Electronic  Data  Interchange  for 
Administration,  Commerce  and  Transport). 
Electronic  funds  transfer  at  point-of-sales  <EFT  POSl:  transfer  by 
electronic  means  of  payment  information  from  a  terminal  at  a  retail 
location  which  is  designed  to capture,  and  in  some  cases  also  transmit 
such  payment  information. 
Face  to Face  paxments:  refer  to  payments  carried out  on  the  spot  (e.g. 
by  a  person  travel I ing  tq  another  country)  between  a  resident  and  a 
non-resident. 
Final  settlement:  settlement  of  the obligations  between  two  parties  by 
Irrevocable  transfer  of  credit  across  their  accounts  at  a  defined 
settlement  Institution. - 3  -
Funds  Cor  money>:  inc I  udes  credit  in  an  account  kept  by  a  bank  and 
includes  credit  denominated  in  a  monetary  unit  of  account  that  is 
establ lshed  by  an  intergovernmental  Institution or  by  agreement  of  two 
or more  States. 
Gross  settlement  system:  a  transfer  system  In  which  each 
transfer  or  debit  collection  order  is  settled  Individually 
without  netting debits against credits). 
credit 
(i.e. 
Interbank  funds  transfer system:  a  formal  arrangement,  based on  private 
contract  or  statute  law,  with  multiple  membership,  common  rules  and 
standardised  arrangements  for  the  transmission  and  settlement  of  money 
obligations arising  between  the members;  the  transfers  may  be  made  for 
the  members •  own  account  or  at  the  request  of  their  customers  (on 
either  an  agency  or  principal  basis).  Interbank  funds  transfer  systems 
Include gross or  net  settlement  system. 
Large  yalue  transfer  system  Cor  wholesale  transfer  sxsteml:  interbank 
funds  transfer  system  through  which  large  value  and  high  priority  fund 
transfers are  made  between  banks  for  their  own  account  or  on  behalf  of 
theIr  customers.  Though  as  a  ru I  e  no  m  i  ri imum  va I  ue  is  set  for  the 
payments  they  carry,  the  average  size of  payments  through  such  systems 
is  relatively  high.  The  scope  of  "wholesale"  or  "high  value"  or 
"relatively  high"  has  not  yet  been  defined  precisely  In  the  context of 
the Commission•s  work. 
Nett lng  Cor  nett lng  schemes>:  an  agreed  offsettIng  of  posit Ions  or 
obi lgations  by  trading  partners  or  participants  in  a  system.  The 
netting  reduces  a  large  number  of  individual  positions  or  obligations 
to  a  smaller  number  of  positions.  Netting  may  take  several  forms  which 
have  varying degrees of  legal  enforceabi 1  ity  in  the  event  of  default of 
one  of  the parties. 
Originator:  means  the  issuer  of  the first  in  a  series of  payment  orders 
Payments:  Payments  refer  to  both  remote  payments,  whether  carried  out 
by  credit  transfers,  cheques  or  other  means,  and  face-to-face  payments, 
whether  carried out  by  Eurocheques,  cards or other means. 
Payment  order  Cor  payment  Instruction>:  an  order  or  message  requesting 
the  transfer  of  funds  (in  the  form  of  a  claim  on  a  third  party)  to  the 
order  of  the  beneficiary.  The  order  may  relate  either  to  a  credit 
transfer  or  a  debit  transfer.  Relevant  are  written  and  in  particular 
electronic orders. 
Prepaid card:  a  card  "loaded"  with  a  given  value,  paid  for  in  advance. 
Remote  payments:  imply  the  process of  sending a  payment  across a  bor.der 
by  an  originator  remaining  in  his country of  residence. - .. -
Retail  transfer sYstem:  Interbank  funds  transfer  system which  handles  a 
large  volume  of  payments  of  relatively  low  value  In  forms  as  cheques, 
small  credit  transfers,  direct  debits,  and  payments  at  the  point  of 
sale;  the  scope  of  "retail" or  "low  value"  or  .. small  credit  transfer" 
has  not  yet  been  defined  precisely  In  the  context  of  the  Commission's 
work. 
S.ttiiiOnt:  completion  of  a  payment  or  the  discharge  of  an  obligation 
between  two  or more  parties.  Frequently used  to refer  to the payment  or 
discharge  of  interbank  transactions  or  a  series  of  prior  existing 
transactions.  See  also final  settlement  and  gross settlement  system. 
Settlement  agent:  the  Institution  Initiating  the  final  settlement  of  a 
clearing, on  behalf of all  ParticiPants. 
$ttt1111nt  finalitY:  refers  to  the  point  at  which  the  final  and 
Irrevocable  transfer  of  value  has  been  recorded  in  the  books  of  the 
relevant  settlement  Institution.  The  timing  of  a  settlement  can  be  any 
of  the  following:  immediate,  same  day  <end  of  day),  next  day. 
Settlement  Institution:  the  Institution  across  whose  books  transfer 
takes place  to achieve settlement. 
Settlement member  Cor  particiPant>:  a  member  of  the system  that  holds  a 
settlement  account  at  the  settlement  institution.  Non  settlement 
members  settle their  positions using  a  settlement member). 
S.W.I.F.T.  Society for  Worldwide  Interbank  Financial  Telecommunication 
an  International  financial  transaction  message  network.  Created  and 
owned  by  banks,  the  network  is  also  avai I  able  to  some  categories  of 
non-bank  institutions. 
SYstemic  risk:  the  risk  that  the  failure  of  one  ParticiPant  in  an 
Interbank  funds  transfer  system  or  securities settlement  system,  as  in 
financial  markets  generally,  to  meet  his  required  obligations  will 
cause  other  participants or  financial  firms  to  be  unable  to meet  their 
obligations when  due. 
Tiering  arrangement:  an  arrangement  allowing  a  bank  which  does  not 
directly  participate  in  funds  transfer  <or  securities  settlement) 
systems,  to operate  through  the  services  of  another  bank,  which  Is  a 
member  of  the system.  See  also direct ParticiPant. 
Truncation:  a  procedure  in  which  the  physical  movement  of  paper  Items 
within  a  bank  or  between  banks  is  curtailed,  being  replaced  by  the 
transmission  of  alI  or  part  of  their  content  in  electronic  form. 
t ~APACS 
A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X  2 
CROSS-BORDER  PAYMENT 
SYSTEM  INFRASTRUCTURES 
Association for Payment Cleariaq Ser.ices 
Mercury  House,  Triton Court 
14  Finsbury Square 
London  EC2LA  lBR 
Telephone  071-711  6200 
Fax  071-256  5527 I  INTRODUcnON 
There is a wide variety of  remote payment mechanisms available to individuals and stnall 
and medium-sized enterprises for the transfer of value from one country to another.  These 
payment mechanisms cover the spectrutn from the use of  cash, through cheques and 
coaespondent banking arrangements, to automated systems such as SWIFT.  The purpose 
of this paper is to set out the basic payment mechanism infrastructures.  Existing payment 
systems can then be compared to these infrasuuctures in order that potential gaps or  t 
shortcomings in the services offered to customers can be identified.  The choice the 
customer has to make between the use of one or other of the mechanisms offered by the 
banking industry and outlined in this paper will depend upon factors such as: 
- the value being transferred; 
- the cost incurred in, for example, currency conversion and commission for the 
transportation of  the funds; 
- the risk of  loss through theft, fraud or failure of  the system; and 
- speed 
TI1ese last three issues -costs, risk and speed- are a.tuong the consu1ner's main concen1s 
in making a cross-border payment. 
II  PATM.ENTStS1'EMINFRASTRUCTURES 
1  Common flenw:ails 
The common elements in any payment system which need to be considered in  constructing 
any such system are set out below.  The list is in terms of a cross-border system and 
therefore includes currency conversion. 
(a)  Type of  payment 
,  tl 
(b)  Message format 
(c)  Routing identifier 
(d)  Carrier 
(e)  Currency conversion 
(f)  Metnbership and access 
(g)  Settletnent arrangements 
(h)  Time-cycle 
(i)  Security 
(j)  Charges. 
(k)  Reponing requirements 
·(a)  Type of  payment 
For any system there needs to be agreement as to whether it will handle debit or credit 
items. or both~ paper or automated/electronic items, individual items or batched items and 
whether there will be any maximum or tninirnum set for the value of items to be handled. 
(b)  Message formal 
In the transmission of any payment between two panies. it is necessary for each pany to  _, 
understand the message.  This can be achieved either by using a conunon format for the 
tnessage, i.e. the same "language" or by each pany being able to conven the messages sent 
into the recipient's format or conven n1essages received into its own format.  TI1ere are 
considerable advantages in using a co1nnton founat. in panicular where a systetn 1nay 
need to be able to expand.  With a conunon fonnat new tnembers silnply adopt that and 
there is minimum disruption to the system:  otherwise each time a new member joins 
existing participants have to change their systems to accommodate conversion into. or out 
of. the new tnernber  ·  s fonnat. 
- .I  -\ 
There are a nwnber of  common formats already in use internationally, for example in 
SWIFT, or being developed, for example, through UN/EDIFACf.  Any new payment 
system could adopt one of  these existing standards, which would be a quicker solution 
than devising a new standard. 
(c)  Roadng identifier 
In  transmitting any payment between payer and beneficiary it is necessary to be able to 
identify the beneficiary's address, be it a home address for the use of the post, or  the 
address of  a bank_account.  Identifiers are thus required to route the payment to the cm:rect 
receiving point. 
Domestic payment systems already have standards for these identifiers such as numbers 
for identifying banks and their branches, often known as sorting codes, and account 
numbers.  There are also some internationally used identifiers such as the Issuer 
Identification Number in card systems or the SWIFT Banking Identifier Code (BIC) which 
is a country and bank identification code. 
When linking systems or developing a new system there is the question of  whether to 
develop a new system of routing identifiers or to adopt existing systems, for example by 
using an existing international identifier in conjunction with domestic sorting codes and/or 
account numbers as required.  Constructing a new standard would not only be vecy 
time-consuming, it could also cause considerable disruption to existing payment systems 
and could be very costly if  it required significant re-investment in equipment. 
(d)  Carrier 
Whatever the payment system used, be it the sending of  a cheque in the post or a 
sophisticated electronic payment system, it is necessary to identify an appropriate canier 
to provide a network or communication link between the parties and to determine the 
functionality of such a carrier.  In some payment systems a number of carriers may be 
used, in others there will be one carrier.  In some, public networks are used, in otheiS., a 
private network may be introduced for the use of the system.  Examples of the networks 
already used in the banking sector and available for automated links are SWIFT, 
VISANET and EPSS.  Alternatively the information can be transferred by the physical 
exchange of tapes or disks. 
(e)  Cam:ncv conversion 
A nwnber of issues arise here, namely whether conversion takes place, where it takes 
place, which currencies are handled by the system and how the rate of conversion is set. 
If the sender initiated the payment in the recipient's currency, e.g. from a currency 
account, conversion would not be needed.  It also might not be needed if  the payment was 
sent in a third currency in which the recipient wished to receive the payment, and which 
was drawn on a currency account. 
The point of conversion may be at the sender, be it the sender's bank or his 
national/domestic clearing house, or at the point of receipt, again by either the recipient"s 
bank or the national/domestic clearing: house.  From the sender's vieV~point, transparency 
is aided if the conversion is undenaken at the sending point. so that the cost of conversion 
and commission is apparent.  This assutnes. of course. that the sender has initiated the 
payrnent in his local currency and the recipient wants to receive a sum in his. local 
currency. 
It is possible to set up a payment system to handle a single currency, or multiple 
currencies.  The decision as to which currencies it will handle is a matter for the panies 
involved. 
- 2 -Setting the rate of conversion can be undenaken in a number of ways depending on the 
degree of competition required.  At one extreme it could be a single rate set by agreed 
national authorities.  At the other extreme it could be a matter left to the discretion of each 
bank to set different rates for different customers. 
The use of one European cunency would, of  course, overcome some of these issues. 
(f)  MaDbersbip aod access 
In any system it is necessary to determine the membership sttucture and arrangements for 
access to the system.  These will depend on a number of  considerations, the paramount 
being the need to maintain the operational and fmancial integrity and efficiency of  the 
system. 
There are three basic structural models.  The fll'St model is of  direct membership only i.e. 
where all panicipants in the system are direct members and hence panicipate in 
settlement; and take full operational and fmancial responsibility for their transactions. 
The second model is of direct rnetnbership and indirect access, i.e. where there are a 
number of direct members who panicipate in settlement and take operational and fmancial 
responsibility for the system, and a number, usually larger, of  indirect panicipants who 
have access to the system under the sponsorship of one or more of  the direct members. 
Physical access to the system may be through a member, orpanicipants may be able to 
input and receive items directly.  Settlement will be achieved through the accounts of  their 
sponsoring member. 
The third model is the same as this second model, except that in addition customers are 
allowed direct access to the system e.g. the right to input tapes directly to an automated 
clearing house.  This is not linked to membership as these are customers of  members, but 
is a practical way of  handling their input and offering service to the customer. 
It can be seen from these models that it is possible to c~nstruct  payment systems such that 
an institution which wants to panicipate need not take on the costs and responsibilities of 
full1nembership.  This is particularly advantageous for smaller institutions who wish to be 
able to offer cenain payment services to their custorners, but who do not have sufficient 
business to make full membership in a particular payment system cost-efficient. 
The other advantage of this dual system of direct membership and indirect access is that it 
i~ possible to set the criteria for membership so as to reduce the risks of  prejudicing the 
integrity and efficiency of  the system.  These are criteria such as a requirement to be 
appropriately supervised and to satisfy the settletnent institution of the ability to meet 
settlement requirements. 
(g)  Settlement ammgements 
Settlement may be effected in payment systems in a variety of ways, through bilateral 
links or through a single settlement body.  The aspects to be considered in deciding the 
appropriate settlement arrange1nents include the risks involved, the size of sums being 
handled, the number of parties involved. and the required time-cycle for settlement. 
For cross-border payments the options would be: 
- bilateral settlement through correspondent banking links 
- settlement through central banks in each country 
- settlement directly between clearing houses in each country 
- 3-
( , 
... 
• 
settlement through a single settlement body in each country which is not the central 
bank 
through a single settlement body for the whole system 
through an amalgam of  some of  these e.g. some countries having a single setdemeal 
point, others with a number of  settlement bodies. 
The BIS recently published a repon of  its conunittee on interbank netting schemes (dte 
Lamfalussy repon) which set out six standards for cross-border and multi-currency nettiaz 
schemes and six principles for the cooperative oversight by central banks of such systemS.. 
These would need to be considered in establishing the settlement arrangements for any 
cross-border payment system. 
(h)  TDDC-cycle 
There are a number of elements to the time-cycle in a payment system.  There is the 
question of the tinte-table for delivering items to the transmission point, e.g. the delivery 
of a tape to the clearing house, to ensure that they are processed within a cenain 
time-scale.  There is the time-cycle for processing, the time-table within which items have 
to be received for settlement on a cenain day, and the time-table for settlement itself.  Tbe 
end-to-end time-scale for processing a cross-border payment is very difficult .to judge 
because of  the mix of automated and manual systems used.  This mix will differ from 
country to country and this difference will be reflected in the time-scale. 
There is also the question of when finality of  payment is achieved, which is as rnadt a 
legal question as one of  time-tables.  Added to this is the issue of whether or not a 
payment is revocable and if  so what the time-table is for revoking a payment.  Fiaally 
there is the issue of  the time-table for dealing with errors, e.g. returned items. 
Obviously, decisions as to what these time-tables should be cannot be taken in isolatioa 
from considerations about practicalities such as the particular systems being used and the 
panies involved. 
(i)  Security 
Consutners' concerns about the risk of loss of a paytnent through fraud or systems failu.n: 
can be accommodated by the introduction of security features and contingency 
mechanisms.  The level of security required may vary from system to system depending 
not oniy on the characteristics of the system itself, but also on the type of payments being 
handled. 
Contingency arrangements should cover not only possible fall-back systems, but also 
procedures for handling errors. 
(j)  Charges 
The charges in any system fall into two categories, fust the charges between the 
panicipants and secondly charges to the customer.  The latter are a tnatter for the 
individual bank and its customers.  As regards charges between the participants. these may 
be inter-bank charges, or inter-clearing house charges and/or charges 1nade by the cle~ 
house on its members.  Depending upon the national (eg Office of Fair Trading in the UK.l 
or regional (eg DG IV) requiretnents. the charges tnay be agreed bilaterally between the 
different parties or be at an agreed rate.  For exrunple. where an existing network was uxd 
as carrier. pan of the contractual agreetnent would relate to the charge for use of  the 
network.  It is not always necessary to have inter-bank or inter-clearing house dtarges  .. bmt 
Competition is normally best seiVed by free negotiations. although this may be impactical 
in a system with a large number of members. 
-4-(k)  Rq>ottiog JeqaiR:mea1s 
The reponing threshold for cross-border payments differs from one Member State to 
another.  Indeed, not all Member States have such a requirement. In  developing a 
cross-border payment system it would be necessary to have regard to this.  For example it 
might be more convenient in a system handling retail payments if  the maximum value to 
be transmitted was related to the lowest reponing level for individual Member States. 
2  Tbe Basic ln&astmctares 
This section sets out the basic infrastructures which are available.  The aim is to show the 
various possible mechanisms which may be used, although for ease of  reference the first 
two are described in relation to panicular payment instruments. 
The various environmental issues listed under Section 3 relate to each infrastructure to 
differing degrees. 
(a)  Cash 
The exchange of cash, the simplest p~yment  medium, only requires the two parties 
concerned i.e. the paying pany (the payer) and the party being paid (the beneficiary) and 
the means of  transmitting the cash between them.  The third pany involvement will be the 
canier i.e. the means used to transmit the cash and a body to undenake c1111ency 
conversion if  ~quiled. The example of  this type of  cross-border payment which follows 
raises many of  the issues involved in the use of  other systems or payment media. 
(i)  PayiDCl1l in sencltz's c:aamcy 
- Mr A withdraws money in currency A from his bank, Bank A. 
- Mr A puts cash in post to Mr B. 
- Mr B receives the cash and takes it to his bank, Bank: B, (or bureau de change) to 
exchange for his own currency, currency B. 
BANK A 
'  t 
MRA 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
c1H 
-5-
BANKS 
MRS 
•  • In  this case Mr  A knows the cost of transponation i.e. the cost of  the postage Slalllp-
He does not know the cost of the currency as he does not know the rate which Mr· B 
will be charged for-convening into currency B. Mr  A cannot be sure, tberefore,. dlat 
Mr  B will receive a particular sum. 
There is a risk of  loss, through error, fraud or failure.  The envelo}>e might be 
delivered to the wrong address, or the address might be incon:ect.  The envelope 
might be opened in transit and the money stolen. The postal system might fail ad 
the envelope might never be delivered. Mr  A has no control on these factms,. 
although he may wish to pay for extra security by sending the envelope by, say, 
registered mail, or take out insurance. 
Finally, Mr  A CaJUlot be certain of  the time the payment will take.  He may know-tbe 
average time taken to deliver such a letter in normal circumstances, but he caDmllt 
guarantee that time-table unless he chooses to pay for extra cenainty by send.iag if  via 
a specialised delivery service. 
Tbe issues for tbe payer are lack of  transparency, the risk of  loss and tbe lime lk-
paymeot will take. 
(ii)  Money scot in  1e0eiver's cWieocy 
Mr  A can gain greater certainty in terms of  the cost of  currency by converting IJiS 
money, CUIIency A, into cunency B at his own bank, Bank A, and sending Mr  B tile 
money in  his own currency.  Mr  A then knows how much the CUireDcy bas  cost ad 
that Mr  B will receive a set amount, which he can spend or pay into his accouut  wilh 
Bank: B. 
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The issues for tbe payer now reduce to the risk of  loss and the time tbe pajiW  will 
take. 
-6-(b)  <lleqae 
When a cheque is used for making a cross-border paym~t,  the process is as follows: 
(i)  Domestic cheques 
- Mr  A writes a cheque from his own cheque book, drawn on Bank A, in currency A, 
and posts it to Mr  B. 
- Mr  B takes the cheque to Bank B. 
- Bank B sends the cheque, for collection, to its correspondent bank in counuy A. 
1bis may be Bank A or another bank, Bank C. 
- Where Bank C is involved, they will send the cheque for collection to Bank A 
through their domestic clearing system (CS). 
- Bank C obtains value in currency A, convens to currency Band the necessary 
credits and debits are entered on the accounts in countries A and B. 
Similar arguments apply here as with the cash model.  Mr A does not know the 
conversion rate which will be used, or any fees which Bank B will levy on Mr  B. 
Neither is he able to know the time which the transaction will take, panicularly if 
Bank C is involved Mr  A knows the cost to him of sending the cheque to Mr  B, but 
does not know the cost of  transponation of  the cheque from Bank B to Bank C and 
through the domestic clearing system to Bank A.  Costs are likely to exceed the value 
of  low-value cheques. 
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Tbe issues for tbe payer axe transpuency and tbe time tbe payment will take. 
- 7-
..  .. (ii)  By ewocbeqoe 
An alternative would be for Mr  A to send Mr B a eurocheque written in cur.reucy B. 
Mr  A would bear the conversion costs in due course and would send Mr B tbe exacr 
amount concerned.  Mr B would take the eurocheque to Bank B for collection.. It 
would then be passed through the national clearing centre (EB) to the clearing cenae 
(EA) in country A for collection.  Mr  A would be charged the conversion and other 
costs when the cheque, or a truncated version thereof, returned to Bank A 
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Competition policy and consnmer protection an: issues for consideration in  R:latima 
to the opentioo of  tbe earocbeque scbeme.  For the payer, the time tbe paymeat will 
take is tbe ptiocipal issue.  The ultimale dwge to the payer is uoknown albe  .-sa 
mel this fact may be of  coocem to tbe payer. 
(c)  Bauk to baok 
These links may be direct or via some form of switch or network.  Essentially a direct Iii* 
is a bilateral arrangement.  In the simplest case, the sender's bank and the recipient's bank 
are correspondents.  Here, there is no need for a separate settlement system or for 
compatible formats since no cross-border clearing is necessary;  local clearing is effected 
in each country via the domestic system. 
The fundamental difference from the previous examples is that Mr A does not send 
payment direct to Mr B. who then has to arrange to collect that payment.  Mr A deals with 
his bank, requesting them to transfer funds to Mr B ·  s account. 
- 8-The procedure is as follows: 
- Mr  A instructs his Bank A to pay Mr  B. 1llis instruction could be for a payment in 
currency A orB or a third currency, eg ecu. 
- Bank A arranges payment with its conespondent in counuy B. 1bis may be Bank B or 
may be another bank, Bank C. 
- If  the coD"Cspondent is Bank B, Mr  B is paid directly into his account. 
- If  the correspondent is another bank - Bank C - then payment will need to be made 
through the domestic clearing system (CS) to Bank B. 
Issues of transpuency and of  curtency costs are as in previous examples.  It should be 
noted that many correspondent banking relationships operate on a manual basis. 
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Tbe payer may be aaaware of  the time dJe p.yment will take which will be dependent 
upon national sySieiDS aDd the pi  ocedwes of  R:Ceiving banks will differ from country to 
country. Tbe beoeficiary is likely to inalr a c::barge for the processing of  tbe payment by 
Bank B aod this COSI is Wlkoown to the payer; ~ncy  is tben:fon: an issue. 
A more complicated case is whe~  the sender's bank. Bank A, does not have a 
correspondent in the country of the recipient's bank so the payment has to be routed 
through a bank in country A which does, Bank D.  That bank's correspondent may or may 
not be the recipient's bank.  Where it is not. the payment has to go through a funher stage 
in each country's domestic system before reaching the recipient's bank.  Thus, in this 
example four banks would be involved. 
-9-
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One way of avoiding these problems is to use a gateway into a switch or network,. wfaic:h 
offers a means of transmitting a message from Bank A•to Bank B but offers no added 
value, rather than having to rely on bilateral relationships.  In this way, multiple hmcBia& 
is also largely avoided. 
In one tnodel of such a system a payment message would be sent by the member banks 
through a gateway into such a network.  An existing service provider, or another tbinl 
party provider, could offer this service.  · 
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Tbe issues for the payer ranain ~  for all these variants of  tbe generic bank  10 
bank  ~laliooship. 11Im: woalcl in additioa be issues regarding tbe integrity of  aoy &bini 
party netwotk  p~ovicter wbicb is 1101 c:oaaoUed by tbe banks.  Tbe risk wbidJ may eame 
from involviog ~  ill tbe prvYisioa of a payment systemS scnice n:quiJa caR:ful 
cousideralion. 
- 10-(d)  Aatomaled Oeariog House to Automaled Oeariog House (ACH to ACH) 
In  this scenario, the sender (ega business/corporate customer) can either input directly to 
his domestic ACH or ask his bank to make the input on his behalf.  The bank or domestic 
ACH makes the currency conversion.  The domestic ACH then transmits the payment 
message to the recipient ACH in the cowttry of  the recipient's bank, where the payment 
can be handled as a domestic item.  ' 
Settlement could be perfonned by means of  a designated bank (  eg the centtal bank) in the 
countty of  each ACH or by means of  correspondent banking relationships. 
The following example of  this scenario is based on a credit insttuction: 
- Mr  A instructs Bank A to make a payment to Mr  B. 
- Bank A submits the payment details to ACH-A. 
- Currency conversion is conducted by Bank A or ACH-A. 
- ACH-A transmits the payment message to ACH-B. 
- ACH-A also transmits settlement details to the settlement body, say settlement 
Bank-SA. 
- ACH-B out sorts the information received and transmits to Bank B. 
- Settlement Bank SA informs settlement Bank SB of  the details of  settlement and their 
respective accounts with each other are credited and debited in the nonnal way i.e. as 
with a correspondent bank link. 
- Settlement Bank-SB informs Bank B of  the receipt of the payment value. 
- Bank B credits Mr B 's account. 
For ease of reference the examples which follow are set out in terms of a single ACH.  It 
may be, however, that in a particular country there is not a single ACH, or that the ACH 
operates as a distributed system rather than being in a single physical location.  lltis 
should be borne in mind when looking at the various infrastructures. 
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The payer is likdy to bave traospareocy of  payment insofar as tbe cum:ocy coowasioa is 
made at tbe bank or ACH in  the sending country.  He may not be aware~  however, of  .ay 
charges levied by Bank B on Mr B. Tbe risk of  loss is no longer a concern. for lbe 
customer because of  tbe secure transmission systems offered by the banks~  allhoagb there 
is a risk of  delay to a payment due to the provision of  wrong or inadc:quale data by Mr A. 
Tbe oeed for acauate data is imporant.  Some uncenainty may still remain regarding the 
time tbe payment will take because of  differences in national systems and the 
intemal/braoch network procedures of  tbe receiving bank. 
- 12-In a variant of the previous example a number of  the operations can be sub-contracted to 
an intermediary or intermediaries.  The ntessage transmission between ACHs could be 
performed using correspondent banking relationships with format and currency conversion 
being undertaken by a nominated bank, as exemplified below.  The correspondent banking 
relationship is also used for settlement. 
In this instance the sequence of  events is as follows: 
- Mr A insttucts Bank A to make a payment to Bank B. 
- Bank A submits the payment details to ACH-A. 
- ACH-A transmits the message to Bank C. 
- Bank C transforms the message into the format for the recipient ACH-B. 
- If  Bank B is the correspondent of Bank C the payment to the account of Mr B can be 
made directly. 
- If  the correspondent is another Bank- Bank D-then the message, in the format of 
ACH-B, is sent to Bank D. 
- The account ofMr B is credited through the domestic clearing via ACH-B. 
- Settlement is realised through the correspondent banking relationship. 
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A further variant illustrates the incorporation. of a 'Super' ACH which is a principal at the 
hub of  the link between ACHs. 
The process here would be: 
- Mr  A instructs Bank A to pay Mr B. 
- Bank A sends the payment message with others to ACH A. 
- Currency conversion is conducted by Bank A or ACH-A. 
- ACH A sorts out the messages for other panicipating countries, including that with Mr 
A's payment, and sends them to the Super ACH for onward transmission. 
- The Super ACH sons the messages received by destination ACH and sends the message 
about Mr A's payment to ACH B. 
- ACH B sends the payment to Bank B for Mr B 's account. 
Settlement could be by a number of methods - correspondent relationships, between 
central banks A and B, between the ACHs or over accounts at the Super ACH. 
I  e:e 
-----------~~-~~----------
8------ ~----8 
4  '  BANK A  BANKS 
_,.......---...._  ----------...._-
I 
I  I  I 
4  '  t  t 
MRA  MRB 
- 14-In the post-1992 Single Market, with membership of an ACH being open to those banks 
throughout the Member States which meet the criteria of domestic systems, then the 
following cross-border payment mechanism could be used. 
In this model Mr  B 's bank B, would be a member of  the ACH in country A. 
Hence: 
- Mr A insttocts his bank to pay Mr  B. 
- Bank A sends the payment to ACH-A. 
- Cuaency conversion is conducted by Bank A or ACH-A. 
- ACH-A outsorts the payment to Bank B. 
- Bank B credits Mr B 's account. 
- Settlement could be done in a number of  ways. 
or, alternatively Mr B's bank is not a member of ACH-A, but has a link with a bank-
Bank C - which is. 
Hence: 
- Mr  A instructs Bank A to pay Mr B. 
- Bank A sends the paym~nt  to ACH-A. 
- Currency conversion is conducted by Bank A or ACH-A. 
- ACH A outsons the payment to Bank C. 
- Bank C transmits the payment to Bank B through the domestic clearing system. 
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Alternatively the reverse may apply;  namely, that Bank A is a member of ACH-B. 
Qarificarioo of  tbe interpretation of  tbe Second Banking Coordination Directive as 
~  membership of  clearing systems. including ACHs9 is urgendy reqaiR:d if  conoems 
~  tbe integrity of such a payment system are to be avoided. 
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(e)  Mixed system 
A mixed system could operate for banks in countries without an ACH or for non-member 
banks in a country with an ACH.  It is not a system as such, more an ad hoc arrangemem 
whereby payments to and from such banks can be incorporated wit:hin:an ACH to ACH 
set-up. 
In this instance, the sending country is part of  an ACH to ACH system.  Therefore the 
sender sends his batch of  overseas payments to the ACH dhectly (or via his bank) in the 
nonnal way.  Amongst his payments, however, is one to a country without an ACH (or to 
a non-member bank in an ACH country).  The sending ACH could then send the payment 
to a nominated bank in  the recipient country which would then forward the payment, by 
whatever means practicable, to the recipient's bank within the pre-determined timetable. 
Obviously the main difficulty here is ensuring the integrity of  the system in the receiving 
country and the complication of settlement arrangements. 
(f)  Global Ddwodc 
In this system, Bank A has a branch in country B, to which it is linked through its internal 
network.  This would also relate to a network of a 'family' of banks such as the Giro banks 
or Cooperative banks. 
The process is as follows: 
Mr  A instructs Bank A to pay Mr B. 
- Bank A transmits the payment message to its branch or 'family' bank in  country B. 
· - If  Mr  B banks with another bank - Bank C - then Bank B will have to ammge for 
payment through the domestic clearing system. 
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In  this scenario, Bank A and Bank B are both linked to third pany networks which offer 
added value such as currency conversion and settlement, e.g. VISA, SWIFT, MastetCard, 
EPSS. 
- Mr A instructs Bank A to pay Mr  B. 
- Bank A inputs the payment to the network. 
- The payment is transmitted to Bank B.  , 
- Bank B credits Mr  B 's account. 
Settlement can be undenaken in a nwnber of  ways. 
1bis  model raises a number of  qaestioos, DOt least legal aod risk issues, about tbe roles of 
the various padies, particalady if  tbe oetwodt is n:spoosible for aaaogiDg sett1emeat. 
BANK A  BANKB 
~~ 
I 
'  '  t  t 
MRA  MRB 
- 17-, 
3.  F..uriroomeDtal Issues 
There are six main issues concerning the environment in which payment systems ·operate9' 
which affect the structure of  those systems, namely: 
- Membership 
- Legal framework 
- Competition policy 
- Consumer protection 
- Risk 
- Technology 
3.1  Membeabip 
It is unclear how the Second Banking Coordination Directive affects the membership rules 
of  private and public clearing houses.  The Directive introduces the principle of  the 
freedom of  establislunent, which means that all institutions authorised in one Member 
State to conduct banking business are free to do so in the other Me1nber States.  Tile 
definition of banking business given in the Directive includes the provision of  money 
transmission services, but it is not clear what this implies for clearing house manbership~ 
It is imperative that the operational and fmancial integrity and efficiency of  payment . 
systems is maintained, one means of which is to set criteria which ensure that cenain 
operational and fmancial requirements are met by the members of any system. 
Clarification of  this issue will assist the development of cross-border payment 
mechanisms in Europe. 
3.2  LepJ. framewOik 
There are many aspects of  payment systems which depend on the legal framework in 
place, ranging from finality of payment to insolvency law.  In a cross-border system the 
issues are less easy to resolve as the legal framework may differ in the countries involved. 
This situation would, of  course, be improved by the hannonisation of  legal systems. In  dJe 
meantime, it is essential for the parties in any payment system to know under which legal 
jurisdiction panicular aspects of the payment system operate. 
3.3  Competition policy 
Payment systems depend on a balance of cooperation and competition.  Cooperation is 
necessary to provide the structure of the system and agree on conunon elements, as 
referred to earlier, such as standards for message formats, settlement arrangements and so 
forth.  Competition is also necessary to provide choice to the user and ensure the quality of 
· the product he receives. 
It is essential, therefore, that competition policy permits cooperation and agreements on 
the essential elements of any payment system.  One of these elements, as identified earl.ief', 
is membership criteria and it is also necessary for competition policy to permit the setting 
of open and objective membership criteria to protect the integrity and efficiency of  any 
payment system. 
3.4  Consumer protection 
Consumer protection considerations may impact on payment systems development in a 
nu1nber of ways.  The system may be structured so as to meet panicular consumer 
requirements.  For example, it may be agreed that currency conversion in a panicular 
system will be undertaken at the sending point in order to aid transparency.  Likewise 
clear rules as to how payments are handled and where liability lies at any point in the 
system should also aid the consumer. 
- 18-3.5  Risk 
Concern about risk in payment systems, panicularly the risk of the failure to settle by a 
member, is a topic which is xeceiving much attention currently.  It may impact payment 
systems in a number of  ways such as in the need for clear membership criteri~ the 
possible application of  value limits on the items handled, and any requirements to build 
exposure limits into the system. The implication of  the Lamfalussy principles must be 
bome in  mind when cousidering risk in  payment systems. The extent to which risk is 
imponant depends on the type of  system and the payments it handles.  It is a more 
significant issue for systems handling large-value payments than for those handling retail 
payments.  , 
3.6  Tedaaology 
As technology advances, it enables new system designs to be introduced.  It also affects 
elements such as security where more sophisticated teclmiques can be used. 
4.  Cooswuer Concems 
The four main questions for the consumer when using a payment system - the costs 
involved, of  currency and transponation, risk of loss and time taken - were identified 
earlier.  This section considers each in tum in relation to panicular system models. 
4.1  Cost of  CULttUq 
The coDSUIIler is obviously concerned to ensure that he is charged a fair price for his 
cwrency, but is also concemed to know what that price will be. The extent to which this 
can be achieved will depend on the structure of  the system and the point of  conversion. In 
the simplest example, of  exchanging cash, the consumer knows the cost of  the c~ncy  if 
he convens it prior to sending it.  H he leaves the recipient to conven the currency then he 
does not pay conversion costs, but does not know when'  it will be convened, the rate of 
exchange and the sum received by the beneficiary.  This is true for any cross-border  , 
payment system between countries with different currencies.  However, it is not always 
appropriate for the conversion to take place at the sender's or initiator's end of the 
transaction within a timescale which enables the information to be provided before or at 
the time of the transaction.  Tite recipient may have asked to be paid in the sender's 
currency.  The ,,sender" may have initiated a debit to an account for a future date for which 
the exchange rate is unknown.  In these and other cases it is not possible to know in 
advar1ce  either when the conversion will take place, or the rate at which it will be done. 
4.2  Cost of  ttaosportation 
Transportation costs will vary according to the service offered and the method used.  Just 
as with the postal system consumers can pay extra for an enhanced service - e.g. speedier 
delivery and extra security - so this can be the case with cross-border payments.  Some 
consumers will wish to pay for increased security, or cenainty of delivery on a panicular 
day.  Others would prefer to use cheaper methods of sending payments.  The important 
feature is that they are aware of the options open to them and the tariff or likely charges. 
' 
In electronic payment systems the costs are greatly affected by the cost of  • 
teleconununication services. which can vru-y  widely frorn one country to another.  Hence 
the competitive pricing of telecornmunication services is an important issue. 
Another significant element of transportation costs. in s01ne systems, is the cost of 
convening payment orders frorn rnanual to electronic form. 
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The example of  a cash payment set out earlier showed the types of  loss which might occur 
and these also relate to non-cash payment systems.  There is the risk~  an error may be 
made, say in the infonnation given about the beneficiary's account, and the payment may 
not reach the correct "addressee". This risk can be limited, however, by having 
ammgements for checldng the voracity of  the data, for example by the use of a test key or 
check digits which verify the infonnation given. The risk of  loss can also be reduced by 
ensuring that there are adequate error handling procedures so that if a payment does not 
reach its comet destination it can be returned and re-submitted with correct details. 
There is the risk of  fraud, but this is reduced by introducing security arrangementS and 
mechanisms. The extent of  these may vary according to the type of  payment being 
handled. 
Finally the risk of systems failure is reduced by checks on the system itself, but the risk of 
failure of  the payment is also reduced by having suitable contingency arrangements so that 
even if  the system does fail the paytnents can be tnade through a back-up system. 
In all of these cases it is important for the consumer to know where liability lies foe any 
error or loss, to whom he has recourse for complaint and from whom he can obtain n:d!ess 
if necessary. 
4.4  TDDe-takm for pajmeut 
The length of  time taken to process a particular payment will depend on the number of 
parties involved and the system used, as well as on the type of  instrument. In most 
payment systems which operate to a given time-table e.g. for delivery of items, processing 
and settlement, it is possible to give the consumer information about the nonnal 
time-cycle of  the payment clearing process itself.  It shopld be noted, however, that jf  any 
error or systems failure takes place then this tune-cycle" may not be met. 
It is also important to appreciate that it is not always possible to know when initiating a 
payment what the value-dating policy of the recipient's bank is.  Tills will affect the time 
at which the beneficiary actually receives value. 
It is also not always possible to identify in advance how many parties will be involv~  for 
example if  the sender's bank doc!; not haYe a correspondent banking link with the 
beneficiary's bank, and what timetables they will be working to. 
·Finally, with certain items which are sent direct to the beneficiary rather than through a 
bank, e.g. cheques, the sender carmot know when the beneficiary is going to ptaem  the 
item for payment. 
There are m~y  reasons, therefore, why it is not always possible to be clear in advance as 
to the timetable for the transfer of value to the beneficiary.  It is, however, normally 
possible for the sender to request that the paytnent reaches its destination within a certain 
timescale, but this may necessitate using a more expensive form of payment. 
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The preceding sections have shown the variety of  elements which combine to make a 
payment system.  There is a great number of  possible combinations all of  which have 
different characteristics and cater for different market needs.  The madtet is best served, 
therefore, by ensuring that there is a variety of  provision and competition between service 
providers.  It is also imponant that there is the necessary cooperation to provide systems 
which enable the parties involved to take advantage of  the increased efficiencies and 
economies of  scale, which are beneficial to both providers and users of  payment systems. 
It is necessary, therefore, that there are no artificial obstacles which prevent  that 
cooperation or which prejudice the provision of  competitive services. The Commission 
has identified a number of areas where obstacles might exist and these are discussed in 
detail in separate papers. 
There are, however, four such obstacles which seem wonhy of  mention here- competition 
policy, legal environment, data protection and standards. 
1.  Competition Policy 
Freedom to compete is essential to enable banks to offer a variety of serviceS to customers 
and to provide the customer with a choice of  products.  However, it is also essential that 
some degree of  cooperation is permitted so that the panics in any payment system can 
agree on the infrastructure of the system such as technical and operational standards and 
time-tables.  It is essential that this ability to make ~ements  for cooperation is clearly 
established prior to developing any new payment systems, and competition law needs to 
be clarified on this point. 
One of the areas of agreement which is necessary is that of  membership criteria.  Here the 
position is not clear under either competition law or the  .Second Banking Directive. 
Again, it is essential that the setting of open and objective membership criteria is 
permitted in the interests of maintaining the integrity and efficiency of  payment systems. 
2.  Legal Eoviroamcm 
There are a number of areas in which legal clarity would be beneficial such as fmality of , 
payment, the legality of netting schemes and insolvency law.  In addition, some 
harmonisation in the legal treatment of payments might be benefir.ial. 
It would also be helpful if  the intentions of the Conunission regarding the UNCITRAL 
work could be clarified. 
3.  Data  Protectioo 
It is essential that payment systems are able to carry out the data processing required to 
transmit payments, which may include elements of personal data.  Current proposals for a 
data protection directive could prejudice thi5 and therefore need to be adapted to reflect 
the practicalities of payment system.~. 
4.  St.aodards 
One element is constant throu~thout all consideration of payment systems development. 
and that is the imponance of ~tafl(l~uls.  lbcse rnay be generic technical standards. tnay 
relate to panicular application~ or rnay be operational standards.  In any case, agreetnent 
on standards enables the inter:k.1ton of parties and the smooth rurming of systems.  The 
development of standards is therefore an area for priority attention. as recognised by the 
banking industry in iu work to establish the industry's Conuninee for European Banking 
Standards. 
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IV  CONCLUSION 
The perception of  the advantages and disadvantages of  different payment systems diffexs 
from customer to customer since they all have different requirements.  No one system can 
provide for all customers' various needs. In general customers are looking for efficient 
payment systems which are provided at a reasonable cost, and for the information to be 
able to make informed choices as to which system best meets their needs.  Banks want to 
be able to cooperate on essential issues such as standards, which will facilitate the 
provision of  payment systems, but also to compete on the products and services offered, 
and to be free to choose which payment systems they wish to join or  pani~ipate in. 
This is best summed up in the statement of  the banking industry's aim which is tojJIOtide 
a JliD8e of  seam:, eflicieot and  robust payiiitUl systtms to  meet  1be diffedDg needs of  aD 
sect~  - gcn:_eiiiiDtD~  "!"~,  bus~  aod_penonal customers -at  a fair p.rioe for  tbc 
sernce provtded aod witbin a wmpettttve wtnO*••cat. 
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APPENDIX  3 
lBEROLB OF STANDARDS INUIE DJNFLOPMBNT 
OF EUROPEAN PAnmNT  SYSTEMS 
JN]'RODUC'I]QN 
The Commission has recognised the important role that standards have to play in  the 
elimination of  technical baniers to trade and has accordingly stated that the reaUsat:ion of 
appropriate standards has become an "economic objective".  This paper assesses wbether~ 
in particular, the lack of  appropriate standards are in effect an obstacle to tJte development 
of  the cross-border payment systems which will meet the needs of  the post-1992 huemal 
market in EEC Member States. 
The development of  standards for cross border payments should either reflect intemational 
requirements or, if  developed at a system or regional level, should be capable of 
acceptance by the international community.  In the context of  the foregoing, SWIFT 
provides a good example where bankers developed a SWIFT standard for message types 
(MT500) which was then subsequently processed through ISO into an international 
standard. 
It is clear that standards have an important role to play in the development and operatioit 
of  payment systems be they national, regional or international. 1bis imponance is 
nowhere more apparent than in the post-1992 internal market where the development of 
appropriate European standards will facilitate the creation of an environment in  which 
European payment systems can evolve. These standards will be those which are required 
to produce efficient, economic and secure payment systems to meet  ·the growing needs of 
the internal market.  Commonly accepted standards in themselves are not necessarily a 
pre-requisite for the development of  individual systems as is evidenced by the inttoducticm 
of  the pan-European Giro network:.  However, for comprehensive interchange between 
systems there is a need for standards to be set so that the efficiency and integrity of 
systems may be maintained.  The standards which provide for the foregoing may be 
categorised as addressing either tec:fmicaJ, application or operalioDal needs. 
TfCHNICAL STANDARDS 
These are standards, typically intersectoral, which provide an international, regional or 
national public domain technical specification.  These arc the generic standards which 
form the basis of  the infrastructures which support the current payment systems. 
Typically these generic standards are the X2S interface protocol for networks;  the 
machine readable characters, such as CMC7, OCRA, OCRB and El3B which are used on 
cheques;  and the magnetic stripe material, which is now used extensively as a storage 
medium on plastic cards.  Choices exist, as exemplified by the machine readable codelines 
and inevitably Member States have adopted different methodologies (eg CMC7 in  France; 
Bl3B and OCRB in  the UK) and this aspect·is returned to later in the paper.  There is a 
wide range of  technical standards in existence which are widely used throughout the 
industry. 
Looking to the future, it is clear that new teclmologies such as image processing will give 
rise to a need for a technical standard which the banking industry will wish to use as and 
when image processing is used in payment systems, be they national or cross border.  In 
addition, it is clear that Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) will be used extensively in the 
future and this is reflected in the work being undenaken on the creation of an EDI syntax 
standard developed by UN/EDIFACf. - 2-
APPUCAUON STANDARDS 
These are standards which cover the requirements of one sector or particular systems 
within that sector or system and are developed by that sector for the use of that sector or 
system alone.  Typically, they use the technical standards as a foundation for the addition 
of those requirements which are specific to an industry or applications within an industry. 
At the industry level an application standard could be exemplified by cheque codeline 
formats, magnetic uack data fonnats, or the Primary Account Number (PAN).  At the 
level of system specific application, this type of standard becomes a specification, such as 
those in place for payment systems such as SIT, BACS and CHAPS.  These standards, 
which differ from one system to another, are created by the members of  the system, but 
may be based on sectoral application standards or technical standards. 
OPERATIONAL STANDARDS 
These standards cover the agreements which have to be reached upon the operation of 
individual systems.  'This includes legal matters and·consideration of issues such as 
procedures, service levels, settlement, supervision, membership criteria and contingency. 
These are matters for consideration by the patties who have the responsibility for and 
undertake the liability regarding the system so as to ensure the integrity and efficiency of 
that system.  Such standards may be legislative, eg the legal requilements regarding 
evidence, or voluntary, ie agreed among the members or  participants in the system. 
Pmp!•nes 
In  running any payment system it is necessary to have agreements as to the procedwes to 
be adopted over and above specific technical standards. 
Procedure agreements may include matters such as the procedures for returning items 
unpaid and conditions under which special presentations can be made.  These are matters 
usually contained in the rules of  the clearing house. 
Sc;ryig; leyds 
The Members of a payment system or clearing may agree minimum levels of service, for 
example a guarantee that, in nonnal circumstances, payments received by a certain 
deadline will be processed by a certain time, such as in the same business day.  TI1ese do 
not detract from the level of service given to customers, rather they ensure that a minimum 
level is offered to all customers. 
All payment systems require a means of effecting settlement.  Agreements are required as 
to how settlement is to be achieved and the procedures to be followed for agreeing 
settlement totals and so on.  This may also include agreement as to the point at which 
settlement can be considered final, although this is a legal as well as a standards issue and 
includes consideration of  the issue of risk.  Setting a standard for the point at which 
settlement is fmal is a matter of agreement between the settlement institution and the 
Members of the system.  In  most cases the onus is on the cenual bank as settlement body. 
Insofar as any central bank or settlement institution was unwilling to agree to fmality of 
payment at a standard time, then this could fonn an obstacle to developing a particular 
payment system. I 
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Sqpenision and ljqpjdjty pandanJs 
Setting standards for the supervision of Members of payment systems and for supervisiCII 
of systems themselves is an imponant element in ensuring the continued integrity of~ and 
public confidence in, payment systems.  Standards for the general suJ?$IYision of  CJalit 
institutions are set by the appropriate authority in each Member  State~  although 
increasingly minimum standards are agreed between these authorities as has been 
necessary to establish the single licence concept of the Second Banking Co-ontinatim 
Directive which, of  course, has the force of  legislation.  Liquidity standards, however. 
remain a matter for the host supervisor. In addition, the settlement institution in  any 
payment system may wish to set standards against which the granting of settlement stat111 
is measure~  and standards for the management of  settlement accounts. 
Agreement on standard membership criteria is also a feature of most payment systemS. 
The aim is to ensure that all Members can meet the standards set for operating in  the 
system, be they teclmical, procedural or fmancial standards.  Such standard criteria  eDSU~~: 
that the system is not jeopardised by admitting a company who cannot operate to the 
standards set, that public confidence in the system is maintained and that customers do ROt 
suffer.  The operational and fmancial integrity of a system could be prejudiced if  a new 
Member were unable to meet its commitments in the area, the standard time-table, or be 
unable to adopt agreed settlement procedures. 
It is usual for the Members of  a payment system to agree contingency arrangementS to be 
adopted in the event of  an operational failure in the system. If  these are to woJk then  eada 
Member must be able to meet the standards set for contingency operations. 
CREADON OF STANDARDS 
The bodies which undenake the standards work just described are diverse.  Nationally. 
regionally and internationally the intersectoral technical standards are develop~ 
legitimised and placed in the public domain by the national standards bodies, CEl'l and 
ISO respectively.  The application standards development is undertaken in the public and 
private domain by sectoral bodies.  An example of system-specific application standanls 
development is the regional cooperation amongst European Savings banks, which has 
resulted in the creation of  Eufiserv - an A  TM network with its own application standard. 
National, regional or international operational standards may be developed by a 
· commercial grouping of  interested panies who comprise a system such as euracbeque  or., 
at a national level, a payment system such as SIT. 
The cooperative sectoral standards activity by the banking community in Europe is being 
coordinated by the Banking Federation, the Savings Banks Group and the Association of 
Cooperative Banks who are setting up a Committee on European Banking Standards 
(CEBS).  It is intended that this body will produce proposals to CEN on publicdomaiD 
teclmical standards and create sectoral application standards - some of which will also be 
in the public domain - to meet the identified needs of the European banking industry.  For 
standards to be placed in the public domain, a formal consultation procedure for 
manufacturers and consumers will take place after the document has reached a mature 
stage.  [This will be of  particular imponance in the development of European payment 
systems.]  The creation of system-specific application standards or of operational 
standards will, on the other hand, be realised by the relevant operational grouping or 
system. -4-
INSIRJJMENTS/MECHANISMS 
The concomitant increase in cross border payments in Europe consequent upon the 
post-1992 internal market is likely to give rise to the creation of new payment instruments 
and mechanisms which will be facilitated by new European standards in all three of the 
categories cited in this paper.  The new instruments and mechanisms will evolve as the  ' 
opponunities presented by the internal market become evident.  It is, however, already 
possible to identify aspects of current cross border payment systems where changes are 
likely to occur and for which standards may need to be created. 
The provision of cash by means of A  TMs is widespread throughout Europe and linkages 
between nationally-based A TM networks have been, and will continue to be, forged on the 
basis of commercial considerations so that it is possible to use A  TM facilities as one 
moves from one country to another.  The Visa, eurocheque, Euftserv and Nexus systems 
are but four examples of the providers of  this cross border facility.  The internationally 
agreed technical standards which make this interchange possible are already in place. 
In the event of the introduction of a single currency in the EEC member states, it would be 
necessary for the A  TMs in these countries to be able to handle this cumncy as the sole 
currency dispensed.  European standards for the A  T.M:s dispensing the currency would be 
required at that time. 
'"'"  debjt:; 
A variety of  domestic cheque and codeline formats are used in the countries of the EEC. 
The invesanent in each Member State in the provision of  systems which are based on 
these domestic fonnats has been considerable.  In addition, there is a general move 
throughout the Conununity to encourage the use of 'electronic' instruments such as debit 
cards which, together with the possible use of fmancial EDI, will lead to a reduction in the 
use of cheques.  In such an envirorunent it would be economically impractical to seek the 
introduction of new equipment and systems based on a standard pan-European cheque 
codeline.  Such a course could not, in any event, be introduced at a stroke and would 
therefore necessitate two codeline systems running side-by-side for some considerable 
time which would cause confusion to customers who would be holding two cheque books, 
and necessitate considerable additional expense in the running of duplicate systems - a 
cost which would have to be passed on to the customer in charges.  However, eurocheque 
is a European paper debit instrument which has overcome the aforementioned problems. 
Indeed, the recent increase in the value limit will now make this instrument even more 
attractive for cross border payments.  Should the super European cheque concept, as 
proposed by the Forum of Private Businesses, be accepted then there will be a need to 
consider how this might be made to work. 
Debit Tm:Pr;r 
There will be scope in the internal market for the creation of new instruments to meet 
market demands.  One such, is the proposal by French bankers for a European debit 
transfer.  This will be a topic for consideration within the banking community and 
application and operational standards will be created to meet the identified needs.  This 
new insaument would enable banks and their coq>orate customers to promote a means of 
cross-border payment which has proved to be successful in many European countries. I 
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The situation with regard to paper credits is the same as that detailed for debits. 
Widespread cross border use of paper collection credits (eg payment to suppliers) depends 
upon codeline standardisation, whereas dispersal credits (eg payroll andldividend 
payments) can be presented using the domestic code  line for subsequent automated 
processing. 
The Gennan bankers have come forward with a suggestion regarding a European payment 
using a standard fonnat for electronic cross border messages but pennitting each member 
state to use their own national standards for the paper insttument.  This will be a topic for 
discussion by the banking industry and where appropriate standards might prove necess81J'  .. 
I  inking of  ACHs or  iustilutioos 
The linking of ACHs, or indeed institutions or groups of institutions, would provide 
facilities capable of  handling both regular payments and one-off payment instructions. 
There are a range of ways in which the interface between these may be achieved.  For 
example, outgoing payments could be translated into the fonnat required by the tecipient 
or, alternatively, a common interchange fonnat could be developed.  In order to minimise 
costly conversion operations in the in#iating or receiving countries whenever a new ACH 
link is forged, it would be convenient to use a common interchange fonnat which could be 
the SWIFT :MTI 00 or BULP  A Y with possible future evolution into EDIF  ACT  message 
types.  Nonetheless, banking industry application and, maybe, operational standards will 
be required so that the linkages can operate efficiently and the integrity of  the network 
may be maintained.  These standards will probably cover: 
i)  the message fonnat to be used if  a conunon interchange protocol is to be adopted -
this could be based upon a SWIFT or UN/EDIFACT technical standard; 
ii)  an operational standard to specify where and how the currency conversion is 
conducted - is it the responsibility of the sender, the recipient, or both, and is only 
one rate applied for each currency or should each remitter or receiver be pcnnitted 
to apply a competitive rate; 
iii)  interface protocol from each national ACH fonnat to the common or independent 
ACH fonnat- an application standard;  and 
iv)  operational arrangements for settlement. 
All these are issues which the banking industry would be able to address in the CEBS 
and/or as pan of discussions between European ACHs or institutions. 
In addition, there is a need for the customer to comply with standards if  a direct or indirect 
interface into an ACH or institution may be achieved.  1bis is an operational standard 
promulgated by the ACHor institution which enables input by a customer.  An example of 
such a standard is that which permits customers to directly input into BACS. 
Bank-ar&OUDt identifieu/agtbegtjcators 
In the context of paper credit, debit and interchange there will be a need to agree standards 
for bank identifiers so that payments may be routed correctly.  This will be an application 
standard which could be the Bank Identifier Code (BIC) used by SWI.Ff.  11tis provides 
routing to banks and would require extending at a national level to route to branch level. 
The use of the BIC with an extension to incorporate branches could be implemented at a 
national level without causing undue disturbances to existing systems.  In addition. the 
field specification for the account number will need to be agreed so that payments may be 
posted automatically. -6-
In addition a proposal has been made for the development of a European integrity key - an 
application standard - to reduce the number of  rejected items and enable the return of 
items to be automated.  A standard for message and operation-type identifiers may also 
prove to be necessary. 
Both of  the foregoing topics will be considered by the banking industty in the CEBS as the 
discussions on cross-border payment systems develop. 
The standards for interchange using magnetic stripe cards issued by the banking sector 
have formed ·the basis for the cross border activity with such cards which is evident today. 
These standards - work upon which is either completed or underway - cover aspects such 
as authentication of  the participants to the transaction, namely the cardholder, card and 
terminal;  the authorisation of  the transaction;  and the clearing and settlement of  the 
transaction. 
The creation of  standards to ensure the use of  the IC card as a multi-sector instrument in 
Europe is being addressed by CEN with the full participation of  the banks. 
CONCLUSION 
The standards required by the banking industty to meet the needs of  cross border payment 
systems in a cost effective manner are many and varied. In  the public domain they are 
being dealt with internationally under the procedures laid down by ISO and 
UN/EDIFAcr, and in Europe within CEN.  To expedite the input of  technical standards 
into CEN and the creation of  banking sector application standards the CEBS is being 
created.  It would be appropriate that this body should be accepted as a banking sector 
Associated Standardismg Body (ASB) by CEN. Such a move would be in the spirit of  the 
proposals embodied in  the Commission Green Paper on,the Development of  European 
Standardisation:  Action for faster technological integration in Europe [doc: 
COM(90)456].  The creation of  the CBBS, and the intention to apply for ASB status, 
indicates the desire of  the banking industty to participate in the creation of  an environment 
in which the payments systems in the internal market can flourish to the benefit of all. 
The banking industry recognises and accepts the vital role it has to play in the creation of 
standards.  These standards should, wherever possible, be based upon existing 
international standards.  Where these do not exist, new standards would be created which 
maintain the integrity of  existing systems by creating the minimum of  disruption and, in 
addition, provide the opponunity for competition and commercial initiative. 
The participation of  the European banks in the standardisation work of  ISO, 
UNIEDIFAcr, CEN and now CEBS indicates that the industty is capable of  ensuring that 
the standards which are necessary for cross-border activity are produced in good time. 
The industry acceptance of  the urgency now attached to the creation of  standards in 
Europe is evidenced by the creation of CEBS. The infrasuucture for the creation of 
technical and application banking standards is in place.  Operational standards, on the 
other hand, are the concern of the members of  each system and will be determined so as to 
ensure that efficiency and integrity are maintained.  The banking industty, therefore, has 
the ability to respond positively and rapidly to the requirements for standards which arise 
as the intemal market evolves. 
This paper demonstrates the continuing need for standards and that the mechanisms for 
identifying, developing and supporting all the categories of standards required, be they 
technical, application or operational, are in place excepting the banking sector ASB, for 
which approval will be sought from CEN in due course, and that the providers of  these 
mechanisms should now be encouraged to position themselves to act to meet the evolving 
needs of  the internal market. 
18 November 1991 BAt«  OF  FRANCE 
Legal  services Directorate 
Paris.  15 October  1991 
PAYMENT  SYSTEMS  TECHNICAL  DEVELOPMENT  GROUP 
APPENDIX  4  LEQAL  ISSUES 
1.  By  definition,  all  cross-border  payments  between  two  Community 
countries  Involve  at  least  two  separate  legal  systems:  that  of  the 
originator's  country  and  that  of  the  recipient's  country.  They  may 
also  involve  the  national  law  of  one  or  more  banking  tntermed_lartes 
In  a  country  other  than  that  of  the  or tglnator  or  the  recipient. 
especially  if  the  currency  used  is  that  of  neither  party's  country .. 
It  is  even  possible  that  a  payment  by  one  COmmunity  national  to 
another  could  involve  the  law  of  a  non-member  country  If  the currency 
of  payment  were  a  non-Community  currency,  e.g.  the us  dollar1. 
2.  This  will  be  the situation until  legal  rules  governing  payments  have 
been  harmonized.  Despite  the  effort  that  has  already  been  made 
within  the  Communlty2,  harmonization  cannot  yet  be  said  to  have 
taken  place.  Moreover,  these  Initial  moves  towards  closer 
coordination have  taken  non-binding  form  (recommendations  rather  than 
directives  or  regulations).  Practical  achievements  have  been  rather 
disappointing;  for  example,  as  regards  payment  cards,  only  France  and 
Belgium  appear  to  have  taken  any  notice  of  the  Recommendation  of  17 
November  1988  and  apply  it almost  in  its entirety. 
1  In  thIs  case,  under  Regu I  at ton  J  of  the  Feder a I  Reserve  Board • 
. payments  through  FEDWIRE,  including  relations between  originators and 
recipients,  are  governed  by  US  law,  and  In  particular  by  Article  4A 
of  the  Uniform  Commercial  Code.  This  means  that,  strictly speaking. 
basic  relations  between,  say,  an  Italian  originator  and  a  German. 
recipient  of  a  dollar  transfer  passing  at  some  stage  through  FEDWIRE 
would  be  subject  not  to  Italian or  German  law,  or  to  a  national  law 
chosen  by  the parties,  but  to us  law. 
2  Commission  communication  to  the Counci I of  12  January  1987  on  payment 
cards; 
Recommendation  of  8  December  1987  on  a  code  of  conduct  relating  to 
electronic payment; 
Recommendation  of  17  November  1988  concerning  payment  systems; 
Reconvnendation  of  14  February  1990  on  the  transparency ·of  banking 
conditions relating  to cross-border  financial  transadtibns. - 2  -
3.  Cross-border  means  of  payment  do,  of  course,  exist,  in  particular  for 
small  amounts  (Eurocheques,  cards  affiliated  to  the  Visa  or 
Mastercard  network,  etc.),  but  they  stem  from  private  Initiatives and 
are  not  specifIc  to  the  COtNnun i ty.  Moreover,  they  are  based  on 
contractual  agreements  whose  legal  validity  is  circumscribed  by  the 
rules,  including  public  policy  rules,  in  each  of  the  countries 
concerned. 
These  means  of  payment 
part lcular  payments  by 
bus 1  nesses . . 
do  not  cover  all 
correspondence  or 
retail  payments,  In 
payments  by  sma II 
4.  At  the  statutory  level,  there  is  no  harmonization  of,  or  even 
compat lblllty  between,  . cheques,  transfers,  electronic  payments, 
operating  rules  for  systems  Involving  the  exchange  of  means  of 
payment,  duties  and  responsibilities  of  banks,  discharge  of 
liability, or  bankruptcy. 
The  most  sophisticated  attempts  to  harmonize  laws  on  payment  systems 
have  been  made  outside  the  Community:  work  by  the  United  Nations 
Commission  on  International  Trade  Law  (UNCITRAL)  on  a  draft model  law 
on  International  credit  transfers,  application  of  the  Lamfalussy 
report  on  netting systems,  etc. 
5.  What  is  more,  moves  towards  harmonizing  the  rules  governing  the 
taking-up  and  pursuit of  the business of  credit  institutions,  through 
the  two  banking  coordination  Dlrectlves3,  do  not  cover  the  whole 
field  with  which  we  are  concerned  here.  In  Community  law,  the 
Issuing  and  management  of  means  of  payment  are  included,  pursuant  to 
the  second  Directive,  in  the  list  of  activities eligible  for  mutual 
recognition  but,  unlike  the  granting  of  credit  and  the  taking  of 
deposits,  they  are  not  activities  that  can  be  carried out  solely  by 
credit  institutions.  Under  French  law,  on  the  other  hand4,  the 
issuing  and  management  of  means  of  payment  are  activities  reserved 
for  credit  institutlons5.  The  result  of  these  differences  is  that  a 
body  managing  a  payment  system  (clearing  house,  central  counterparty 
in  a  multi lateral  netting  system,  etc.>  would  need  to  be  a  credit 
Institution  if  established  in  France  but  would  not  necessarily 
require such  status under  Community  law. 
6.  The  existence of different  legal  systems  for  payments  is all  the more 
likely  to  be  seen  as  an  obstacle  since,  for  reasons  of  economic 
public  order,  banking  and  financial  activities  In  general  and 
payments  in  particular  have  traditionally  been  regulated activities. 
There  would  certainly  exist  fewer  divergences  between  the  various 
systems  of  1  aw  1  n  the  Conunun it  y  - and  there  fore  I  ess  need  for 
harmonization  - if  each  country  did  not  have  a  set  of  national  laws 
governing  systems  of  payment  (national  currency  unit,  means  of 
payment,  banking  law,  bankruptcy  law,  etc.). 
3  Directives  77/780/EEC  of  12  December  1977  and  89/646/EEC  of 
15  December  1989. 
4  1  t  wou I  d  appear  that  a  draft  I  aw  with  simi I  ar  effect  is  under 
consideration  in  Italy also. 
5  Article 1 of  the  French  Banking  Law  of  24  January  1984. - 3  -
7.  The  purpose  of  thIs  paper  is  to  rep I  y ·to  the  Quest ion  whether  the 
existence  of  different  legal  systems  within  the  Community  is  an 
obstacle  to  the  establishment  of  a  cross-border  payment  system  and 
then,  if  necessary,  to  examine  possible  ways  of  surmounting  that 
obstacle. 
IS  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  DIFFERENT  LEGAL  SYSTEMS  AN  OBSTACLE? 
a.  For  convenience  sake,  we  will  dlst lnguish  between  legal  problems 
concerning means  of  payment  and  those concerning systems of  payment. 
Means  of  payment 
9.  In  general  terms,  some  Community  countries  have  legal  provisions of 
their  own  regulating  the  use  of  different  means  of  payment,  while 
others  do  not.  For  example,  the  concept  of  legal  tender  is  included 
In  some  legislations,  making  It  possible  to  refuse  payments  made  by 
means  not  ranking  as  such.  In  France,  for  example,  payments  made 
otherwise  than  by  means  of  French  banknotes  (or  coins  for  small 
amounts)  may  be  refused.  The  legislations  of  other  countries  (e.g. 
United  Kingdom>  do  not  appear  to  include  this  concept  of  legal 
tender. 
Conversely,  other  types  of  legal  provision,  often  from_  the  body  of 
tax  law,  make  it  compulsory  to use  specific monetary  instruments  for 
particular  payments.  In  France,  for  example,  business  payments  and 
salary payments  in  excess of  FF  10  000  (about  ECU  1  400)  must  be  made 
by  crossed cheQue  or  bank  transfer,  not  in  cash. 
such  differences  between  national  legislations may  be  an  obstacle to 
the  establishment  of  a  European  payments  system  to  the extent  that  a 
valid  payment  in  the  debtor's  country  <i.e.  a  payment  made  using  a 
suitable  instrument)  might  conceivably  turn out  to  be  invalid  in  the 
creditor's country or,  at  least,  liable to a  tax  penalty. 
1  o.  The  I  aw  governIng  cheQues  is  not  the  same  everywhere.  Not  a II  the 
Member  States of  the  Community  have  adopted  the  rules  annexed  to the 
Geneva  Convention  of  19  Uarch  1931,  in  particular  the  United  Kingdoa 
and  Ire I  and.  Indeed,  the  Convent ion  i tse If  authorizes  a I ternat ive 
approaches  to  certain points.  Under  English  law,  the  ownership  of  a 
sum  of  money  is not  transferred by  virtue of  the  issuing of  a  cheQue. 
so  that  cheQues  may  be  stopped;  under  French  law,  on  the other  hand. 
the  bearer  of  a  cheQue  acQuires  ownership  as  soon  as  the  cheQue  has 
been  issued  and  payment  may  be  stopped  only  if  the  cheQue  is  lost or 
stolen, or  if  the bearer  is bankrupt. 
The  rules  as  to  when  ownership  of  the  amount  entered on  a  cheQue  is 
transferred  affect  precautionary  or  enforceable  distraint  orders  in 
respect  of  the  funds  In  Question. 
ProvIsions  reI at I  ng  to  dishonoured  cheQues  are  a I  so  different  from 
one  country  to another. - 4  -
11.  Rules  governing  transfers are not  harmonized. 
While  some  Community  countries  have  brought  In  statutory  provisions 
regulating  the  system  of  transfers,  others  have  Introduced  virtually 
no  specific  provisions,  relying  Instead  on  the  general  law  of 
obligations  covering,  for  example,  money  orders  (France>  or  renewal 
by  change  of  debtor  (Spain).  It  Is  then  up  to  the  courts  to  apply 
these general  rules. 
Moreover,  when  specific  rules  do  exist,  they  cover  paper  transfers 
but  rarely or  never  electronic transfers. 
This  absence  of  harmonization  entails different  answers  to questions 
such  as whether  a  transfer order  Is  Irrevocable or  when  a  transfer  Is 
complete  <I.e.  when  llablll ty  Is  discharged}.  For  example,  under 
French  case  law,  a  transfer  order  cannot  be  revoked  once  the 
originator's account  has  been  debited;  payment  Is  deemed  to have  been 
made  (i.e.  the debt  Is  extinguished}  once  the recipient's account  has 
been  credited.  Under  one  section  of  Belgian  case  law,  transfer 
orders may  be  revoked  until  such  time  as  the amount  to be  transferred 
has  been  entered  as  a  credit  on  the  recipient's  account  (this  rule 
also  applies  in  Italy  and  Germany),  while,  under  another  section, 
they  may  not  be  revoked  once  settlement  has  been  made  between  the 
recipient's bank  and  the originator's bank. 
For  the  rest,  most  cou~tr ies  a I low  the  time  when  transfer  orders 
become  irrevocable  to  be  changed  by  contract  to  an  earlier  or  later 
date  than  that  reQuired  by  case  law  or  statute.  For  example,  under 
the  operating  rules  for  the  SWIFT  system,  transfers  notified  via 
SWIFT  cannot  be  revoked. 
In  view  of  the deslrabll ity of  promoting  the use  of  transfers,  and  In 
particular  electronic  transfers,  as  payment  Instruments  within  the 
Community,  differences  in  nat iona I  I  aw  may  be  an  obstacle  to  the 
establishment  of  an  efficient payment  system.  For  example,  it may  be 
that  an  order  to  revoke  a  transfer  order  issued  In  a  country  where 
revocation  is  authorized  after  issue  cannot  be  handled  by  a  system 
where  transfer orders cannot  legal IY  be  revoked  after  issue. 
12.  The  legal  treatment  of  payment  cards  Is  sti I I  far  from  uniform 
despite  the  harmon I  za t I  on  a I  ready  accomp I i  shed  <see  point  2) .  For 
one  thing,  the  1987  and  1988  Recommendations  have  not  been 
implemented  in  all  the  Community  countries;  for  another,  the 
Recommendations  deal  mainly  with  contractual  aspects  <card-holder  and 
retailer  accepting  the  card)  and  do  not  prevent  divergences  In  the 
non-contractual  aspects  of  payment  cards:  e.g.  whether  the  payment 
discharges  II ab IIi ty,  whether  such  payments  can  be  revoked, 
provisions  regarding proof,  etc. 
For  example,  the  legal  systems  of  certain countries allow  an  account 
to  be  debited  when  the  number  of  a  payment  card  has  been  given  over 
the  telephone,  without  any  secret  code  or  handwritten signature being 
reQuired;  in  other  countries,  payments  made  in  this  way  would  most 
probably  be  declared void  if  contested. .. . 
• 
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Similarly,  the Question whether  a  card-holder  may  stop a  payment  Wben 
he  has  given  the  order  for  It  by  signing  an  Invoice  (whether  witb  a 
handwritten  signature  or  with  an  electronic  code)  has  not  been 
answered  In  the same  way  In  all  the Community  countries&. 
ThIs  absence  of  harmon i za t ion  may  cause  simI I  ar  d Iff I  cuTt I  es to tltose 
mentioned  In  relation to transfers. 
13.  As  to  the  different  types  of  debit  order  (direct  debit.  pre-
authorized  payment,  deposit-transfer  slips,  etc.),  the  legal 
provisions  governing  them  seem  to  be  mainly  characterized  by  a  lack 
of  organization.  These  instruments  are  based  on  national  banking 
practice and  no  COmmunity  country appears  to have  Introduced specific 
legislation. 
14.  When  we  come  to  consider  means  of  payment  that  are  stIll  at  the 
experimental  stage,  like  prepaid  cards,  we  naturally  find  tbat 
legislation  Is  non-existent. 
15.  If  the  aim  is  to  establish  an  efficient  Intra-community  pa)'llent 
system  that  Is  as  fast  and  as  cheap  as  possible,  It  is  onty  worth 
removing  obstacles  hampering  the  Instruments  that  can  play a  part  In 
such  a  system.  In  view  of  the  handling  reQuired  for  cheQues  (despit.e 
the  Introduction of non-material  systems of exchange)  and  the cost of 
processing  them,  It  Is  highly unlikely  that  cheQues  will  feature  in a 
future  European  payment  system.  The  obstacles  resulting  froa 
different  legal  arrangements  for  cheQues  can  probably  be  disregarded. 
However,  the  absence  of  harmonization  of  the  law  governing  transfers 
(especially  electronic  transfers),  payment  cards  anci  c:lebi.t 
Instruments  is  more  problematic.  Differences  in  the  legal 
arrangements  signify  uncertainty  about  the  following  two  points  at 
least  (which  concern originators and  recipients): 
(a)  final  discharge  of  I labll ity  for  payment  (does  the  pa~nt 
extinguish  the  debt  and,  if so,  at what  point?); 
(b)  possibl I tty  of  revocation  of  the  payment  order  (can  tt  be 
revoked?  If  so,  untl I  when?  If  not,  are  there any  exceptfcns?). 
Payment  systems 
16.  The  main  legal  problem  raised by  the operation of  a  payment  system is 
whether  settlements  between  participants  are  final.  This  Question 
was  referred  to  In  earlier  notes  (note  from  Mr  Allen  on  the  role of 
standards  in  the  development  of ·European  payment  systems;  note  from 
Mr  Tresoldi  on  systemic  risks and  supervision) . 
6  For  example,  in  France,  a  law  adopted  in  1985  prohibits card-holders 
from  stopping  payments  unless  the  card  has  been  lost  or  stolen.  or 
the  recipient  has  gone  bankrupt  (as  is  the  ease  for  cheQues). - 6  -
17.  The  moment  when  payments  via  a  payment  system  become  f Ina 1  varies 
considerablY  from  one  legal  system  to another: 
(a)  payments  are  final  from  the  moment  the  operation  has  been 
recorded,  both  in  systems  based  on  gross  settlements  (In 
practice,  the only examples  of  this  type of  system would  seem  to 
be  outside  the Community:  FEDWIAE  In  the  United  States,  and  SIC 
In  Switzerland)  and  In  those  based  on  the  principle of  clearing 
(this  would  seem  to  be  the  case  with  CHAPS  in  the 
Un 1  ted KIngdom) ; 
(b)  payments  are  final  when  the managing  organization declares  that 
the clearing  Is definitive (e.g.  CHIPS  In  the United States); 
(c)  payments  are  final  when  balances  remaining  after  clearing  have 
been  entered  in  the accounts of  the participants on  the books  of 
the  central  bank  (this would  seem  to be  the most  frequent  case; 
examples  are Saglttaire  in  France  and  the  ECU  clearing system). 
18.  It  is  not  enough,  however,  to  consider  only  the  operational  rules 
(whether  statutory  or  contractual)  of  payment  systems.  It  Is  also 
necessary  to  establish  whether  the  rules  on  final  payment  apply  in 
the worst-case scenario,  i.e.  when  one  of  the parties goes  bankrupt. 
In  several  Member  States,  the  usual  rule  prohibiting  a  bankrupt  from 
paying  any  debts  after  proceedings  have  begun  is  supplemented  by  a 
rule  making  the  effects  of  the  decision  to  start  proceedings 
retroactive  as  to 00.00  hours  on  the  day  It  was  taken.  In  practice, 
this means  that,  if  a  bank  were  suddenly  to fall,  a  decision  to start 
proceedings  taken  towards  the  end  of  the  afternoon  is  liable  to 
render  all  payments  effected  since  00.00  hours  that  day  void  or 
voidable.  Such  payments  could,  therefore,  be  challenged even  if  they 
are  considered  final  under  the  operating  rules  of  the  system  used. 
This  rule  certainly  exists  in  Belgium,  France,  Italy  and  the 
Netherlands7. 
19.  The  rule  that  bankruptcy  takes effect  as  from  midnight  may  affect  the 
val idlty of: 
(a)  payments  made  under  a  system  based  on  gross settlements; 
(b)  the  settlement of  netting balances  for  systems  based on  netting;_ 
(c)  the  actual  clearing  operation  under  legal  systems  which  treat 
the operation as a  payment. 
However,  under  most,  if  not  a I I ,  of  the  I  ega I  systems  considered, 
payments  made  after  00.00  hours  on  the  day  of  t-he  opening  of 
bankruptcy  proceedings  are  not  automatically  void:  the  rule  must  be 
invoked  by  the official  receiver  and  confirmed  by  the  Judge. 
7  See  paragraph  2-25  of  the Lamfalussy  report. 
.. 
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20.  As  for  banks,  this  uncertainty  about  the  moment  'at  which  payments 
become  f Ina I  should""mean  that  due  prudence  wi II  prevent  banks  not 
subject  to  the  "midnight"  rule  from  re-using  invnediately  any  sums 
credited  to  them  from  a  payment  system  or  an  Institution  subject  to 
the  rule.  Theoretically,  they  should walt  untl I  midnlg~t so as to be 
sure  that  they  wi II  not  be  asked  to  pay  back  the money:·  They  should 
also  wait  until  midnight  to  be  sure  that  the  risks  on  tbelr 
counterparts are eQual  to  the net  amount  cleared and  not  to  the gross 
amount  exchanged. 
These  disadvantages,  of  course,  loom  less  large  for  small  amounts 
than  for  large ones. 
21.  The  "midnight"  rule  may  also  have  adverse  effects  on  banta• 
customers.  1  f  banks  cons 1  der  that  payments  exchanged  or  c I  eared 
may  be  contested,  prudence  demands  that  the customer  should  loglcarty 
be  credited  only  when  it  Is  certain  that  the  payment  Is  final.  For 
customers,  the  ••mtdnlght"  rule does  not  expedite payments. 
22.  Apart  from  this  difficulty,  which  stems  from  bankruptcy  law,  the 
operation  of  a  future  European  payment  system  may  also  be  disrupted 
by  differences  in  liabll ity  laws. 
Fa I lure  to  execute  a  payment  order  or  improper  executIon  (delay. 
error,  etc.)  does  not  lead  to  comparable  compensation  under  the  raw 
in  the different member  countries.  Liability rules  In  some  countries 
allow  compensation  only  for  direct  damage  suffered,  while  elsewhere 
they  allow  compensation  for  indirect  damage,  at  least  where  it  was 
foreseeable.  Some  countries  recognize  liability  only  for  proven 
error,  while  others  leave  some  room  for  objective  liability,  without 
fault,  based  simply  on  the  risk  involved  in  the  use  of  sophisticated 
systems  controlled  by  only  one  of  the  contracting  parties.  Under 
some  I  aws,  contractua  1  c 1  auses  exempting  or  I im it i ng  I i  ab iIi ty  are 
generally  accepted,  while  other  laws  I imit  the  validity  of  such 
clauses  if  their  effect  Is  to  favour  a  professional  operator  against 
a  non-professional  or  if  they  are  included  in  general  conditions not 
specifically approved  by  the customer. 
The  establishment of  an  efficient Community  payment  system  that  is as 
cheap  as  poss i b I  e  reQuires  banks  and  their  customers  to  know  the 
extent  and  limits of  their  liability; clearly,  wide-ranging  liability 
wi II  be  welcomed  by  customers  but  may  a I  so  make  transact ions  more 
expensive. 
23.  The  Quest ion  of  1 i ab i 1 i ty  is  a 1  so  reI evant  to  consumer  protect ion 
<see  work  by  consumer  working  par.ty). - 8  -
POSSIBLE  SOLUTIONS 
24.  The  first  matter  to decide  is  the  order  of  priority of  the  problems 
to be  solved. 
Harmonization  should  concentrate,  first  of  all,  on  devising  rules 
for:  ' 
(a)  the moment  when  originators can  no  longer  revoke  payment  orders, 
In  particular  for  transfers,  payment  cards  or  any  other 
electronic means  of  payment; 
(b)  discharge of  liability  for  payments  made  by  means  of  transfers, 
cards or debit  Instruments; 
(c)  the  time  when  Interbank  settlements  within  a  payment  system 
become  f Ina I. 
Of  course,  it  Is  desirable  for  the other  legal  problems  to be  solved 
at  some  stage  as  well  (although,  If  there  Is  no  need  to  promote  the 
use  of  cheQues  internationally,  the  problems  concerning  them  can 
safe I  y  be  ignored),  but  thIs  is  not  of  paramount  importance.  The 
main  thing  Is  to  establish  legal  structures  ensuring  the  safety  of 
payments  rather  than  harmonizing  the  formal  aspects  of  means  of 
payment  or  relations  between  banks  and  customers,  which  are,  In  any 
case,  largely governed  by  contract  and  thus subject  to competition. 
25.  From  this  point  of  view,  it  Is  worth  considering  whether  any  work 
already  done  at  International  level  on  harmonization  could  usefully 
be  exploited or whether  the Community  should  adopt  an  approach  of  Its 
own. 
At  International  level,  the only  work  that  could  be  useful  is  that  of 
UNCITRAL. 
UNCITRAL  model  law 
26.  UNCITRAL  began  work  on  its  draft  model  law  on  international  credit 
transfers  in  1986;  it entrusted  the  task  to a  working  party which  had 
as  its original  remit  trade  bills but  which  was  renamed  the  working 
party  on  international  payments.  The  draft  prepared  by  this working 
party  was  submitted  to  UNCITRAL  in  June  1991;  it  Is  hoped  that  the 
draft  can  be  adopted  once  discussions  have  been  completed  in  Uay 
1992.  The  draft  UNCITRAL  model  law  is  not,  at  this  stage, 
definitive. 
Moreover,  a  mode I  I  aw,  un II ke  an  I  nternat lona I  convent ion,  is  not 
binding;  it  merely  serves  as  a  voluntary  reference  framework  for 
businesses or  the  legislative bodies. 
27.  The  draft  model  taw  is  aimed  at  harmonizing  taws  governing  all 
transfers  (paper,  telex,  electronic,  etc.)  involving  more  than  one 
country.  Domestic  transfers are not  covered  although,  clearly,  rules 
established  for  international  transfers  may  also  be  used 
domestically.  (It  should  be  made  clear  from  the  outset  that,  within 
the  European  Community,  the  distinction  between  domestic  and 
international  transfers does  not  apply.) 
4  • f' 
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It  Is  explicitly stated  that  the  model  law  does  not  deal  with  issues 
related to consumer  protection. 
28.  After  defining the  terms  used,  the model  law  goes  on  to deal  witb: 
(a)  obllgat Ions  of  the  part les  (obllgat Ions  of  the  originator  and 
other  senders,  obllgat Ions  of  receiving  banks,  obllgat ions  ·of 
the beneficiary's bank,  acceptance); 
(b)  time  for  receiving banks  to execute payment  orders  (the ....  4aJ 
or  the  following  day); 
(c)  revocation  <not  possible  In  principle,  but  with  exceptions); 
(d)  solutions  to  problems  arising  in  the  course  of  execution 
<money-back  guarantee  when  transfer  cannot  be  complet•d. 
liability  limited  to  payment  of  interest,  no  other  compensation 
ava i I  ab I  e); 
(e)  civil-law  consequences  of  a  credit  transfer  (discharge  of 
underlying  obligation  on  acceptance  of  the  transfer  by  1be 
beneficiary's bank); 
(f)  conflict  of  laws  (law  chosen  by  the  parties;  otherwise,  , .. of 
the  receiving bank). 
29.  The  mode I  1  aw  was  drawn  up  essent I  a I I  y  with  a  view  to  fac i I itatJing 
the  transfer  of  large  amounts  (high  value>  at  high  speed  and  .low 
cost.  It  was  strongly  influenced  by  Article  4A  of  the  us  Un1f·or• 
Commercial  Code,  which  concerns  the  electronic  transfer  of  funds. 
That  Article  is now  in  force  in  at  least  twelve  states,  Including~ 
York  and  Cal lfornia,  and  governs  the  CHIPS  and  FEDWIRE  systems. 
The  fact  that  the  mode I  1  aw  was  drafted  to  dea I  with  the  needs  ·of 
transfers of  large amounts  can  be  seen  from  the  following  features: 
(a)  the  time  allowed  for  carrying out  instructions  received  is ~t 
(in  principle,  transfers  must  be  executed  on  the  same  day; 
execution  on  the  following  day  is  allowed  as  a  subsjdiary 
possibility,  Introduced  in  order  to  avoid  incompatibility  witb 
the Commission  Recommendation  of  14  February  1990); 
(b)  liability  in  cases  of  failure  to  execute  an  order  or  erroneous 
execution  is  limited  to  the  payment  of  interest;  there  is  no 
compensation  for  exchange  losses  or  other  direct  or  indi-rect 
damage  (originators transferring  large  amounts  can  hedge  against 
exe~ange risks and  take out  Insurance  for  other  risks); 
(c)  there are no  provisions on  consumer  protection. 
It  is  therefore  not  certain  that  the  model  law  is  suitable  for  the 
needs  of  sma II  transfers,  in  which  the  Payment  Systems  Teenn4eal 
Development  Group  is  Interested. - 10  -
30.  It should also be  noted  that  the  UNCITRAL  draft still  includes points 
of  disagreement  and  that  some  problems  have  not  been  solved. 
The  most  controversial  point  of  disagreement  In  the  model  law  Is  the 
money-back  guarantee,  or  obligation  to  refund  to  the  originator  the 
money  sent  to  cover  the  transfer  order.  It  Is  noteworthy  that  the 
country  facing  the most  serious problems  as  a  result  of  this  rule  Is 
a  CommunIty  country:  Germany.  The  other  COmmunIty  countr les  accept 
it  in  principle.  Moreover,  the  confl let-of-laws  rule  adopted  does 
not  seem  compatible  with  the  Rome  Convention  of  19  June  1980  on  the 
Law  applicabfe  to  Contractual  Obligations,  which  Is  In  force  In  the 
Community  countries&. 
The  many  unresolved  problems  are  technical  rather  than  matters  of 
principle.  For  example,  there are  no  rules  for  dealing with  changes 
to a  payment  order;  again,  It  Is  permissible  for  a  receiving  bank  to 
execute  an  order  on  the  day  following  the  day  of  receipt,  Non 
condition  It  executes  for  value  as  of  the  day  of  receiptH:  a 
provision that might  mean  everything or  nothing. 
Nevertheless,  the  UNCITRAL  model  law  does  exist,  and  the  work  that 
went  Into preparing  It  was  not  negligible. 
Moreover,  if  UNCITRAL  manages  to  amend  the  draft  so  that  it  can  be 
adopted  at  Its  next  seas I  on,  the  model  I  aw  wi II  become  an 
international  standard  compatible,  most  probably,  with  us  law 
(otherwise,  the  United  States  could  be  expected  to  block  it),  and 
likely  to  be  adopted  by  countries  that  play  an  Important  role  in 
International  financial  relations  (Japan  has  set  up  a  committee  to 
consider  the  possibi I ity  of  transposing  the  model  law  into  national 
law). 
In  other  words,  if  the  Commission  intends  to  start  work  on  an 
Instrument  to  harmonize  transfers  (electronic  and  other  types),  It 
would  not  be  reasonable  for  It  to  set  off  In  a  direction  different 
from  that  followed  by  UNCITRAL. 
Of  course,  the  UN  draft  woul.d  have  to  be  supplemented  (but  not 
amended  as  regards  the principles  it  lays  down>  by  various provisions 
if  it were  to cover  smal I  transfers  (consumer  protection). 
31.  The  model  law,  however,  deals only  partially  and  Incidentally  with  a 
number  of  matters  that  may  be  regarded  as  priorities  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  PSTDG  (see point  23). 
It  does  indeed  lay  down  the  principle  that  orders  once  given  cannot 
be  revoked  (Article 11(1)),  the  rule  that  bankruptcy of  the  sender  or  ~· 
originator  does  not  of  Itself  operate  to  revoke  a  payment  order 
(Article  11(8)),  and  the  idea  that  a  transfer -or, more  precisely, 
the  acceptance  of  a  transfer  by  the  beneficiary's  bank  - is  one  way 
of  discharging  obligations  (Article 17(2)).  But  these  provisions 
8  When  the  parties  to a  contract  do  not  specify which  law  applies,  the 
Rome  Convention  provides  that  the  contract  Is  governed  by  the ·law  of 
the  country  with  which  it  is  most  closely  connected,  whereas  the 
UNCITRAL  model  law  provides  that  it  is  governed  by  the  law  of  the 
country of  the  receiving  bank. "'. 
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only  to transfers  (the object of  the model  law>;  they  are not  genera·J 
rules  applicable  to  all  means  of  payment.  What  is  more,  tbe·y  are 
drafted  In  terms  that  are  probably  too  vague  to be  effective against 
contrary national  provisions of  public policy such  as currency  taw or 
bankruptcy  law.  J 
The  UNCITRAL  model  law  is  not,  therefore,  the  solution  to  the 
problems  of  structure  that  need  to  be  solved  If  an  efficient 
Community  payment  system  Is  to be  established. 
Other  possible solutions 
32.  In  view  1of  the  obstacles  to  harmonization  mentioned  above  (see 
point  23),  the  Community  could  concentrate  Its effort  on  Introducing 
rules to govern  the  following points: 
<a>  a  rule  whereby,  notwithstanding  certain  bankruptcy  laws. 
payments  made  by  a  credit  Institution  via  an  interbank  ~ayment 
system9  may  not  be  ca I I  ed  Into  Quest I  on  If  they  have  bee~~ 
carried out  In  complla~ce with  the  rules of  the  system  <except. 
of  course,  In  cases  of  fraud  by  virtue  of  the  principle  ·that 
fraus  omnia  corrumplt); 
(b)  a  rule  to  dissuade  originators  from  going  back  on  their 
instructions  (lrrevocabl I ity); 
<c>  a  rule whereby  payments  carried out  within  the  Community  are  in 
full  discharge  of  liability,  i.e.  they  extinguish  debt  under 
c i vII  law. 
The  first  two  ru I  es  are  maIn I  y  intended  to  protect  rec I  pi ent.s  of 
payments;  the  third protects  the originator of  a  payment  order. 
The  derogation  from  bankruptcy  law  In  certain  countr les  canno·t  be 
dealt  with  In  isolation  from  the  work  already  under  way,  but 
apparently  proving  problematic,  with  a  view  to  more  general 
harmonization of  bankruptcy  law  In  the Community. 
The  harmonization of  rules on  discharge  of  liability should  be  dealt 
with  in  the context of  Introducing  a  single currency. 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  three  suggested  rules  seem  to be 
necessary  not  only  for  the smooth  functioning of  a  payment  system  for 
smal I  amounts,  but  also for  that  of  a  system  hand I ing  large amounts. 
9  A system  which  may,  if  necessary,  be  extended  to  Include  non-banks 
within  the  meaning  of  the  European  directives  where  their  normat 
activities  include  the  execution  of  payments  on  behalf  of  their 
customers  (post offices,  central  banks,  etc.). ' APPENDIX  5  PRINCIPLES  ON  OQNPETITION  FQB  CREDIT  TRANSFER  SYSIJM$ 
The  present  document  concerns  situations  in  which  banks  and  other  financial 
institutions  are  setting  up  a  system  allowing  for  clearing,  netting  and/or 
settlement of  cross-border  transfer  payments  between  them  or  linking existing 
transfer  networks  with  each  other.  Thus,  the  document  will  not  dtrectry 
concern  Questions  regarding  cooperation  In  the  area  of  payment  cards  or 
cheQues.  Institutions setting up  or  linking  transfer  systems  will  wieb  to do 
so on  the basis of agreements  which 
- determine  the  membership  In  such  systems,  I.e.  In  admitting  to  tbe 
cooperation  only  such  Institutions  which  fulfil  certain  pre-establlabed 
criteria,  regarding  especially  their  financial  standing,  their  orderly 
management  and  their  technical  capacities; 
rely on  firmly established principles for  technical,  legal  and  operational 
aspects  of  the  services  rendered  to  the  institutions'  customers;  Indeed 
payment  processes  Inside  the  system  will  have  to  follow  pre-established 
rules  and  procedures;  these  can  concern,  for  instance,  message  for•ts. 
security  procedures,  time  spans  at  which  the  systems  are  operatton•l  or 
routing  instructions  (technical,  application and  operational  standards); 
- cover  the sharing of  the costs of  the system  between  Its participants. 
The  Commission  considers  that  the  application  of  the  EEC  Treaty  ca.petltlon 
rules  to  such  agreements  should  be  guided  by  the  principles  set  out  below. 
This  does  not  Imply,  however,  that  the  competition  rules will  be  applicable 
to  all  such  agreements;  Indeed,  agreements  without  which  the  provision  of 
payment  services  Is  not  conceivable might  wei I  not  fall  under  the problbltlon 
of Article 85(1)  at all. 
1.  MembershiP  In  I  SYStem 
The  Question  of  "membership  In  payment  systems  ..  Is  a  wider  one.  not 
I imited  to  competition  pol icy.  In  particular,  legal  aspects  pertaining  t.o 
the  principles of  freedom  of  establishment  and  services  enshrined  in  the 
e·ec  Treaty  as  well  as  to  the  impact  of  the  Second  Banking  Directive 
89/647/EEC  in  this  area  will  often  arise  with  regard  to  payment  syst  .... 
These  legal  Questions  will  concern  systems  membership  in  .-tch  is 
controlled  or  monitored  by  public  authorities.  These  aspects  of  pUblic 
regulat lon  wi II  be  studied  separately  and  are  not  dealt  with  tn  the 
present  paper.  The  following  considerations pertain to  the aspects arising 
wl th  prIvate  arrangements  among  i nst i tut ions  settIng  up  new  or  I ink lng 
existing systems. 
a)  N9n  exclusivity 
As  a  general  rule,  cooperation agreements  which  embrace  the majority of 
credit  institutions  of  one  country  or  are  I ikely  to  process  a 
significant  part  of  payment  traffic between  different  countries either 
totally or  in  a  given market  segment  (e.g.  automated  clearing o-f  retail 
payments;  foreign  exchange  nett 1  ng >  may  be  cons I  de red  to  prov tde  an 
••essent i a I  fac I II ty..  and,  therefore,  shou I  d  be  open  for  further 
membership  provided  that  candidates  meet  appropriate  criteria (ef.  (b) 
be low). - 2  -
Where  a  I lm I  ted  number  of  I  nst i tut ions  set  up  a  payment  system,  they 
may  be  entitled  to  choose  their  partners  according  to  their  general 
business  strategy and  cannot  always  be  forced  to open  their  particular 
agreement  to  further  partners,  even  of  equivalent  standing.  However, 
such  agreements  must  not  contaIn  c I  auses  whIch  have  the  effect  of 
preventing  Individual  participants from  taking part  in  other  systems. 
b)  Criteria 
The  general  requirement  of  non-exclusivity,  described  In  (a),  first 
sub-paragraph  above,  Is  not  Intended  to  prevent  the  appllcat ion  of 
membership  criteria  for  such  schemes  which  are  obJectively  Justlffed. 
These  can  concern,  for  Instance,  the  financial  standing,  the  orderly 
•anagement  and  the  technical  capacities of participants. 
Aa  regards  criteria based  on  volume,  It  will  be  legitimate  to  require 
that  the expected  traffic generated by  a  candidate member  should not  be 
negligible.  But  payment  systems  should  wherever  possible  permit 
participation by  Institutions of  varying sizes. 
Thus,  instead  of  basing  an  membership  criterion  simply  on  expected 
volume,  it  may  often  be  preferable  to make  the  candidates  own  decision 
depend  on  economic  considerations  (e.g.  a  high  flat  rate  contribution 
representing  the  participation  in  previous  investments  by  other 
participants;  however,  the  share of  the entrant  must  not  exceed  a  fair 
share of  the actual  cost of  past  Investments). 
Where  foreign  banks  apply  for  membership  In  a  domestic  transfer  system, 
their  expected  volume  may  be  low  In  the  beginning;  In  such  cases  the 
type  of business,  the experience and  the  volume  of  payment  transactions 
In  the country of origin of such  banks  should  be  taken  into account. 
Refusal  of  membership  or  exclusion  should  be  subject  to  an  Independent 
review  procedure. 
2.  Operation of sxstems 
a)  Ooerational  standards 
Details  about  technical,  application  and  operational  standards  are set 
out  in  the  Payment  Systems  Technical  Development  Group's  paper  on 
standards  <source  document  to  the  Report).  Of  particular  interest  in 
the  present  context  are  "operational  standards".  such  operational 
standards,  for  exampfe,  include  standardised  message  formats 
(agreements  on  eligible hardware  should  however  be  avoided),  as well  as 
rules  on  transaction  times  stipulating,  for  instance,  that  value  will 
be  received  by  the  beneficiary  bank  of  a  credit  transfer  during  the  .• 
same  day  If  a  payment  order  Is  received  before  a  given  hour  of  that 
day,  while  later  orders  will  be  executed  on  the  following  business 
day.  However,  such  arrangements  must  be  limited  to  interbank  ~ 
relations  and  must,  In  particular,  not  lead  to  concerted  value  dating 
practices vts-•-vls the customers. 
The  participants can  also,  where  Justified,  set standards  regarding  the 
kind  and  quality  of  transactions  to  be  processed  by  a  system,  for 
instance defining minimum  or  maximum  amounts  involved  or  requiring  that 
value  must  be  received  before  a  payment  is  being  made.  However,  such 
transaction  standards  must  not  lead  to  any  exclusivity  arrangement; 
users  must  remain  free  to  change  banking  connections  from  one  partner 
to  the other or  to bank  with  several  partners simultaneously. - 3  -
b)  Risk  management 
Arrangements  may  also  concern  minimum  security  standards  and  riSt 
management.  They  will  often  wish  to  take  Into  account  tn. orlnclples 
contained  In  the  •Report  of  the Committee  on  Interbank  Netting Sc~ 
of  the Central  Banks  of  the G-10"  (Lamfalussy  Report,  Nov~r 1990.  ima 
particular  Its  section  III.C),  It  being  understood  t.bat  t'-
pr lnciples  may  have  to  be  adapted  to  the  part lcular  needs of  retauu 
payment  systems. 
Thus,  for  Instance,  part lclpants  may  be  required  to  "prepay•  for u. 
risk of  their own  default  by  postlng.collateral  sufficient to cover~ 
exposures  which  their  obligations create  for  the  counterpartles.  w..m. 
syst•s  reI y  on  rIsk  management  procedures  whIch  consist  In  limIt hill 
their  mutual  exposures,  lower  limits  can  be  set  tGf'  _,._ 
counterpart lea  or  for  part lclpants  of  a  relat lvely  1-r credlit 
standing.  A  prearranged  sharing  of  losses  from  defaults  011  part...-. 
will  be  possible. 
3.  costs and  prices 
a>  Pricing vis-i-vis customers 
Here,  as  In  other  areas  of  banking  competition,  no  agree~s bet-..m 
participating banks  on  prices of  transactions  with  thetr  ~a.ers c.m 
be  accepted.  The  systems  should  be  devised  in  such  a  way  tl!ta·t  btndlflla 
commitments  affecting  the  Interbank  relations  must  leave  tbe  partnams 
free  to  determine  the  offers which  they  can  make  and  concUtl:ons  wtaacll\ 
they wil I  apply  to their  customers. 
b)  Cost  of  systems  and  central  bodies 
The  cost  Incurred  by  the  setting up  of  a  system  and  those  arising aua 
of  the operation of  a  central  body  (e.g.  an  ACH),  can  be  sbared ~ 
systems  participants at  fixed  rates  (general  charge  of  a  central  boct.H,. 
e.g.  an  ACH  tariff  valid  for  all  participants or,  as  the  case  may~" 
varying according  to volumes  or other  pre-established condttuons). 
c)  Interchange  fees  in  multi lateral  systems 
Interbank  transaction  fees  other  than  those  charged  by  a  central ~ 
can  a I  so  be  the  subject  of  genera 1  arrangements  between  ar 1 
participants.  However,  these  general  arrangements  must  leawe  open  the 
possibility  for  Individual  participants  to  agree  on  lower  lnterchanga 
fees  b~laterally.  In  other  words,  a  generally  agreed  fee  structure CErn 
provide  for  maximum  fees  only.  It  must  remain  possible  to negotiate 
variations  from  this  maximum,  either  effected  directly  tbr~ 
bilateral  rebates  between  participants or  through  a  central  .achanism,, 
as  appropriate.  Members  of  a  system  with  maximum  Interchange fees  ere 
not  obliged  to offer  prices  below  the  maximum.  However,  the  COmmiss~ 
would  have  to consider  individual  cases upon  their merits,  to deter•iDE 
whether  the absence  of  prices below  the  maximum  was  the  result of anti-
competitive behaviour. .. 6PPENQIX  8  Reporting  Requlr~~tnts and  cross-border  pavments 
ltlaiUI:  Existing  threshold of  100,000  BF  (2,400  ECU  approx.) 
There  Is a  proposal  to raise  the  figure  to 1,000,000 BF. 
QoQIIrk:  Existing threshold of 8,000  ECU. 
Franco:  Threshold 
<100,000  FF 
>100,000  FF 
(100,000  FF  •  14,350  ECU  approx.) 
Procedure  resident/non-resident 
customer:  dec I  a rat ton  If  transact I  on 
Is  over  50,000  .1M  not  carr led  out 
through  a  bank 
bank:  cumulative declaration  (+record 
If  transaction  Is over  50,000) 
customer:  must  give data 
bank:  additional  declaration 
GorllnY:  The  existing threshold  Is  5,000  DM  (2,500  ECU  approx.) 
Greece:  No  threshold  exists  and  every  single  transaction  Is  reported 
(studies are underway  to modify  the system- probably  by  June  92) 
Ireland:  Banks  will  ask  for  the  purpose of  any  transfer  above  250  Irish 
Pounds  to non-resident  accounts: 
no  reporting  threshold exists for  Imports  and  exports of goods; 
10,000  Irish  Pounds  Is  the  threshold  applying  for  payments  In 
connection with  the provision of services across borders; 
20,000  Irish Pounds  Is  the  threshold applying  for  gifts. 
ItalY:  from  May  1990,  abolition of  the currency  control  system. 
New  threshold  of  13,000  ECU  was  Introduced  (all  transactions  below  It 
are cumulatively  reported). 
This  results  In  an.  "information  loss",  of  about  101  of  trade 
transactions,  and  concerns  In  particular  BoP  data  for  tourism. 
Luxemb9ura:  same  as Belgium 
Hotberlands:  The  existing threshold  Is  25,000 Guilders  (+12.000  ECU) 
Portugal:  No  threshold  on  Individual  transactions  exists  for  BoP 
compilation purposes  (other statistical  forms  for  data collection exist 
to this aim). 
However,  Jn  order  to  prevent  "Irregular"  capital  movements, 
notification  Is  still  required  for  some  transactions  (for  most  of 
these,  notification  Is  regardless of  the amount  concerned). 
Spain:  The  current  threshold  is  of  1,000  ECU.  (with  a  reform  coming 
Into  force  as  from  01.02.92,  the current  threshold might  be  raised). 
~= No  reporting  requirement  exists. •. 
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REPORT  OF  THE  PAYMENT  SYSTEMS  USERS  LIAISON  GROUP 
A.  INIROQUCTION 
The  composition.  terms of  reference and  objectives of  the Group 
1.  The  Group  was  composed  of  5  members  drawn  from  the  banking  sector  (2  of 
whom  were  also members  of  the  Payment  Systems  Technical  Development  Group 
( "PSTDG")  and  8  representatIves  of  users  of  payment  systems  (of  whom  4 
were  drawn  from  consumer  organisations,  2  from  the  retail  distribution 
sector  and  2  from  the  SME  sector).  The  Group  met  on  5  occasions  between 
April  1991  and  January  1992.  Group  members  participated  throughout  In  a 
personal  capacity.  As  a  result  this report,  which  conveys  the  findings of 
the  Group  to  the  Commission,  does  not  necessarily  reflect  the  positions 
of  members'  organizations  on  the  Issues  raised.  Except  where  otherwise 
indicated  the  report  out I ines  the  consensus,  and  not  necessarIly  the 
unanimous  view  of  the Group  on  the  topics covered. 
2.  The  terms  of  reference of  the  Group  were  to advise on  : 
''Quest ions  reI at ing  to  the  integration  of  payment  systems  of  a  market 
oriented  kind,  in  particular  on  transparency  of  available  services  and 
their  prices,  on  user  needs,  on  competition  matters  and  on  similar 
aspects." 
3.  The  Group  worked  on  the  following  areas  : 
-an investigation of  the  needs  of  different  categories of users; 
-aspects of  competition  in  the  provision of  cross-border 
payment  systems  (CBPS); 
-the  improvement  of  transparency  and  Information  to users; 
- the means  of  redress  for  users  In  the  case of  complaints. 
Principal  categories of cross-border  payments  and  requirements 
4.  Cross-border  payments  may  be  made  face  to  face  i.e.  where  the  user,  who 
Is  a  resident  in  one  Member  State,  is  physically  present  at  the  place of 
payment  in  another  Member  State.  In  such  cases  the  requirement  is 
invariably  for  a  means  of  guaranteed  payment  i.e.  cash,  guaranteed cheque 
or  payment  card.  The  guarantee  is  provided  because  (a)  there  is unlikely 
.to  be  a  continuing  relationship  between  the  parties  and  (b)  the 
transaction  (e.g.  a  purchase>  is  completed  immediately,  at  the  time  when 
the  payment  is  tendered. 
5.  The  other  principal  category of  CBP  Is  the  remote  payment  i.e.  where  only 
the  payment  crosses  the  frontier.  The  payment  Instruments  (cash or  cheque 
or  other  Instrument -e.g. a  credit  card authorisation)  may  be  posted  by 
the  user  to  the  beneficiary  of  the  payment;  alternatively  the  user  may 
instruct  his  bank  or  other  financial  institution offering  a  cross-border 
payment  service  to  send  the  payment  on  his  behalf  to  the  beneficiary's 
bank  (or  other  institution).  Such  a  payment,  known  as  the  credit 
transfer,  is  the  main  category  of  interbank  payments.  Others  which  are 
not  as  yet  generally  available  for  cross-border  use  include  the  debit 
transfer.  where  the  payment  is  initiated  by  the  beneficiary;  the 
principle  example  of  this  is  the  direct  debit.  Remote  payments,  as  a 
rule,  unlIke  most  face  to  face  payments,  do  not  require  to be  supported - 2  -
by  a  guarantee  of  payment.  The  beneficiary  can  generally  walt  until  he 
knows  that  he  has  received  value  for  the  relevant  payment  Instrument 
before  performing  his side of  the contract. 
6.  A further  Important  categorisation of  payments  is between  large  value  and 
small  value  payments.  The  Convnisslon  had  made  it  clear  that  the  main 
focus  of  Its  Initiative  and  thus of  the  Group,  should  be  on  the  smaller 
payments,  known  as  retail  pa~nts. The  Group  took  note  of,  but  did  not 
discuss,  the  question  of  the  cut-off  level  between  retail  and  wholesale 
payments. 
7.  Finally,  a  distinction between  payments  can  be  drawn  according  to whether 
they  are  regular  or  lr.r_egular.  The  Group  noted  that  different 
considerations would  apply  r-n  each  case. 
8.  The  Group  recalled  the  objective  stated  In  the  Green  Paper  of  •ensuring 
that  Europe  Is  equipped  with  structures  which  provide  payment  services 
which  are  as  cheap,  as  rapid  and  as  rei iable  between  different  Member 
States  of  the  Comrnun I  ty  as  they  a I  ready  are  wIth 1  n  them".  The  Group 
agreed  that  this  realisation was  the  ultimate objective.  However,  It  was 
recognised  that  the objective could  not  be  fully  achieved until  there was 
a  single  currency  and  a  further  convergence  of  underlying  costs  and  that 
Its  realisation would  not  mean  that  alI  payment  systems  would  perform  to 
the  same  standard  (I.e.  different  payment  systems  will  continue  to  have 
different  character 1st lcs).  The  fact  that  the  object lve  would  not  be 
fully  realised unti I  the  above  mentioned  conditions were  present  did  not 
diminish  the  need  to make  rapid  progress wherever  possible. 
9.  In  reviewing  the  various  payment  Instruments  and  payment  syst•s  the 
Group  adopted  the  not ion  of  "cross-front ler  acceptab Ill ty"  as  a  genera 1 
criterion  by  which  to  assess  them.  A means  of  payment  or  payment  system 
which  could  be  readily used  for  making  payments  outside  the user's Member 
State  without  exorbitant  costs  over  and  above  Its  domestic  use  and  was 
widely  accepted  for  payment  throughout  the  EC  might  be  described  as 
having  a  reasonable  level  of  cross-frontier  acceptability,  for  the  user. 
Banks  whi 1st  judging  payment  instruments  along  similar  I ines  would  add 
further  desiderata  such  as  the  relative  cost  of  handling  and  the  degree 
of security.  Thus  the notion of  "cross-frontier  acceptability" of payment 
Instruments  and  systems  is  wider  than  that  of  "interoperabllity"  as 
applied  to  payment  cards  and  complements  the  objective  discussed  In 
paragraph  8  above. 
B.  ISSUES  EXAMINED  BY  THE  GROUP 
Differing needs of different users 
10.  It  was  felt  that  the analysis of  user  needs  would  be  assisted by  drawing 
a  distinction,  where  appropriate,  between  different  categories of  user. 
ThIs  Is  not  a  new  departur·e,  as  the  Green  Paper  (cf  para.  7)  refers  to 
three  categories of  user  (Individuals,  companies  and  the  public  sector). 
The  Group  decided  to  study  the  needs  of  Individuals  (consumers),  small 
and  medium  sized  enterprises  (SME>  and  users  in  the  retai I  trade  and 
distribution sector.  Nevertheless,  In  doing  so,  the  Group  noted  that  many 
of  the problems  were  the  same.  In  this Report,  most  of  the  Issues were  of 
common  concern  to alI  users;  points of  relevance  to a  particular category 
of  users  are  either  noted  as  such  where  they  arise,  or  dea It  wIth 
separately at  the beginning of  this section. 
., 
.• 
• ,. 
r. 
... 
- 3  -
Characteristics of  SME's 
11.  A large majority of  businesses  in  the  EC  are small,  by  any  definition.  In 
many  SMEs  the  owner  performs  many  of  the  functions  which,  in  larger 
business  would  be  carried  out  by  specialised  personnel;  the  owner  Is 
therefore  faced  by  time  pressures  and  needs  so  far  as  1?9SSible  simple, 
straightforward  methods  of  payment  for  his  cross-border  transactions. 
These  considerations  were  taken  Into  account  in  the  Group's  discussions 
and  are  reflected  in  Its conclusions. 
Payments  by  traders  :  particular considerations 
12.  Traders  find  that  making  a  CBP  Is  often  more  difficult  than  a  domestic 
one  (even  If  one  Ignores  the  currency  conversion).  For  a  larger  trader, 
with  a  sufficient  volume  of  business  in  another  Member  State,  one 
solution  is  to open  a  local  bank  account.  In  general,  traders  f'avour  the 
use  of  electronic  means  of  payment  on  the  ground  that  there  Is  less 
handling  Involved,  so  It  is  less  costly  for  them,  and  Is  more  rapid  and 
rei iable. 
General  description of problems  which  users face 
13.  The  problems  which  users  encounter  were  considered  under  the  following 
headings  : 
a>  The  level  of  charges  for  making  cross-border  payments,  particularly of 
small  amounts. 
b)  The  double  charging  which  so~etimes occurs  where  the  originator  asks 
to bear  al 1  the  fees  yet  the beneficiary  is charged,  additionally. 
c)  The  time  payments  take  (e.g.  the  length  of  time  taken  to  clear  CB 
cheQues  and  thus  to transfer  value  to  the beneficiary or  to complete  a 
credit  transfer  by  placing  value  In  the  beneficiary's  bank  account) 
and  the  uncertainty as  to  the  time  involved. 
d)  Lack  of  Information,  before  making  the  transaction,  on  the  various 
means  of  payment  available  and  the  respective  charges  for  using  them, 
the  tlmescales  Involved  and  any  other  relevant  conditions;  lack  of 
Information after  the  transaction. 
e)  The  need 
resolving 
services. 
for  an 
fairly 
accessible, 
complaints  by 
The  level  of charges  In  general 
effective  and 
users  about 
rapid  procedure  for 
cross-border  payment 
14.  The  Group  agreed  that  as an  ultl ..  te goal  the  level  of charges  for  making 
CBP  should  not  be  greater  than  those  for  making  comparable  national 
payments.  The  achievement  of  a  single  currency  Is  a  necessary  but  not  a 
sufficient  condition  for  the  achievement  of  this  goal  (see  paragraph  8 
above).  In  the  meantime,  the  proxiMate  goal  should  be  to  reduce  the 
disparity  to  the  greatest  extent  possible.  This  reQuired  the  elimination 
of  obstacles  to  and  the  encouragement  of  I inks  between  the  various 
payment  systems,  work  which  was  being  carried  on  within  the  PSTDG.  The 
Group  explored various - 4  -
possible  approaches  to  the  Question  how  charges  might  best  be  evaluated 
before concluding  that  the only satisfactory test was  that  they  should  be 
competitively determined  (see paragraphs  22  and  26). 
Double  charging 
15.  It  was  agreed  that  double  charging  for  CBP  - where  an  originator 
express I  y  pays  hIs  bank  not  on I  y  Its  own  charges,  but  those  of  1  ts 
correspondent  only  to  find  that  the  correspondent  bank  levies  a  further 
charge on  his beneficiary- Is  In  breach of contract  and  therefore wholly 
unjustified  and  Illegal  and  should  be  eliminated  Immediately.  The  Group 
did  not  consider  the  technical  Improvements  which  would  be  required  to 
eliminate  It  and  to  enable  an  or lglnator  to  send  a  precise  sum  net  of 
charges  to  a  beneficiary  (cf  work  of  the  PSTDG).  The  Group  recommended 
that  the work  needed  to bring this about  should  be  pursued  In  the  follow-
up  to thIs Report.  .. 
The  time  taken  to complete  CBP 
16.  Consumer  members  of  the  Group  recommended  that  a  maximum  number  of  days 
should  be  fixed,  representing  the  extra  time  by  comparison  with  domestic 
transact Ions,  required  for  the  clearance  of  cross-border  cheques  and 
other  paper  Instruments;  this number  ("x  days")  should  be  reduced  to zero 
over  a  target  period.  The  proposal  was  not  discussed  In  detail  by  the 
Group;  It  did  however  fall  within  the  Group's  overall  ultimate objective 
for  CBP,  of  eliminating  the  differences  between  them  and  national 
payments.  However,  It  was  noted  that  s I  nee  there  are  no  standard  tIme 
I I  m  I  t s  app I I  cab I  e  at  nat I  on a I  I  eve I ,  the  I  de a  wou I  d  be  d I  f f I  cu 1  t  to 
implement.  The  hope  was  expressed  that  improvements  under  way  should  help 
to reduce  the  length of  time  and  to eliminate any  exceptional  delays.  The 
Group  also note  that  correspondent  banks  had  been  called upon  to execute 
payment  orders  within  2  days  of  their  receipt  under  the  Commission's 
Recommendation  of  1990.  The  Question  of  information  to  customers  on 
timescales  Is  covered  in  paragraph  28  of  the Report. 
Information  a  priori  and  ex  posteriori 
17.  The  Group  agreed  that  a  major  priority was  to  Improve  the  Quality of  the 
Information which  banks  provide  to their  customers,  enabling  them  to make 
their  own  Informed  choice  of  payment  method;  this  would  also ·permit  a 
comparison  of  the  range  of  payment  services offered  by  different  banks. 
It  was  decided  that  the  Improvement  of  customer  Information  should  be  a 
major  part  of  the  Group's  work  programme  and  thIs  Is  dea It  wIth  In 
paragraphs  26  and  following  of  the Report. 
Complaints  and  redress 
18.  Consumers,  supported  by  the  other  user  representat lves  in  the  Group, 
advocated  a  system  within  each  Member  State  for  handling  complaints  and 
providing  redress  In  relation to CBP.  Bank  representatives were  agreed  on 
the  benefIts  of  such  procedures,  a I  though  they  suggested  -and  It  was 
agreed- that  they  dId  not  need  to  be  separate  from  the  procedures  for 
handling  complaints  about  banking  business  In  general.  The  subject  waa 
selected as one  which  the Group  would  Investigate  In  depth  and  is covered 
in  paragraphs  33  and  following. 
.'f 
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VIews  of  the Group  on  particular payment  Instruments 
Cheques 
19.  The  Group  considered whether  a  new  paper  cheque  Instrument,  incorporating 
a  guarantee,  would  help  to meet  the  needs  of  SME's.  Bankers  In  the  Group 
were  convinced  that  such  a  scheme  would  not  contribute  to  the efficiency 
of  CBP.  It  was  also noted  that  It  would  be  covering  much  the  same  ground 
as,  and  thus  duplicating,  the existing  Eurocheque  scheme,  which  would  be 
undesirable.  The  Group  took  note of  the  fact  that  improvements  were  being 
planned  In  the  Eurocheque  scheme  In  the  context  of  negotiations with  the 
Conrnlssion,  Including  a  substantial  increase  in  the  clear lng  ceiling; 
consumer  members  of  the  Group  indicated  a  strong  interest  In  the outcome 
of  these  proceedings.  Finally,  banks  throughout  the  EC  were  working 
towards  reductions  In  the  use  of  paper  Instruments  in  favour  of 
e I  ect  ron I  c  payments  whIch  were  faster  and  1  ess  cost 1  y.  The  ret  a I I  and 
distribution  sector  representative  agreed  with  the  banks  that  electronic 
payments  offered  the  best  prospects  for  Improved  CBP.  The  SME 
representative was  ready  to accept  these points provided  that  banks  would 
Inform  their  customers  clearly  as  to  how  the  electronic  payment  methods 
could  be  used  by  SME's. 
Payment  cards 
20.  Payment  cards  were  a  highly  convenient  means  of  CB  payment,  both  for  the 
customer  and  for  the  trader  (as  recipient).  Moreover,  the  payment  card, 
although  predominantly  a  consumer  Instrument  could  be,  and  was,  to  a 
growing  extent,  being  used  by  business  users.  Indeed,  the  payment  card 
was  described  by  one  member  as  "the  single  currency"  for  CBP. 
Nevertheless,  it  was  agreed  that  the  techniques  for  remote  payment  by 
payment  card  (e.g.  by  giving  the  number  over  the  telephone)  were  not 
[yet]  sufficiently  secure  to  be  widely  used.  Traders  were  however 
concerned  about  two  aspects,  both  of  which  Inhibited  the  lnteroperabi llty 
of  payment  cards  throughout  the  EC  : 
a)  Whilst  there  were  already  some  arrangements  for  debit  cards  Can 
Increasing I  y  important  payment  card  type  In  some  countries)  to  be 
accepted  on  a  cross-frontier  basis  in  payment  for  goods  and  services, 
these  are  not  yet  widespread.  The  Group  noted,  however,  that 
considerable  progress  had  been  made  in  extending  the  interoperablllty 
of  debit  cards  (as wei I as credit  cards)  for  use  in  cross-border  ATMs. 
b)  The  Interchange  fees  set  by  the  lnternat lona 1  card  schemes  for  CB 
payments  were,  In  the  view  of  traders,  anti-competitive,  as  they 
prevented  market  forces  from  operating  across  national  boundaries  in 
the  Community.  Banking  members  of  the  Group  disagreed  that  these  fees 
were  anti-competitive  or  that  they  inhibited  the  achievement  of 
interoperabi lity.  They  also  considered  that  agreements  concerning 
interchange  fees  were  essent i a I  to  the  functIoning  of  cross-border 
card payments  and  the achievement  of an  effective  lnteroperabillty. 
Debit  cards 
21.  The  Group  concluded  that  there  were  few  technical  or  lnfrastructural 
problems  preventing  the  linkage  of  national  debit  card  networks.  Debit 
card  networks  needed  to  see  a  business  case  for  I i nkages  and  a  way  to 
overcome  any  potential  competition pol icy  problems. - 6  -
Compet 1  t I  on  policy 
22.  The  Group  took  note  of  the  Commission's  paper  on  "Principles  of 
Competition  Polley•  <set  out  In  Appendix~ to  the  PSTDG's  report),  which 
had  been  drafted  In  order  to  provide  a  clear  statement  of  the  criteria 
which  the  Commission,  as  the  competition  authority,  would  apply  to  the 
agreements  on  co-operation  which  were  required  for  cross-border  payment 
systems.  It  was  agreed  that  Interbank  agreements  would  have  only  an 
Indirect  effect  on  users  but  users were  not  prepared  to accept  this  lack 
of  direct  connection  as  a  reason  for  excluding  them  from  lnfQrmatlon 
about,  and  the  rIght  to  comment  on,  genera I  agreements  between  banks. 
Users  raised  a  further  general  point  which  was  to  emphasize  the 
Importance  of establishing guidelines to cover  the arrangements  for  •face 
to  face•  payments,  as  we II  as  those  for  remote  payments  whIch  are  at 
present  the  subject  of  the  principles.  Subject  to  these  general  remarks 
and  to  the  particular  comments  below,  the  users  were  satisfied with  the 
•principles". 
Membership  and  access  to systems 
23.  As  regards  the  principle  of  non-exclusivity,  which  states  that  where  a 
co-operation  agreement  is  made  up  of  the  majority  of  banks  or  covers  a 
significant  part  of  the  payments  traffic  between  different  countries  It 
may  be  considered  an  "essential  facility",  the  question  was  raised  by 
user  members  whether  It  would  be  desirable  to  attempt  to  define  the 
boundary  between  an  •essential" facility of  this kind,  which  In  principle 
should  be  open  to  new  members,  and  the  type  of  system  comprIsing  a 
limited  number  of  members,  which  could  freely  choose  whether  or  not  to 
admit  new  members.  User  members  accepted  the  Commission's  view  that  It 
would  not  be  possible  to  determine  these  different  situations other  than 
on  a  case by  case basis.  Further  reflection would  however  be  necessary on 
the  question of  participation  by  non-banks,  on  which  the  principles were 
Incomplete. 
Interchange  fees 
24.  Users  emphasized  the  Importance  to  them  of  there  being  competition  on 
interchange  fees,  defined as  the  fee  paid by  the paying  bank  to  the  payee 
bank  or  vice  versa.  They  thought  that  paragraph  3(c)  of  the  •principles• 
did  not  Identify  the  issue  clearly enough,  which,  for  them,  was  the  risk 
of  conflict  between  centrally  determined  interchange  fees  agreed  by  and 
applicable  to  all  members  with  competition  principles.  Users  also  felt 
that  a  close  watch  by  competition  authorities  should  be  kept  on 
agreements  providing  for  •maximum"  fees  as  the  fee  levels  tended  to 
remain  at  the  maximum  level.  Banking  members  did not  agree with  the views 
of  users on  these  aspects,  as,  In  their  view,  what  was  Important  for  the 
user  was  competition  In  the  overall  charges  made  to  him,  which  could 
exist despite agreed  Interchange  fees. 
Conclusion on  competition 
25.  The  Group  noted  that  the  Commission  envisaged  adopting  the  principles on 
competition set out  In  Appendix  5 of  the  PSTDG's  report  and  drawing  them 
to the attention of all  Interested parties.  The  user  members  of  the Group 
asked  the  Commission  to  lend  Its  weight  to  the  lmplementat ion  of  the 
principles  relevant  to  competition  already  contained  In  Its  1987 
Recommendation  lncorporat lng  a  European  Code  of  Conduct  relat lng  to 
electronic payment.  The  banking  members  considered  the  PSTDG,  rather  than 
this group,  to be  the appropriate  forum  to deal  with  competition matters, 
as  these  were  addressed  extensively  In  the  course  of  the  latter's  work 
and  therefore reserved  Its position. 
r  .. 
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C.  TRANSPARENCY  ANQ  INFORMATION  FOR  USERS 
Background 
26.  The  need  for  users of  cross-border  payment  services  to be  better  informed 
had  been  pointed out  by  both  bankers  and  users  In  their  reactions  to  the 
Discussion  Paper.  Bankers  had  remarked  that  users  often  chose  an 
Inappropriate  means  of  payment  for  a  cross-border  transaction  and  were 
consequent I  y  disappointed  by  the  resu It;  users  agreed  and  said  that 
better  information was  needed  for  both originators and  beneficiaries.  The 
Group  noted  the  principles on  transparency  contained  In  the  Commission's 
1990  Recommendation- appl lcable  to transfers- and  the Commission's  1988 
Recommendation  on  payment  cards  which  also  called  for  clear  a  priori 
Information  to be  contained  in  contracts.  The  Group  decided  that  It would 
be  desirable  to  take  the  subject  further  than  these  two  Instruments  had 
done,  In  order  to  provide  relevant  comparable  ·written  Information 
cover lng  the  various  forms  of  cross-border  payment  mechanisms,  In  a 
comprehensive  fashion.  This  wou I  d  enab I  e  customers  to  make  compar i sons 
between  dIfferent  means  of  payment  and  the  charges  for  them;  It  wou I  d 
also  enable  them  to  compare  the  services  offered  by  different  banks  and 
thus  stimulate  competition.  The  Group  welcomed  a  commitment  given  by  the 
European  CredIt  Sector  Associ at Ions  (ECSAs),  to  prepare  and  send  out 
guldel ines  to their members  in  alI  Member  States,  setting out  the minimum 
information  which  should  be  given  to  their  customers  on  different  means 
of effecting cross-border  remote  payments.  A draft of  these guidelines  is 
set out  In  the Appendix. 
Payment  instruments  and  mechanisms  to  be  included  In  the  scope  of  the 
information- remote  payments  and  face  to  face  payments 
27.  Users  were  in  favour  of  including  alI  cross-border  Instruments  and 
mechanisms  within  the scope  of  the  information which  banks  would  provide, 
not  least  because  there  were  situations  in  which  users  are  faced  with 
deciding  whether  to  use  a  remote  or  face  to  face  payment  method.  In  this 
way  they  would  be  able  to decide  whether  a  payment  by  card would  be  more 
advantageous  than  using  a  cheque,  for  example.  Banking  members  of  the 
Group  suggested  that  remote  payments  would  be  more  appropriately  treated 
separately  from  face  to  face  payments.  This  different  treatment  was 
justified  first  by  the  fact  that  although  the  same  Instrument  (e.g.  a 
payment  card)  might  be  used  for  both  types  of  payment,  the  type  of 
information  to  be  given  in  each  case  might  be  different  and  it  was 
therefore  potentially  confusing  for  the  reader  to  attempt  to  deal  with 
both  In  one  document.  A second  difference between  remote  and  face  to face 
payments  was  that  the  former  would  generally  be  originated  on  the 
premises  of  the  customer's  bank,  whilst  the  latter  would  take  place 
outside  the  bank,  indeed  outside  the  home  country.  A  third  reason  for 
treating  ~hese  categories  separately  was  that  not  all  means  of  face  to 
face  payments  would  be  made  available  by  banks  to  all  customers  and  it 
would  be  embarrassing  for  banks  and  annoying  for  customers  if  a  payment 
card,  for  example,  included  In  the  brochure  were  to  be  refused  on  credit 
grounds.  Fourth,  and  finally,  banking  members  pointed  out  that 
transparency  of  Information  with  respect  to  the  cost  of  making  face  to 
face  payment  was  harder  to  achieve  than  for  remote  payments  because  the 
bank  has  virtually no  control  over  the  beneficiary of  the payment,  at  the 
point  of  sale,  who  might  for  example  Impose  an  unforeseeable  charge  on 
the  customer. - 8  -
27A  Users  and  the  COmmission  took  note  of  the  banks'  views  but  thought  that 
both  types  shou I  d  be  wIthin  the  scope  of  the  in it 1  at i ve  to  Improve 
customer  Information,  although  recognising  that  the  appropriate  way  of 
dealing  with  face  to  face  payments  might  not  be  the  same  as  that  for 
remote  payments.  The  Group  as  a  whole  was  able  to  agree  that  It  was 
desirable  and  Indeed  Important  that  customers  should  be  Informed  as 
clearly  as  possible  as  to  the  various  different  means  of  making  face  to 
face  payments  both  at  home  and  abroad  and  whether  by  cheque,  Eurocheque, 
payment  card  or  other  means.  The  Group  took  note  of  the  willingness  of 
the  ECSAs,  to  consider  recommending  to  their  members  to  review  the 
Information  given  by  them·on  face  to  face  payments  in  the  light  of  the 
guidelines  for  remote  payments.  The  Commission  and  user  members 
cons I  de red  that  It  wou I  d  b4. .. desIrable  for  the  same  1  nformat ion  (mutat 1  s 
mutandis)  to  be  given  for  face  to  face  means  of  payment  as  for  remote 
means,  al.though  banks  should  quite  properly  be  free  to  decide  where  and 
how  to present  and  distribute this  Information.  The  Commission  stated  Its 
Intention  to  keep  In  touch  with  the  ECSAs  with  a  view  to making  further 
progress  towards  this objective. 
Scope  of  the  information  to be  provided  to users 
28.  The  Group  agreed  that  the  following  areas should  be  covered 
a  basic description of  the service; 
the  way  in  which  the  service  can  be  used,  possibly  including  details 
to  be  provided  by  the  customer  in  order  for  the  funds  to  reach  the 
beneficiary  or  to  satisfy  any  technical,  regulatory  or  other 
requirements; 
- description  of  how  to  send  a  precise  sum  to  a  beneficiary  (by  paying 
all  charges  for  the  transfer); 
an  Indication of  the  "target"  time  generally  accepted  by  the  bank  for 
the  funds  to  be  credited  to  the  account  of  the  beneficiary,  or  to  be 
available to him,  under  normal  circumstances; 
the  basis  of  any  commissions  and  charges  payable  by  the  customer  to 
the  bank,  including  foreign  exchange  commission  if  any,  including, 
wherever  possible,  the charges of  the  beneficiary's bank; 
the basis of  the exchange  rate appl led  to  the  transaction; 
the  value  date  applied  by  the  bank  to  the  debiting  of  the  customer's 
account; 
- ways  In  which  the  customer  may  obtain  further  information,  Including 
tariffs  and  exchange  rates  in  effect.  This  might  consist  for  example 
of  notices  In  branches,  or  an  Indication of  how  the  relevant  person or 
office could be  contacted; 
- where  relevant,  specific warnings  with  regard  to certain methods; 
the main  characteristics of each  means  of  payment,  Including  reference 
to redress procedures. 
In  relation  to  the  5th  indent  above,  the  Group  noted  that  In  current 
circumstances  Information  about  additional  charges  Imposed  by  the 
beneficiary's  bank  was  not  always  available  to  the  originator's  bank. 
User  members  and  the  Commission  considered  that  this  was  an 
unsatisfactory state of  affairs and  Invited  the  banking  associations  and 
Individual  banks  to examine  how  the  situation  could  be  Improved  as  soon 
as possible. 
With  regard  to  the 6th  indent  above,  the user  members  considered  It  would 
be  beneficial  to provide,  in  addition  to the  information  described  there, 
information on  the amount  of  the margin  (if any)  appl led  by  the  bank  over 
the  reference  exchange  rate  and  invited  the  banking  members  to  give 
further  consideration to this  issue. - 9  -
Format  of  the  Information  for  users 
29.  Consumer  members  of  the Group  advocated  a  standardised Europe  wide  format 
(as  in  France)  which  would  enable  users  easily  to  compare  information 
provided  by  different  financial  institutions.  Such  an  approach  was  not 
accepted  by  the  banking  members  of  the  Group  in  view  of  national 
differences.  It  was  agreed  nevertheless  by  the  banking  members  that  the 
principle of  ease of· comparison  of  Information  would  be  reflected  In  the 
guidelines.  The  objective would  be  that  banks  in  each  Member  State would 
be  expected  to  produce  guidelines  for  their  customers  along  the  I ines 
recommended.  The  Group  discussed  how  best  to deal  with  changes  In  prices 
or  other  conditions  and  agreed  that  users  should  receive  up  to  date 
written  Information on  tariffs and  charges.  This  could  be  In  the guidance 
document  or  In  separate  leaflets describing  the  vario~s means  of  cross-
border  remote  payment.  Where  changes  in  tariffs or  charges occurred  these 
might  need  to be  made  available  in  a  separate  leaflet. 
Group's  conclusion on  a  priori  user  information 
30.  When  the  draft  CBP  guidelines  have  been  finalised  by  the  European  Credit 
Sector  Associations,  which  Is  expected  by  March  1992(*)  they  would  be 
transmitted  to  the  Associations'  members  for  Implementation  and,  at  the 
same  time,  the existence of  the guidelines should  be  widely  publ lcized by 
alI  Interested  parties.  In  a  second  stage  individual  banks  would 
implement  the  guidelines  by  preparing  (or  revising)  their  own  customer 
I iterature.  The  ECSAs  indicated  that  they  would  make  every  effort  to 
achieve  the  Implementation  of  the  guidelines  by  31  December  1992.  The 
Commission  would  continue  to monitor  this.  Consumer  and  other  user  groups 
who  make  CBP  should  be  encouraged  to  ask  their  bank  for  a  copy  of  its 
guide.  The  implementation  of  this  initiative,  coinciding  with  the 
inauguration of  the  internal  mar~et  In  1993,  wi  I I  represent  a  significant 
step  towards  improvIng  the  transparency  and  efficiency  of  cross-border 
payment  systems. 
Transparency of currency exchange  transactions 
31.  A  special  case,  not  falling  within  the  scope  of  the  a  priori  written 
Information  to  be  provided  to users,  concerns  the  way  in  which  the  price 
of  exchanging  currencies  is  Quoted  and  whether  a  norm  should  be 
recommended  (or  enacted)  in  this area.  The  situation arises where  a  bank 
or  bureau  de  change  takes  as  its  price  not  only  a  margin  on  the  spread 
between  its  buy  and  sell  rates  for  a  currency,  but  also  a  separate  fee 
(which  Is  not  always  apparent  until  after  the  transaction  is completed). 
The  consumer  members  advocated  that  this  fee  should  be  incorporated  in 
the  rate  of  exchange,  to  produce  an  all-Inclusive  exchange  rate.  This 
would  enable comparisons  to be  readl IY  made  between  the  terms  of  business 
offered  by  different  establishments  which  was  not  the  case  If  a  consumer 
tried  to  compare  Inclusive  exchange  rates  with  exchange  rates 
supplemented  by  fees.  However,  other  members  of  the  Group  thought  that 
such  a  rule  could  work  to  the  detriment  of  consumers  In  that  banks  and 
bureaux  de  change  would  be  likely  to  widen  their  spread  on  the  exchange 
rate  in  order  to  compensate  for  the  separate  fees  which  they  would  no 
longer  be  entitled  to  charge.  The  Group  agreed  that  the  following 
principles  should  apply  to  the  Quotation  of  rates  for  currency  exchange 
transactions  by  banks  and  bureaux  de  change  : 
(*)  I.e.  in  time  to be  Included  In  the Commission's  Communication  planned  for 
25  March. - 10  -
clear,  concise  Information  about  buying  and  selling rates  to be  given; 
and  (where  these  were  not  all-Inclusive  rates)  any  other  charges must 
be  clearly and  prominently  displayed. 
A posteriori  lnfor•atlon to customers 
32.  The  Improvements  in  the  Quality  and  presentation of  Information  given  to 
customers  before  entering  Into  a  specific  transaction  need  to  be  matched 
by  Improvements  In  the  information  given  a  posteriori  in  respect  of  each 
transaction.  In  this  respect  users  should  be  given  a  detailed  breakdown 
of  the  separale  elements,  exchange  rate,  commission,  tax,  etc.  The  need 
to  give  customers  such  Information  should  also  be  mentioned  In  the 
gu I  de I I  nes . 
D.  COMPLAINTS  ANQ  REDRESS 
Background 
33.  In  their  comments  submitted  to  the  Commission  following  publication  of 
the  Discussion  paper,  consumer  groups  had  argued  that  there  should  be 
ade~uate,  accessible,  non-legal  means  of  redress  available  to  users  in 
cases  where  cross-border  payments  failed  or  otherwise  gave  rise  to 
complaint  on  the  part  of  customers.  The  Group  noted  that  the  Commission 
Recommendation  90/109/EEC  on  the  transparency  of  banking  conditions 
relating  to  cross-border  financial  transactions  cal Is  for  the 
establishment  of  complaints  bodies which  should  be  competent  to deal  with 
transfers,  as  defined  in  that  instrument.  It  was  agreed  that  the  scope of 
complaints  procedures  should  be  widened  to  Include  other  forms  of  cross-
border  payment,  whether  remote  or  face  to  face  and  whether  by  transfer 
(credit  or  debit),  cheQue  or  payment  card  and  to  dea I  wIth  comp I  a I  nts 
relating  to  the  exchange  of  cash;  the  Group  also  agreed  that  such 
complaints would  normal ty  be  dealt with  through  the complaints procedures 
appl lcable  to banking  business  In  general. 
State of  application of  the  1990  Recommendation 
34.  The  Group  was  informed  by  the  Commission  that  it  had  received  formal 
notification  from  eight  Member  States  that  they  had  designated  bodies, 
competent  to deal  with  complaints  relating to transfers.  In  the  r.emainlng 
four,  It  was  not  yet  clear whether  satisfactory complaints schemes  (which 
comply  with  Recommendation  90/109/EEC)  existed. 
The  case  for  complaints  and  redress schemes 
35.  The  Group  agreed  that  the  proper  hand I ing  of  complaints  was  extremely 
Important  both  for  customers  and  for  the  banks  themselves.  It  was  In 
banks'  own  Interests  to  establish  within  their  own  organisations 
eff I  c lent  systems  for  hand II ng  comp I  a I  nts,  whIch  were  symptoms  that  • 
something  was  not  functioning  as  it  should.  A proper  complaints  system 
within  a  bank  would  enable  It  to  improve  Its efficiency,  by  Identifying 
failures and  remedying  them. - 11  -
36.  At  the  next  level,  If  a  complaint  could  not  be  sat lsfactor lly  resolved 
within  the  Individual  bank,  the  case  for  a  non-.legal  procedure  was 
accepted  by  the  Group  without  the  need  for  discussion  of  the  principle. 
The  Group  therefore  concentrated  its attention on  a  number  of  individual 
aspects of  redress schemes. 
To  which  Instruments  should  redress schemes  apply  ? 
37.  The  Group  agreed  that  all  cross-border  payment  Instruments  (Including 
cash)  should  be  included  within  the  scope  of  the  various  complaints 
schemes. 
To  which  customers  should  redress schemes  be  available? 
38.  The  Group  considered  the question whether  the schemes  should  be  available 
to  businesses or  SME's,  as  well  as  individuals.  On  the  one  hand  bankers 
argued  that  businesses,  or  at  any  rate  Incorporated  businesses,  did  not 
need  the  spec i a I  procedures  whIch  these  schemes  afford  and  that  they 
could  look  after  themselves  either  using  their  commercial  weight  or  the 
remedies  of  the  legal  process.  On  the  other  hand,  business  users,  SME's 
In  particular,  argued  that  the  same  rationale  favouring  redress  schemes 
over  legal  procedures  applied  to  them.  Banking  members  thought  it  would 
be  a  mistake  to  Include  business  users,  whether  large  or  small,  within 
the  scope  of  redress  schemes.  The  Group  recognised  that  there  would  be 
difficulties  In  making  such  schemes  generally  aval labl~  to  business 
users,  mainly  because  of  the  more  complex  nature of  the  banking  business 
In  which  they  were  involved.  The  Group  noted  that  a  solution  adopted  In 
Denmark  was  to  admit  complaints  from  businesses  provided  that  they  did 
not  differ  substantially  from  those  of  private  individuals.  It  was  also 
noted  that  In  some  Member  States  complaints  by  unincorporated  businesses 
were  admissible.  User  members  recommended  -and  the  Commission  agreed-
that  consideration be  given  to extending one  or other of  these approaches 
In  alI  Member  States. 
The  nature of  the  remedies  available 
39.  The  Group  did  not  consider  it  necessary  to discuss  the  level  of  monetary 
compensation  which  redress  bodies  should  be  empowered  to award.  The  Group 
noted  In  its brief  review  of  existing  schemes  that  some  national  bodies 
operated  within  stipulated  limits  whi 1st  others  did  not  appear  to. 
·However,  it  was  noted  that  such  a  procedure  did  not  remove  the  legal 
rights  of  complainants  to  seek  redress  through  the  courts.  It  was  felt 
that  a  better  knowledge  of  existing  national  schemes  should  be 
disseminated  both  to  the  banking  industry  and  to  users;  the  COmmission 
was  continuing  Its  review  of  these  schemes  and  would  publicize  the 
results. 
The  nature of  the complaints  body  (or  person);  In  particular  "independence" 
40.  The  Commission's  1990  Recommendation  was  the  starting  point  for  the 
Group's  discussion of  this point.  It  provides  that  : 
••one  way  of  applying  this pr lnciple [i.e.  the establishment of  complaints 
procedures]  would  be  to  entrust  the  task  of  dealing  with  complaints  to 
bodies  Independent  of  the parties concerned  and  forming  part of  : - 12  -
-the publ lc sector  (ministerial  department); 
- the central  bank; 
-a specialist  body  such  as  the ombudsman's  office; 
-a contact  committee  comprising  bank  representatives and  users." 
41.  The  Group  discussed  the  question  of  the  most  appropriate  form  of 
constitution of  the complaints  body  or  qual iflcation of  the  person  (where 
a  sIng I  e  ombudsman  was  con temp I  a ted).  Two  broad  pr inc i pIes  were  agreed 
upon,  which  should  guide  any  further  Initiative  that  might  be  undertaken 
namely  that  : 
there  shou I  d  be  flex I bIll ty,  so  that  dIfferent  types  of  comp I  a I  nts 
bodies could  be  chosen  In  different Member  States; 
the complaints body  (or.  person)  should  be  sufficiently  Independent  and 
neutral  to be  trusted by  the parties concerned. 
The  Group  also  discussed  the  question  whether  any  formal  mechanism  for 
liaison  between  the  complaints  bodies/ombudsmen  In  different  Member 
States  would  be  needed.  The  Group  suggested  that  ombudsmen  (and 
equivalent  bodies)  In  different  Member  States  should  be  encouraged  to 
take  up  contacts  with  each  other  and  to  consider  whether  they  needed  to 
reach  a  concordat  on  the  hand I lng  of  complaints  about  cross-border 
payments.  The  Group  accepted  the  principle  under  which  originating  banks 
would  be  responsible  to  originators  and  beneficiaries  banks  responsible 
to beneficiaries. 
E.  SPECIFIC  RECOMMENDATIONS  OF  THE  GROUP 
User  needs 
42.  The  Group  recommends  that  the  Commission  and  the  banking  Industry  take 
note  of  the  needs  and  preferences  of  users  of  cross-border  payment 
systems,  In  their  work  on  the development  of  Europe's  payment  systems.  In 
genera I  the  Group  stresses  the  major  Importance  of  ensuring  that  the 
payment  systems  within  the  EC  are  organised  so  as  to  provide  a  service 
which  Is,  as  far  as  possible  (I.e.  subject  to  the  constraints  mentioned 
In  paragraph  8  above),  as  cheap  as  rapid  and  as  reliable  between 
different  Member  States  as  are  the existing  national  payment  systems.  In 
particular,  payment  systems  should  meet  the  differing  needs  of  all 
sectors  for  making  both  remote  and  face  to  face  payments.  The  cross-
border  acceptabi I ity  of  payment  instruments  and  systems  should  be 
strengthened,  with  priority given  to electronic payment. 
Competition 
43.  The  Group  notes  the  Important  role  played  by  competition  pol Icy  In 
defining  the  appropriate  limits  between  the  co-operation  and  the 
competition  which  are  both  vital  elements  in  cross-border  payment 
systems.  The  Group  notes  the  Commission's  Intention  to  adopt  guidelines 
(appended  to  the  report  of  the  PSTDG)  but  notes  that  they  deal  mainly 
with  Interbank  systems  and  not  with  payment  card  arrangements.  The  Group  ~ 
further  noted  the  intention of  the  Commission  in  consultation with  users 
and  banks  (In  an  appropriate  forum)  to  draw  up  guidelines  appropriate  to 
payment  card  arrangements.  However,  banking  members  strong I  y  expressed 
the  view  that  competition  policy  should  not  be  discussed  in  this  Group 
and  therefore  reserved  their  position on  it. - 13  -
lnfor•atlon on  cross-border  payment  Instruments and  systems 
44.  The  Group  notes  the  willingness  of  the  banking  industry  to  improve  the 
Information  ava I I ab I e  to  customers  on  cross-border  remote  payment  and 
welcomes  its  Intention  at  an  early  stage  to  draw  up  guidelines  In 
consultation with  the  Commission  on  the  presentation  by  banks  of  concise 
information  to  users  of  cross-border  payment  servic~  covering  all 
essential  information  to  enable  users  to  make  informed  decisions  and  to 
compare  different  payment  methods.  A draft  of  the  guidelines  prepared  by 
European  Credit  Sector  As soc I at Ions  ( ECSAs >  and  app I I  cab I e  to  remote 
pa~nts Is  set out  In  the Appendix.  The  Group  notes  the  Intention of  the 
ECSAs  to  finalise  these  draft  guide I ines  by  March  1992  and  that  they 
would  endeavour  to have  them  implemented  by  banks  by  January  1993. 
So  far  as  face  to face  pa~nts are  concerned,  the  Group  recommends  that 
the  information  made  available  to  holders  of  the  relevant  payment 
Instruments  should  be  reviewed  In  the  light  of  the  principles applicable 
to remote  payments. 
lnfor•atlon on  exchange  rates 
45.  The  Group  recommends  that  the Commission  should seek  to ensure  that  banks 
and  bureaux  de  change  display  clear  and  concise  information  about  their 
exchange  rates  for  cash  transactions  showing  in  particular  their  buying 
and  sel I ing  rates  (where  this  is  not  an  al 1-inclusive  rate)  and  a 
prominent  indication  of  any  other  charges  following  the  principle  that 
there  should  be  no  hidden  or  "surprise"  charges.  The  Group  invite~  the 
Commission  to  consider  the  best  means  of  implementing  this 
recommendation. 
Redress  procedures 
46.  The  Group  recommends  that  banking  complaints  and  redress  schemes  should 
be  competent  to  deal  with  all  forms  of  cross-border  payment  and  not  be 
I imited  to  transfers.  User  members  and  the  Commission  thought  that 
consideration  should  be  given  to  extending  these  redress  procedures  to 
some  business  users  either  where  their  comp I a i nt  Is  ana I ogous  to  one 
which  could  be  made  by  a  private  individual  or  where  the  customer  Is  a 
smal 1  unincorporated  business.  The  Group  invites  the  Commission  to 
consider  what  further  steps  are  necessary  to  achieve  the  first  aim 
mentioned  above;  User  members  similarly  Invite  the  Commission  with 
respect  to  the  second  possibi I ity.  The  Group  agreed  that  redress 
procedures  should  be  Quick,  fair  and  easily accessible.  This means,  inter 
alIa,  that  the  complaints  body  should  be  sufficiently  independent  and 
neutral  to  be  trusted  by  al 1 the  parties concerned,  but  that  the  precise 
arrangemen~s for  ensuring  this  independence  should  respect  the  different 
traditions of  the  Member  States. 
Follow-up 
47.  The  Group  invites  the  Commission  to  give  particular  attention  to  the 
Quest ion  of  organising  the  fo I low-up  and  monitoring  of  those 
recommendations  which  it  adopts  in  order  to  ensure  their  effective 
Implementation  as  soon  as possible. t 
f\ I"' t" t  I~ U  I  1\  - -J. 
FEDERATiON  BANCAIRE  DE  LA  COMMUNAUTE  EUROPEENNE 
8. 1040  Sruxe1les  .  ~ue  Mor.toyer  10  "'el~phone  02. 511  7e  IX>  Telefnx  02 . 511  13 28 
f)  ....-#i  GROUPEMENT EUROPEEN DES CAISSES D'EPARGNE 
EUROPEAN SAVINGS BANKS  GROUP 
~  EUROPAISCHE SPARKASSENVEREINIGUNG 
(:  /  SECRE'T  ARIA T GENERAL Avenue de  ta  Rena1ssance.  12.  B-1040 Bruxelles • ·'? 021739 16  11  - Tetetax: 021736 09 5 
*  *  * 
*~·  * 
*  ~  *  * .,  .,.. 
* *  * 
Association of Cooperative Banks oi the EC 
Groupe1nent des Banques Cooperatives de laCE 
Vereinigung der Genossenschaftsbanken der EG 
Rue de la Science 23-25. Bte 9  •  B-1040 Bruxelles  •  Tel. (02) 230 11 24 - 230 14  19 
I2F035DI 
T  14 
02.03.1992 
EUROPEAN  BANKING  INDUSfRY GUIDELINES  ON  CUSfOMER INFORMATION 
ON  CR05S-BORPER REMOTE  PAYMENT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The  present  guidelines  have  been  prepared  by  the  three  European  Credit  Sector 
Associations,  i.e.  the  Banking  Federation  of  the  EC,  the  European  Savings  Banks 
Group  and  the  Association  of  Cooperative  Banks  of  the  EC  - in  the  light  of 
work  carried  out  by  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  in  relation  to 
examination  of  payment  systems  in  the  internal  market.  Their  purpose  is  to 
provide  guidance  to  the  Associations'  member  organisations  in  issuing 
recommendations  to  member  banks  in  relation  to  the  production  of brochures  and 
other  literature  for  information  for  their  customers  on  cross-border  remote 
payment. 
Making  cross-border  remote  payments  is  an  activity  which  many  customers 
undertake  infrequently.  It  is  important  therefore  that  information  is  made 
available  to  help  them  to  understand  the  various  transfer  methods  which  they 
can  use  and  to  choose  wn1ch  cross-ooraer  remote  payme!1t  method  is  best  suited 
to  their  individual  needs. 
However,  all  banks  are  not  active  in  the  cross-border  remote  payment  business; 
those  which  are,  do  not  always  provide  a  full  range  of  cross-border  services. 
The  list  of  services  mentioned  in  the  following  pages  (Sections  II  and  V)  might 
therefore  be  in  some  cases  very  rudimentary,  by  their  very  nature  and. not  for 
lack  of  transparency. 
This  document  sets  out  the  guidelines  which  should  be  followed  by  individual 
banks  in  providing  their  customers  with  information  relating  to  the  normal 
circumstances  under  which  cross-border  remote  payments  are  effected.  It  is 
recognised  that  the  nature  of  cross-border  remote  payments  is  such  that  full 
information  is  not  always  known  by  the  customers'  bank  or  branch,  especially 
given  the  lack  of  control  which  the  sending  bank  may  have  over  the 
beneficiary's  bank  abroad. 
\Ievertheless  the  emphasis  should  be  on  making  as  much  information  as  possible 
available  to  the  customer.  and  where  information  is  not  known.  this  should  be 
made  clear  to  the  customer. 2 
The  fallowing  sections  set  out  the  general  principles  on  which  the  banks  should 
base  their  information  to  the  customer,  the  definitions  of  the  terms  used,  the 
examples  of  the  types  of  remote  payment  which  might  be  covered  and  how  the 
information  could  be presented  to  the customer. 
It  should  be  noted  that  although  these  guidelines  are  intended  ultimately  for 
European  Community  banks,  many  cross-border  remote  payments  do  however 
involve  banks  outside  the Community. 
*  *  * 
II.  GUIDELINES 
1.  The  bank  should  issue  for  its  customers  a  list  of  the  services  the  bank 
offers  to effect cross-border remote payments. 
2.  The  bank  should  also  issue  for  its  customers  information  describing  each  of 
these  services  and  indicating  their  essential  characteristics  so  that  these 
may  be  evaluated  by  the customer  according  to  his  requirements. 
3.  For each of these services,  this  information should  at  least  include: 
3.1.  a  basic  description  of  the service; 
3.2.  the  way  in  which  the  service  can  be  used,  possibly  including  details  to  be 
provided  by  the  customer  in  order  for  the  funds  to  reach  the  beneficiary 
and  to satisfy  any  technical,  regulatory or other requirements; 
3.3.  an  indication  of  the  time  generally  needed  for  the  funds  to  be  credited  to 
the  account  of,  or  to  be  available  to  the  beneficiary,  under  normal 
circumstances; 
3.4.  the  basis  of  any  comm1ss1ons  and  charges  payable  by  the  customer  to  the 
bank.  including  the  basis  of  the  exchange  rate  applied  to  the  transactions 
and  foreign  exchange  commission.  if  any; 
3.5.  the  value date  applied  by  the  bank  in  debiting  the  customer's  account; 
3.6.  ways  in  which  the  customer  may  obtain  further  information, · including 
tariffs  and  exchange  rates  in  effect.  This  might  consist  for  example  of 
notices  in  branches.  or  an  indication  of  how  the  relevant  person  or  office 
could  be  contacted~ 
3.7.  where  applicable.  specific  warnings  with  regard  to  certain means  of  remote 
payment.  .f 
.t.  The  bank  should  also  include  a  reference  to  redress  procedures  available  to 
the  customer  and  the  way  to  access  them.  ~ 
*  * 3 
Ill.  DEF1NITIONS 
. A  cross-border  remote  payment  is  defined  as  a  transfer  of  funds  between  a 
customer  of  a  country  A  institution  and  an  institution  in  country..,-B,  which  might 
or  might  not  be  a  branch  of  the  originating  institution,  for  the  benefit  of  a 
beneficiary  in  country  B. 
A  customer  is  to  be  clearly  defined  as  remitter  (the  person  who  issues  the 
transfer order)  or beneficiary (the party  to whom  the  funds  are  allocated through 
the  crediting  of  his  account  or  through  the sending  of  a  statement enabling  him 
to  receive payment of the  funds). 
IV.  EXPLANATORY  NOTES 
The  numbers  hereafter  refer  to  the  corresponding  points  in  the  "Guidelines" 
section (Part  II.). 
1.  How  the  list  of  the  services  which  the  bank  offers  for  making  cross-
border  remote  payments  is  provided  is  a  matter  for  the  individual  bank. 
For  example,  as  many  customers  undertake  cross-border  remote  payments 
only  infrequently,  some  banks  may  well  choose  to  provide  a  list  in  their 
branches;  others  may  choose  to  provide  a  different  brochure  for  each 
service  offered. 
2.  In  providing  this  information  about  their services,  banks  should  make  every 
effort  to  present  it  in  a  form  which  is  easy  for  the  customer  to 
understand,  in  particular  in  plain  language,  and  in  order  for  the  customer 
to  compare. 
3.1  The  basic  description  of  each  of  these  services  should  tell  the  customer 
fundamentally  how  the service operates. 
3.2  The  Information  should  include  details  on  how  the  customer  can  have 
access  to  the  service,  for  example,  whether  or  not  the  customer  needs  to 
go  to  his  branch  to  make  the  transfer. 
It  should  also  tell  the  customer  what  details  he  needs  to  have  to  make 
the  transfer,  such  as  the  name  and  address  of  the  beneficiary,  his  bank 
name.  account  number  and,  if  available,  bank  S\VIFT /BIC  code  (BIC:  Bank 
Identification  Code). 
3.3  The  sending  bank  should  give  its  customers  such  information  as  is 
available,  including  an  indication  as  to  how  long  it  would  expect  the 
transfer  to  take  in  normal  circumstances. 
It  will,  however,  not  always  be  possible  for  the  bank  to  know  precisely 
when  the  transfer  will  be  credited  to  the  beneficiary's  account  or received 
by  him  since  this  will  depend  on  domestic  facilities  for  funds  transfers  in 
either  - sending  or  receiving  - country,  and  on  the  arrangement  between 
the  beneficiary  and  his  bank. 4 
The  bank  may  also  want  to  advise  the  customer  to  let  the  beneficiary 
know  when  the  bank  expects  the  transfer  to  be  made.  in  normal 
circumstances, so  that the customer can  advise  the  beneficiary  if it  is  not 
received  in  that  timescale  and  the  beneficiary  can  investigate  what  has 
happened  to  it. 
It  may  be  particularly  difficult  to  provide  information  on  timetables  in 
some  circumstances,  for  example  where  the  beneficiary's  bank  does  not  " 
have  a  correspondent  relationship  with  the  sender's  bank  and  another  one 
or  more  banks  need  to  be  involved.  In  these  circumstances  this  should  be 
made clear ·to  the customer. 
3.4.  This  information  may  change  fairly  frequently.  It  may  therefore  not  be 
possible  to  give  the  customer  the  precise  charges  figures  in  a  brochure 
setting  out  the  bank's  services.  In  these  circumstances  the  information 
could  be  provided  in  another way.  The  information  given  shall  indicate  to 
the  customer  where  or  how  he  can  obtain  the  precise  charges  to  be 
levied,  for  example,  from  his  branch. 
This  should  include  an  explanation  to  the  remitter  of  the  fact  that  the 
beneficiary's  bank  will  sometimes  levy  charges  when  the  money  is 
received,  and  to  indicate  whether  the  bank  allows  the customer  the  option 
of  paying  these  charges  himself.  The  bank  should  explain  to  the  customer 
that  it  may  not  know  the  sums  involved  even  after  the  transaction  has 
been  completed.  Such  information  would  entail  the  sending  bank  addressing 
a  request  for  specific  details  to  all  the  institutions  involved  in  handling 
the  operation.  Some  remitters  will  be  content  for  the  beneficiary  to  be 
levied  any  charges  by  his  bank. 
The  beneficiary  of  a  cross-border  remote  payment  may  also  incur  certain 
charges;  their  amount  will  depend  on  the  means  of  transfer  used  by  the 
remitter  and  on  the  treatment  given  to  the  payment  operation.  The 
customer may  obtain  the  appropriate  additional  information  from  his  bank. 
*  *  * • 
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V.  ILLUSfRA  TION  OF THE  GUIDELINES 
I.  OPTIONS  THAT  MIGHT  BE  AVAILABLE  TO  CUSTOMERS  WHO  WISH  TO 
EFFECT  A  CROSS-BORDER  FUNDS  TRANSFER 
Cross-border  funds  transfer 
Express  cross-border funds  transfer 
Bank  foreign  draft 
Bank  draft/  cheque 
Electronic transfer 
Standing  order (regular  transfers only) 
Cheque remittance 
Eurocheque remittance 
Internal  transfer 
Credit card 
Debit card (where  applicable) 
It  should  be  noted  that  these  options  should  be  considered  solely  in  relation  to 
their  cross-border  role,  i.e.  where  a  remitter  and  a  beneficiary  are  located  in 
different  countries.  The  options  may  differ  from  country  to  country  and  from 
bank  to  bank. 
II.  EXAMPLE:  CROSS-BORDER  FUNDS  TRANSFER 
Basic  description  : 
This  is  an  order  from  a  bank  customer  to  his  bank  to  transfer  abroad  an  amount 
to  a  beneficiary. 
~a  in  Sum  to be  Basis of  Value  oate  ! ndicat  we  t  1me 
cnaracter1S't1CS  transferreo  (  H'l  coorn,ss1ons  ana  aop 1  1ed  to the  for  remote  payment  to 
~f the type of  iocal  or fore1gn  cnarges.  1ncluding  oeo1t of the  the  benef1c1ary 
""emote  cayment.  currency)  fore1gn  exchange  :~st.omer's 
COITIT11SS10n  account. 
Details  to  be  provided  :  Beneficiary's  bank  SWIFT /BIC  code,  name  and  address, 
bank  account  number  and/or  name  and  address  of  the  beneficiary. 
Specific  observations  :  The  customer  should  specify  which  of  the  parties  -
himself  (the  remitter)  or  the  beneficiary,  or  both  - should  pay  any  bank  charges 
incurred.  The  normal  practice  is  for  the remitter  to  pay  any  charges  payable  to 
his  own  bank,  and  for  the  foreign  beneficiary  to  pay  for  any  charges  payable  to 
his  bank. f 
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SYSTEMIC  RISKS  AND  SUPERVISION 
by c.  Tresoldi 
1.  The  evolution of  payment  systems 
The  current  configuration of  payment  systems  is the  outcome 
of  a  long-term drive  to  make  trading  smoother  and  minimize  the 
associated costs. 
In  the  last  few  years  this  process  has  accelerated. 
Technological  and  financial  innovation  has  favoured  the  deepening 
of  domestic  and  international  financial  markets,  enhanced  the 
efficiency  of  markets  in  managing  information,  helped  to  reduce 
transaction  costs  and  contributed  to  the  birth of  new  and  more 
flexible  techniques  for  h~dging  the  risks  connected  with 
financial  transactions.  These  changes  have  gone  hand  in hand  with 
the  increasing  financialization of  the  industrial  economies  and 
the  rising level  of liquidity of  financial  assets. 
Everywhere  the  recent  changes  have  included  a  streamlining 
of  regulation,  with  the  criterion of  deregulation  being applied 
to  the  entire  range  of  banking  services.  Exchange  controls  have 
been  eased  or  eliminated  and  large  cross-border  capital movements 
are  continually  being  made.  This  has  steadily  reduced  the 
differences  between  the  financial  systems  in  most  of  the 
industrial  countries  and  further  sped  up  the  internationalization 2. 
and  integration of  markets. 
But  the  liberalization and  internationalization of  markets  ' 
has  also  created  a  more  difficult environment  for  financial 
intermediaries.  The  volume  of  funds  handled  and  the  speed  of 
transactions  have  accentuated  the  liquidity  risk  that  each 
operator  has  to  face.  The  entry of  new  intermediaries  whose 
activity is unregulated  and  which  are  not  subject  to  the  control 
of  the  supervisory  authorities has  made  competition  fiercer, 
increasing  the  .indi~idual  operator's  risk  of  insolvency.  The 
strong  international  links  created  between  foreign  exchange, 
money  and  financial  markets  have  increased  the  possibility of  a 
chain  cf 
volatility 
business  failures.  In  recent  years  Lhe  greater 
of  interest  rates  has  itself increased  the  risk  of 
failure  of  intermediaries. 
In  the  field of  customer  payment  services,  the  advances  in 
technology  have  favoured  the  emerging  of  new  intermediaries 
competing  with  the  banking  system  and  the  launch  of  new  products 
which,  sometimes,  make  the  intemediary  responsible  for  the 
financial  risk  involved  in  the  transactions  (i.e.  credit cards). 
The  efficiency of  these  intermediaries'  internal  procedures  and 
the  "confidence"  they  are  able  to  secure  on  the  part  of  all 
operators  have  become  important  aspects  of  the  functioning  of 
markets. 
In  the  field  of  payments  between  financial  interm~diaries, 
the  pronounced  growth  in  the  flow  of  transactions  and  the 
sharpening  of  domestic  and  international  competition  have  made  it 
all  the  more  urgent  to  contain the  operating and  liquidity costs 
associated with  making  payments. 
In  this  new  international  context,  the viability  of  the 
payment  system  has  come  to  depend  increasingly on  the  efficiency 
and  stability of  clearing and  settlement mechanisms.  Clearing 
enables  intermediaries  to  exchange  a  multiplicity of  payment 
• '  , 
"'· 
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operations  during  the  business  day  and  produces  a  single  final 
net  balance  for  each  intermediary.  The  settlement  of  the  net 
balance  - instead of  the  single  transactions  - makes  it possible 
to  achieve  considerable  economies  in  the  reserves  of  liquidity, 
which  tend  to  diminish  relatively  as  the  system's  "multilat-
erality"  increases. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  the  clearing mechanism  leads to 
the  creation of massive  intraday  debtor  positions,  so  that  the 
risks  inherent  in it  loom  today as  one  of  the  chief potential 
sources  of instability for  the  financial  system.  Automation  and 
increasing  use  of  computer  networks  have  themselves  created new 
types  of  risk.  The  poszibility cf  an  intermediary net being able 
to  meet  its payment  obligations  at  the  moment  of  settlement of 
final  balances  creates  a  "settlement  risk"  that  may  be 
symptomatic  of  a  temporary  liquidity crisis  or  even  an  outright 
failure.  (The  risks  that  can  emerge  in payment  sy~tems  between 
financial  intermediaries are  examined  in detail  in Appendix  A.) 
Moreover,  the  default of  a  participant can  lead  to  a  chain 
reaction,  which  could  be  amplified  by  the  integration of  markets. 
The  collapse  of  share  prices  in October  1987  and  more  recent 
episodes  are  examples  of  the  global  propagation of difficulties 
arising in  an  individual  market. 
These  crises  put  settlement  systems  to  a  severe  test. 
Several  important  clearing  participants  risked  bankruptcy; 
injections of liquidity alone  kept  them  from  failing. 
If  a  financial  operator  is unable  to  make  payments ·because 
of  the  technical  deficiencies  of  the  payment  system,  the  amounts 
that operator  owes  to others  become  uncollectable  credits  and  the 
default  travels  through  the  system by  chain  reaction. 
The  case  of  the  Bank  of  New  York  is well-known.  In  November 
1985  it suffered  a  software-related  computer  failure  and  had  to 4. 
pay  the  operators  who  had  sold securities  without  being  able  to 
deliver  the  securities  to  the  buyers  and  collect  the  related 
payments.  Since  the  inability of  the  Bank  of  New  York  to  cover 
the  massive  overdrafts  could  have  caused  the  problem  to  spread 
throughout  the  clearing  system and  set off  a  chain  of defaults, 
the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  was  forced  to  grant  an 
unprecedented  loan  of  $22.6  billion. 
These  examples  point  up  the  importance  of guaranteeing  the 
integrity  of  the  payment  system at all  times.  The  operators  who 
participate  in it must  be  fully aware  of  the  risks  involved  and 
face  them  on  their  own  initiative.  But  it is equally clear  that 
the  monetary  authcritic~ cannot  remain  neutral  or  passive  in  the 
face  of  the  existing systemic  risk,  which  affects  the  stability 
of  the  financial  system.  Controls  on  transparency are  a  necessary 
but  not  a  sufficient condition in order  to  guarantee  the  system's 
stability. 
The  objective  of  central  banks  is to  reduce  systemic  risk, 
i.e.  the  risk  that  the  default of  one  institution,  and  its 
resulting  inability to  meet  its obligations  when  due,  will  lead 
to  the  illiquidity or  failure  of  other  institutions. 
Systemic  risk  is 
propensity  of  payment 
exposures  suddenly  or 
therefore  related  to  the  relative 
and  settlement  systems  to  transmit 
unexpectedly  from  one  participant  to 
another,  and  from  one  market  to other  markets,  in ways  that will 
make  it more  difficult for  all participants  to manage  and  contain 
their exposures. 
In  the  context  of  payment  systems,  the  likelihood of  a 
participant's  default  increases as  the  size  and  the duration of 
his  exposures  grow.  It results  in  increasing  systemic  risk. 
Furthermore,  markets  themselves  do  not  ensure  that  solvent 
intermediaries  will  be  able  to  overcome  situations  of 
l 
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illiquidity.  Hence  the  need  for  lending  of  last  resort,  to 
prevent  illiquidity  from  spreading  through  the  system  by  the 
"domino  effect".  At  the  same  time,  however,  individual  banks  must 
never  rely  on  central  bank  refinancing,  in  order  to  avoid 
imprudent  and  lax  behaviour. 
In  summary,  a  payment  system created  by  market  forces  alone 
might  be  able  to satisfy some  of  the  market's  needs  but  would  not 
be  able  to  guarantee  the  soundness  of  the  financial  system as  a 
whole. 
In  a  payment  system  based  on  fiat money,  only central  bank 
... ""'..._ ..  ............. ~  gives  transactions  finality,  both  in  payme-nts  bt:tween 
customers  and  in  transactions  between  intermediaries.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  a  transaction is  "final"  only 
by  cash  or  through debiting/crediting 
central  bank. 
once  it has  been  settled 
the  accounts  held at  the 
From  their daily  experience  central  banks  know  that the 
linkage  between  the  payment  system,  the  money  and  fin~ncial 
markets,  monetary policy and  supervisory  responsibility is  not 
only  conceptual,  but practical  and  operational.  Every  act  that 
ends  in  an  accounting  transaction  with  the  banking  system 
necessarily  involves  the  finalizing  of  a  payment,  the 
intervention of monetary  policy and  the  transfer  or  mopping  up  of 
liquidity.  A  greater  system's  operational  efficiency tightens 
these  links  and  solidifies  the  cohesiveness  of  the  entire  system. 
Because  of  the  tasks  entrusted  to  them,  the  central  banks 
are  devoting more  and  more  attention  to  the  changes  under  way  in 
the  payment· sector.  The  outstanding  problems  concern  the  control 
of  the  money  market  and  the  control  of  banks'  credit and 
liquidity  risks;  the  objectives are  to  improve  the  financial 
structures,  that is to  say  both  the  markets  and  the  methods  of 
settling transactions  between  banks  to  each  other  and  to  non-bank 
operators. 6. 
The  distinction between  bank  and  non-bank  institutions is 
increasingly hard  to  make  in  the  payment  field,  but  this does  not 
detract  from  the  need  for  orientation and  oversight  by  the 
monetary authorities;  on  the  contrary,  it enhances it. 
The  stability  of  payment  and  settlement mechanisms  is 
of  critical  importance  ~o central  banks.  Disturbances  in  the 
settlement  process  can  directly  affect central  banks  in their 
capacity  as  the  guardians  of  the  stability  of  the  financial 
system  and  as  lenders  of last resort,  and  in their  conduct  of 
monetary  policy. 
Central  banks  can  seek  to  assure  the  stability of  payment 
systems  by  an  ongoing  process  of  overseeing  the  prudence  of  the 
design  and  management  of  private  payment  and  settlement 
arrangements  as well  as  by  the  provision of  their  own  payment  and 
settlement services.  In either  case,  the  concern of  central  banks 
is  to  ensure  that  the  credit  and  liquidity risks  faced  by 
participants  are  prudently mana9ed  and  contained  and  not  merely 
shifted to their other  creditors or  to  central  banks  themselves. 
2.  The  control of  risks at the national  level 
Settlement is the  crux  of  every  payment  system.  Finality of 
payment  is achieved  only with  the  exchange  of  monetary base.  For 
this  to  occur  in  a  payment  system  based  pn  intermediaries,  a 
transfer  must  be  made  on  the  accounts  at  the  central  bank. 
Central  banks  usually  provide  the  payment  system  with  the 
liquidity  by  refinancing  intermediaries.  In  the  main  industrial 
countries  the  right  to hold  a  settlement account with  the  central 
bank  and  thus  the  possibility of  access  to  lending  of  last  resort 
is  only  granted  to  banking  institutions that  are  subject  to 7. 
supervision,  and  even  then  the  selection  for  access  is  very 
rigorous. 
Over  the  last  several  years  the  central  banks  have 
intervened  vigorously  in settlement  systems,  both  by  setting up 
new  systems  and  operating  them  directly and  by  promoting  the 
adoption  of  measures  specifically  aimed  at controlling  risks  -
with  stringent standards  of  security  - in  private and  public 
clearing systems. 
The  former  approach  has  entailed  g1v1ng  banks  incentives  to 
settle  every  single  payment  operation on  their accounts  with  the 
central  bank,  siwultaneous  exchange  of  operations  and 
settlement  in  "final"  money.  eliminates  the  risks  for  the  payment 
syst•m  as  a  whole.  Central  banks  have  been  working  hard  in  order 
to  minimize  the  risks  connected  to  this  system.  Its use  has  been 
encouraged  by  offering  banks  the  possibility of  using  their 
compulsory  reserve  deposits  with  the  central  bank  for  settling 
payments,  providing  for  the  possibility of  intraday overdrafts  on 
the  accounts  with  the  central  bank  and  introducing automatic 
queuing  mechanisms. 
Central  banks'  intervention with  regard  to  clearing  systems 
has  concerned  both  those  that  they  operate  directly and  the 
privately managed  systems.  The  objective  has  been  to  increase  the 
responsibility  of  operators  and  consequently  reduce  central 
banks'  exposure  to  moral  hazard.  Central  banks  are  able  to 
intervene vis-a-vis privately operated  schemes  by virtue of  their 
partecipation  in  interbank  organizations  that  oversee .  the 
development  of  clearing  systems  and  by  their ability to exercise 
moral  suasion  in their  capacity as  banking  supervisory authority 
and  lender  of last resort. 
Measures  to  protect  stability  have  mainly  involved 
wholesale  systems,  which  have  greater  implications  in  terms  of 
risk,  and  have  focused  on  access,  operational  mechanisms  and  the 8. 
legal  and  regulatory  framework.  The  measures  that  have  been 
adopted  in  the  main  industrial countries  to  control  risks  apply 
both  to  the  net  and  gross  settlement  systems,  though  a  drastic 
reduction  of  the  systemic  risk  is carried  out  by  the  gross 
settlement  system alone.  These  measures  are  shown  in  the  annexed 
tables  and  can  be  summarized  as  follows: 
a)  participation  requirements  designed  to  restrict membership  to 
institutions  whose  solidity  and  technical  and  operational 
efficiency are  co~ensurate with  the  risks  that are  created in 
the  system.  Control  of  access  has  taken  on  a  specific 
importance  in  the  light  of  the  growing  interest of  new 
non-banking  institutions in  joining clearing  system5.  Such  a 
development  could  have  implications  for  monetary  policy,  since 
par~icipation  in  the  final  phases  of settlement  of  clearing 
balances  is  associated  with  the  possibility of  access  to 
refinancing.  The  refinancing  of  non-bank  operators  involves  •  problems  of moral  hazard  in  respect  of  intermediaries  that are 
not  necessarily subject  to  supervisory  requirements  and  could 
also  make  the  money  multiplier unstable; 
b)  mechanisms  to  prevent  crises. 
In  general,  these  mechanisms  enable  system participants  to 
limit  exposures  vis-a-vis  all  counterparties.  The  ex-ante 
measures  include: 
equipping  the  central  banks  and  operators with  information 
instruments  to  monitor  intraday exposures  in  real  time; 
fixing,  by  each  participant,  of  limits  on  bilat~ral net 
credit with  one  another; 
fixing,  within  the  system,  of  a  multilateral  net  "cap"  for 
each  institution  as  a  limit  on  the  overall  daylight 
overdraft  that  the  institution will  be  permitted  to  incurr; 
pricing of  overdraft credit. 
c)  mechanisms  designed  to manage  defaults. 
These  arrangements  provide  for  a  collateral facility to  cover 
• 
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participants'  exposures  and  the  liquidation  of  the  collateral 
in  the  event  of  insolvency.  In addition,  loss-sharing  formulae 
are  sometimes  provided  for;  they aim  at allocating the  losses 
among  the  "surviving"  participants in  propor.tion  to  their 
activity  vis-a-vis  the  defaulting institution.  These  measures 
encourage  prudent  management  of  the  individual participants' 
positions  in  respect of all counterparties.  Some  systems  have 
also  tried  to  introduce  legal  clauses  to  ensure  the 
enforceability of  final  net  clearing balances. 
So  far,  less  attention has 
risks  in domestic  retail  systems, 
been  devoted  to  controlling 
which  normally  do  not  have 
significant  implications  fer  stability and  monetary  policy.  The 
crucial  question  for  the  functioning  of  these  systems  is,  rather, 
their  technical  and  operational  efficiency,  considering  the  large 
volume  of  operations  they  handle  and  the  range  of  persons 
interested in  joining  them. 
Forms  of  control  on  retail  systems  could  nonetheless  be 
justified  on  the  basis  of  the  "unitary  nature"  of  the  payment 
system,  which  presupposes  a  cohesive  development  of  the  structure 
of  the  different  systems  and  of  the  measures  for  controlling 
them.  However,  it  should  be  stressed that  clearing systems' 
specialisation  is  not  widespread  all  over  the  developed 
countries:  in  some  countries  retail  and  wholesale  transactions 
are  dealt with  through  the  same  systems. 
3.  The  control of  risks  in cross-border  payments 
There  is  no  central  authority  of  reference  at  the 
international  level.  Intermediaries  exchange  and  settle 
cross-border  payments  through  procedures  based  on  bilateral 
arrangements  that are  not  governed  by  a  framework  of  definite, 10. 
uniform  and  binding  rules.  Payor  and  payee  banks  settle their 
debit  and  credit positions  on  accounts at  correspondent  banks  in 
the  country  that  issues  the  currency of  payment.  The  latter 
settle their  own  positions  by  means  of  the  domestic  systems. 
The  growth  of  cross-border  payments  in  the  last  f~w years 
has  revealed  the  inadequacy of  the  traditional  schemes,  based  on 
bilateral  arrangements,  and  fostered  a  demand  for  cross-border 
netting systems,  both bilateral and multilateral. 
The  application of  these  netting procedures  to  cross-border 
payments  is radically  reshaping  relations  between  operators  and 
between  market~. 
At  the  micro  level,  the  transition  from  a  system based  on 
the  settlement  of  individual  operations  to  one  in which  only net 
obligations  are  settled  reduces  the  need  to hold  liquid  funds  in 
various  currencies  or  to  borrow  in order  to  meet  liquidity 
requirements  due  to  the  temporary  mismatch  between  credit  and 
debit  flows.  The  end  result is more  efficient treasury management 
for  both  banks  and  commercial  enterprises. 
At  the  macro  level,  the  relative  importance  of  the  various 
national  money  markets  is  changing.  The  physical  location of 
netting  systems  is becoming  a  very  important  factor;  the  concen-
tration  of  cross-border  clearing  and  settlement activity  in  a 
given  place  spurs  the  development  of  the  host  country's  market 
and  draws  business  away  from  the  markets  of  the  countries  of 
issue  of  the  currencies  included  in off-shore clearing. 
While  cross-border  netting  systems  can  permit  notable 
operational  savings,  they have  notable  implications  in  terms  of 
the  size of  risk  and  the  transfer of  risk  between  countries. 
Many  factors  amplify  risk  in cross-border  payments,  over 
and  above  the  traditional  ones  associated with  operations  on  the 
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foreign  exchange  market. 
In  the  first  place,  disparities  in  the  legislations 
complicate  the  question  of  the  enforceability of  the  balances 
ar1s1ng  from  clearing  agreements  between  banks  established  in 
different countries.  The  non-enforceability of  balances  can  cause 
the  risks  to  increase,  especially in  countries whose  laws  allow 
the  liquidating authority to  adopt  a  strategy of  cherry picking, 
performing  only profitable contracts  and  rejecting  those  that are 
unprofitable. 
Secondly,  the  business  days  of  the  payment  systems  and 
money  markets  of  the  different  countries de  net  coincide  because 
of  the  differences  in  time  zones  and  settlement procedures.  This 
amplifies  cross-currency  settlement  risk  and  can  impair  the 
functioning  of multi-currency  systems  when  an  institution suffers 
a  liquidity crisis. 
Lastly,  the  characteristics of  cross-border  systems  make  it 
difficult  to allocate  the  tasks  of  controllinq the  systems  a•on9 
the  central banks  involved,  i.e.  the  central  bank  of  the  country 
where  the  system  is  located,  the  central  banks  of  the 
participating  institutions'  countries  of  origin and  those  of  the 
countries  of  issue  of  the  currencies  used. 
In  the  context  of  the  developments  in progress,  the  central 
banks  of  the  G-10  countries established  the  Lamfalussy  Committee 
to  analyze  the  implications  of  private  cross-border  netting 
schemes.  The  committee's  Report  defines: 
- minimum  standards  which  all  systems  should  meet  so  that  the 
participants and  the  netting providers  have  both  the  incentives 
and  the  ability to manage  the  associated credit  and  liquidity 
risks; 
- principles  for  cooperative  central  bank  oversight  of 
cross-border  schemes. 12. 
The  principles  for  cooperative  oversight are  designed  to 
ensure  comprehensive  oversight  by all  the  central  banks  having  an 
interest  in  the  stability of  the  system.  In particular,  the 
central  bank  of  the host  country  should  normally have  the  primary 
responsibility.  The  responsibile  authority  should  assess  the 
design  and  operation of  the  system as  a  whole,  consulting with 
the  other  central  banks  involved where  necessary.  The  central 
bank  issuing the  currency \avolved  in the  system  should  share  the 
responsibility  in appraising  the  system's  settlement procedures, 
given  the  relevance  of  the  settlement  for  the  conduct  of monetary 
policy  in that  country.  Lastly,  central  banks  should discourage 
domestic  credit institutions  from  participating  in  systems  that 
do  not  provide  sufficient  guarantee~. 
Although  the  ·Lamfalussy  Report  focuses  on  wholesale 
systems,  its approach  assumes  the  unitary  nature  of  the  payment 
system  and  takes  the  links  between  the  system  and  monetary 
policy  fully  into account.  The  Report  affirms  that  central  banks 
should  inform  one  another  about all  clearing systems,  for  •what 
may  appear  to  be  a  small  operation  in  relation to  the  market  of 
the  host  country,  for  example,  could  be  large  in  relation to  the 
interbank  market  in  the  country  of  issue  and  vice  versa. 
Relatively  small  operations  can  also  grow  over  time  and  become 
more  significant". 
This  approach  can  certainly be  applied  to  cross-border 
netting  systems  for  retail operations.  In  principle,  such  systems 
should  entail  appreciably  smaller  risks  than  cross-border 
wholesale  systems,  since  they would  not  be  involved  in  foreign 
exchange  transactions  and  be  subject  to  the  related  risks.  On  the 
other  hand,  there  are  risks of  commingling  between wholesale  and 
retail  operations  and  th~ possibility that  the  combining  of  the 
retail  flows  originating in  the  various  countries  could  in  any 
case  result  in  large  volumes,  with  effects  on  risk  and  • 
implications  for  monetary  policy.  Problems  of stability  could 
also  result  from  extending participation  in cross-border  retail , 
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systems  to  comprise  a  larqe  number  of  banks  of  various  standing 
and  with  different  abilities  to  assess  reciprocal  credit-
worthiness. 
4.  The  payaent systea at the  co ..  unity level 
The  foreqoinq  analysis  has  underscored  the  significance of 
clearing  and  settlement  systems  for  the  efficient management  of 
payment  mechanisms.  It  has  also  stressed  that  clearing and 
settlement  systems  can  have  important  implications  for  the 
stability of  the  financial  system  and  for  the  conduct  of  monetary 
policy. 
The  "critical" aspects are: 
- participation,  which  can affect stability,  the  smooth  operation 
of  the  system and  monetary policy,  especially if participation  . 
also  extends  to  the  phase  of  settlementJ 
operating mechanisms,  which  can  affect the  size of  risk; 
- settlement  and  refinancing  mechanisms,  which  involve  central 
banks  directly and  can  have  a  significant  impact  on  monetary 
policy. 
Another  point  that  has  been  emphasized  is  that these 
problems  chiefly concern  wholesale  systems.  At  the  same  time, 
attention  must  also  be  devoted  to  systems  that handle  retail 
payments.  In principle,  these  systems  could  handle  flows  of  a 
very  limited  size  and  thus  might  not  have  significant 
implications  for  stability and  for  monetary policy.;  nonetheless, 
the  need  to control  them  derives  from  the  unitary nature  of  the 
payment  system,  which  requires: 
that  the  payment  system  follow  an  organic  and  coherent  course 
of  development  in its various  component  areas  so  as  to  be  able 
to  exploit possible  economies  of  scale  (for  example,  by  means 14. 
of  shared  infrastructure); 
- that  risk-management  and  pr1c1ng  mechanisms  take  account  of 
possible shifts of  funds  between  systems; 
- that  central  banks  be  enabled  to acquire  information  on  the 
various  retail systems  on  a  regular  basis  so  as  to  be  able  to 
evaluate  these  systems'  impact  on  stability and  implications 
for  monetary policy. 
*  *  * 
The  development  of clearing and  settlement  systems at the 
Community  level  raises different  problems  depending  on  whether 
one  takes  a  long  or  short-term perspective. 
. I_n 
systems 
single 
respect 
a  long-term  perspective,  the  development  of  clearing 
in a  framework  characterized  by  a  central  bank  and  a 
currency  involves  problems  that 
to  those  examined  in connection 
are  similar  in every 
with  the  development  of 
national  systems. 
In  particular,  problems  related  to  the  settlement  of 
balances  and  the  granting  of credit facilities  would  be  dealt 
with  by  the  European  Central  Bank.  The  tasks  of  regulation  and 
oversight  would  also  be  the  responsibility of  the  ECB,  as  laid 
down  in Article  22  of  the  Draft Statute  of  the  European  System of 
Central  Banks  and  of  the  European  Central  Bank:  "The  ECB  and 
national  central  banks  may  provide  facilities,  and  the  ECB  may 
issue  regulations  to  ensure efficient  and  sound  clearing and 
payment  systems  inside  the  Community  and  with  third countries". 
In  a  short-term perspective,  the  development  of  Community 
... 
clearing  and  settlement  systems  involves  problems  different  from  · 
those  posed at the  national  level  and  coinciding  only  in  part 
with  the  ones  associated with  cross-border  systems. 
Features  which  the  Community  and  cross-border  cases  share 
. 15. 
are: 
- the  presence  of  cross-currency  settlement  risks arising  from 
the  multiplicity  of  currencies  used  and  the  variety  of 
settlement  mechanisms  existing  in  the  diffe~nt  national 
systems; 
- the disparity of  legislation; 
- the difficulty of ensuring effective  supervision of  systems. 
Differences  between  the  two  cases  stem  from  the  process  of 
economic  and  monetary  unification.  In  the  Community  context, 
progress  towards  irrevocably fixed  exchange  rates  increases the 
substitutability  between  currencies  and  can  lead  to  currency 
substitution  in  response  to  the  characteristics of  national 
payment  systems,  with  possible  implications  for  both  monetary 
policy and  risk  management: 
- monetary policy:  the  concentration of  payment  flows  in a  single 
currency  could affect  the  demand  for  reserves  and  refinancing 
in  that  currency,  interferring  with  the  conduct  of  monetary 
policy in  the  country of  issue.  Moreover,  currency substitution 
could  prove  incompatible  with  progress  towards  fixed  exchange 
rates  and  the  exigencies  of  coordinating national  monetary 
policies; 
- stability:  the  concentration  of  flows  in  a  single  currency 
could  lead  to  a  high  concentration of  risks  in the  banks  that 
hold  accounts  with  and  receive  refinancing  from  the  central 
bank  of  issue  of  the  currency  in  question.  In effect,  those 
banks  would  become  clearing banks  for  all  the  other  banks  of 
the  Community. 
The  emergence  of  these  problems  could  also  make  the 
situation  of  retail  systems  more  critical;  if  currency 
substitution  also occurred  in that  sector,  the  combined  sum  of 
intra-Community  retail  payments  could  create  significantly large 
flows  in  a  single  currency. 16. 
APPENDIX  A 
RISKS  IN  INTERBANK  PAYMENT  SYSTEMS 
1.  Types  of  risk 
Credit  .. 
1  -i  ...... ~ ~  ~ ...  9  ..  ~ ... "" ,.  ...... ~w•w•~:t  ••On~,  the  risk  of  fraud  and  operation 
risks  are  particularly  significant  types  of  risk  in  interbank 
payment  systems.  In addition,  several  kinds  of  market  risks  loom 
large  in  interbank  systems  that  handle  international  payments  or 
securities transactions. 
Credit  and  liquidity  risks  are  connected with  a  bank's 
ability  to  have  sufficient  funds  available  to  meet  its 
obligations. 
Liquidity  risk  is  the  risk  the  creditor  runs  of  an 
obligation  being discharged not  when  due,  but  with  a  delay that 
is  not  predetermined,  however  short  it may  be.  By  contrast, 
credit  risk  is  related to  the  possibility  of default  by  the 
debtor. 
The  difference  between  these  two  types  of  risk  is  one  of 
time  horizon;  solvency  refers  to  the  value  of assets  irrespective 
of  the  length of  time  required  to  realize  that value,  whereas 
liquidity  concerns  the  ability to satisfy legitimate  demands  for 
payment  on  time  by  means  of  an  appropriate  cash  management. 
In  addition  to  these  financial  risks,  cross-border 
transactions  involve  a  series of  market  risks  linked  to  possible 
.. 
' • 
... 
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exchange  rate  changes.  For  example,  forward  replacement  cost  risk 
arises  in  payments  systems  when  default  by  a  counterparty  induces 
a  payment  system participant to  enter  into  a  replacement  contract 
with  a  third party  in order  to discharge  its own  obligations.  In 
this  case  any  loss  of  principal  incurred  by  the  participant will 
be  accompanied  by  the  risk  connected with  the  cost of  raising  the 
foreign  currency  funds  to  replace  those  that it has  not  received 
in payment. 
The  risk  of  fraud,  inherent  in the  payment  system function 
of  ensuring the  circulation of  financial  assets  in an  economy, 
involves  the  possibility that payment  instruments  may  be  procured 
unlawfully  or  be  counterfeited.  The  risk  of  theft  and 
counterfeiting,  which  used  to  concern  bank  notes  alone,  has 
spread  and  now  impinges  on  other  payments  instruments  such  as 
cheques,  payment  cards,  etc.  Moreover,  the  introduction  of 
increasingly  automated  procedures  has  created  a  wide  variety of  . 
"computer  crimes". 
The  massive  use  of  computers  and  telecommunications 
networks  also poses  operations  risks,  the  effects of which  spread 
more  widely  and  rapidly  than  in  the  past. 
Fraud  and  operations  risks will  not  be  treated in  this 
discussion,  which  will  focus  on  the  financial  and  market  risks 
connected with  the  execution  of  cross-border  transactions. 
2.  Interbank  payment  systems 
Interbank  payments  are  executed  in  two  logically distinct 
phases:  exchange,  involving  the  exchange  of  the  data  and  of  any 
accounting  documents  required  for  executing  transactions,  and 
settlement,  when  monetary  settlement of  transactions  is effected 18. 
by  crediting and  debiting  settlement  accounts.  The  first  phase 
influences  mainly  the  quality of  services  to  customers  and  the 
operating costs  incurred  by  banks,  while  the  second  affects first 
and  foremost  banks'  liquidity management  and  the  risks present  in 
the  interbank  market. 
Interbank  payments  can  be  settled one  by  one  on  a  gross 
basis  by  entering  each  in~~vidual transaction  on  the  settlement 
accounts  or,  by  contrast,  at  the  completion  of  a  clearing 
procedure  by which  settlement  on  these  accounts  is limited to  the 
net  balances  after  offsetting the  credits against  the  debits 
recorded  over  a  given  span  of  time. 
Settlement  accounts  are  generally held  with  the  central 
bank,  although  they  can  be  opened  with  other  operators 
(commercial  banks  or  the  clearing house)  that act as  "settlement 
agents"  either for  the  whole  system  or  for  a  group  of  other  . 
participants  (the  latter in  the  event  that  only certain operators 
are  allowed  to settle on  the  accounts  of  the  central  bank). 
basis, 
istics 
real 
Systems  that handle  transactions  individually on  a  gross 
or  gross  settlement  systems,  have  different  character-
depending  on  whether  or  not  transactions are  settled  in 
time.  More  specifically,  the  following  types  can  be 
identified: 
1)  systems  that provide  for  real-time  settlement of  transactions 
for  which  sufficient  funds  are  available  on  the  account at the 
time  of  execution  and  reject  funds  transfers  exceeding 
available  reserves; 
2)  systems  that provide  for  transactions  to  be  settled in  real 
time  even  though  sufficient funds  are  lacking  at the  time  of 
execution  (e.g.  Fedwire  in  the  United  States); 
3)  systems  that provide  for  transactions  to  be  settled at the 19. 
moment  when  sufficient  funds  are  available  on  the  settlement 
accounts  to  ensure  finality of  the  transaction  (e.g.  SIC  in 
Switzerland).  Such  systems  allow  for  funds  transfers  to  be  -- executed  in  real  time  or  to  be  queued  and  finalized  as  soon  as 
sufficient  funds  are  available  on  the  accounts. 
Net  settlement  systems  can  be  classified by  different 
criteria,  but  three  cri  tera  are  particularly imp.ortant  for  the 
purposes  of  risk  analysis:  the  legal  force  of  the  clearing 
agreement,  the  number  of  counterparties  and  the  number  of 
operators  allowed  to settle at  the  central  bank.  These  factors 
affect  both  the  size  and  the distribution of  risks.  Applying  the 
yardstick  of  the  legal  force  cf  the  agreement  we  can  identify: 
al)  "advisory"  or  "position netting"  systems,  where  netting  is 
without  legal  force  and  the  resulting  balances  can  be 
considered  as  final  only  when  they are  settled in central 
bank  money  (at  the  end  of  the  clearing cycle).  When  a 
participant  fails  to  perform  on  an  obligation at  the  time  of 
settlement!  all its  transactions  can  be  cancelled  and  the 
balances  of  all  the  other  participants  recalculated  (the 
so-called  "unwinding"); 
a2)  legally  binding  net  settlement  systems,  in which  balances 
become  final  when  determined  and  the  clearing house  operator 
is  unable  to  stop  the  execution of  transactions  and  repeat 
the  clearing after  having  cancelled all  the  transactions  of 
the  defaulting participant. 
On  the  basis  of  the  number  of  counterparties  we  can 
identify: 
bl)  bilateral 
debit  and 
Individual 
net  systems, 
credit  items 
participants 
which  provide  for  the  clearing of 
between  pairs  of  participants. 
must  settle  (bilateral)  balances 
vis-a-vis each  counterparty; 20. 
b2)  multilateral  net  systems,  with all  the  transactions  of  each 
participant.  In  such  systems  each  participant has  to  settle a 
single  balance  with  a  central  counterparty,  which  is 
notionally  or  legally interposed  .as  the  substitute  for  the 
original counterparties. 
As  regards  the  number  of operators  allowed  to participate 
in  the  settlement,  the  following  distinction can  be  made: 
cl)  net  settlement  systems  in which all operators are  allowed  to 
settle on  accounts  with  the  central  bank; 
c2)  two-tier  systems, 
banks)  are  allowed 
bank  and  all other 
exchange  of  debit 
where  only  certain  operators  (settling 
to  settle on  accounts 
participants  take  part 
and  credit  items  and 
with  the  central 
in  the  phase  of 
settle the  final 
balances via  a  settling bank". 
3.  Financial  risks  in interbank  payment circuits 
Financial  risks arise  in  interbank  transactions  because  the 
transfer  of  assets  is not  always  accompanied  by  simultaneous 
payment.  In  payment  systems  a  settlement  lag  comes  into being  in 
the  interval  between  the  exchange  and  settlement phases.  Payments 
can  be  considered  to  be  final  and  the  related  obligations 
discharged  only at  the  moment  of  final  settlement. 
Financial  risks  can  take  a  variety  of  forms,  depending  on 
whether  they  stem  from  the  inability of  participants to: 
discharge  one 
counterparty 
or  more  obligations 
(  _c_o_u_n_t_e_r_p_a_r_t_y  __  r_i_s_k ) .  A 
vis-a-vis 
particular 
a  single 
form  of 
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counterparty  risk  is  the  correspondent  risk.  In  systems  that 
provide  for  settlement  on  the  accounts  of  one  or  more 
settlement agents,  there  is  the  risk  of  the  settl~ment agent(s) 
not  being  able  to  perform  the  envisaged  services  (including 
those  carried out  on  behalf of  third parties).  In  this  case  the 
stability  of  the  system will  depend  on  the  financial  solidity 
of  the  institutions that act as  settlement agents; 
settle  their positions vis-a vis  the  system  (settlement  risk, 
so  called because  it  arises at the  moment  of  settlement  of 
final  clearing balances).  A particular  type  of  settlement  risk 
in  international  payment  systems  is  the  so-called 
cross-currency  settlement  risk,  or  Hcr~t~tt  risk,  l.e.  the 
possibility  that  a  participant may  fail  to  settle its position 
in  one  (or  several)  of  the  settlement  currencies.  It stems  from 
the  existence  of  an  interval  between  foreign  currency 
settlements  in different countries  and  systems. 
The  two  types  of  risk  described  above  are  closely 
interrelated  and  can  appear  initially  as  counterparty  and/or 
settlement  risks  when  a  counterparty's default  on  an  obligation 
makes  a  participant unable  to settle  its position vis-a-vis  the 
system. 
Counterparty  and  settlement  risks  coincide  in bilateral 
clearing  agreements  and  in multilateral  clearing arrangements 
where  a  central  counterparty  is  legally substituted  for  the 
original counterparty to contracts. 
These 
participant 
by others. 
risks  become  systemic  when  the  failure  of  one 
to  meet  its obligations  causes  a  series  of  defaults 22. 
3.1.  Counterparty  and  settlement  risks 
Net  settlement  systems  qive  rise  to credit/debit positions 
that  are  closed during  the  working  day.  In  settlement  systems, 
settlement  lag is virtually non-existent  owing  to  the  fact  that  • 
the  phase  of  exchange  coincides  as  a  rule  with  that  of 
settlement.1  Thus,  intra-day credit - comparable  to that ·created 
in net  settlement  systems  - is generated only in gross  settlement 
systems  where  the  central  bank  permits participants to  carry out 
transactions  even  when  sufficient  funds  are  lacking  for 
settlement. 
In  net  ~ettlcmcnt systems  and  in  gross  settlement  systems 
similar  to  Fedwire,  operators  treat credit positions  that  have 
accrued  during  the  day  not  as  actual  credit  items  but as 
immediately  available  funds  for  loans  to  customers  or  other 
banks.  In  other  words,  during  the  day  banks  carry  out 
transactions  of  several  kinds  using  funds  that will actually be 
available  to  them  only at  the  end  of  the  day. 
Interbank  intra-day  credit  stems  from  factors  connected 
with  the  distribution of  payment  flows  during  the  working  day  or 
with  the  economic  benefits  of  such  credit  compared  with  other 
sources  of  funds. 2  The  former  factors  include: 
- the  lack  of  synchronization  between  the  flow  of  payments  made 
and  received  in  funds  transfer  systems; 
1. 
Wheie  queuing  is provided  for,  settlement  lag is  the 
interval  between  the  time  the  payment  is queued  and  the 
time  it is executed.  ~ 
2.  For  a  systematic  analysis  of  the  factors  determining  demand 
and  supply of  intraday credit,  see  D.  Mengle,  D.  Humphrey 
and  B.  Summers,  "Intra-day credit:  risk,  value  and 
pricing",  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Richmond, 
January-February  1987,  Vol.  73/1. 4 . 
23. 
- cash  management  forecasting  errors,  resulting  in  the  failure  to 
collect  funds  as  expected  and/or  the  necessity  of  making 
previously  unforeseen  payments  during  the  day.  The 
participation  of  institutions whose  actions  are4not  subject  to 
any  control  by  banks,  for  example  the  central  bank  and  the 
Treasury,  increases  the  likelihood of  such  occurrences. 
The  latter factors  include: 
- the  need  to  minimize  the  costs  of  having  to  hold  sufficient 
funds  to  cover  all  the  expected  outpayments  for  the  day; 
the  n~ed to  exploit  the  economic  benefits of  being  able  to  make 
immediately  final  the  payment  vis-a-vis  the  final  user  even 
though  sufficient  funds  are  not  available at  the  time  the 
payment  is executed. 
Failure  to  take  account  of  intra-day exposures  as  a  form  of 
lending  is  a  factor  of  instability  for  the  system,  since 
intermediaries  do  not  take all  the  measures  relating to  the 
amount  and  price  of credit  that would  be  necessary  in order  to 
contain  the  risks  involved.  This  implies  the  absence  of  limits  on 
the  size  of  the  exposure  on  the  one  hand  and  the  lack  of 
remuneration  for  the  credit granted  on  the  other.  Consequently, 
within  the  system  as  a  whole,  the  amount  of  intra-day credit will 
be  larger  and  its cost  lower  than  those  that would  obtain under 
efficient conditions. 
3.2.  Systemic  risks 
Systemic  risks arise  when  default  by  a  bank  causes  factors 
of  crisis to  spread  throughout  the  circuit via  the  domino  effect. 
Illiquidity  can  also  touch  off  systemic  crises  in  payment 24. 
systems. 3 
!  ~ 
The  particular  nature  of  multilateral  clearing, 
particularly  the  fact  that  settlement  of  the  obligations  owed  to 
one  participant depends  on  settlement  of  the  obligations  owed  to 
all  the  others,  accentuates  the  speed at  which  the  effects of  a 
default  can  spread.  Moreover,  the  repercussions  may  spread  beyond 
the  system. where  the  crist~ originated,  owing  to  the  integration 
of different circuits. 
In addition,  multilateral  clearing has  potentially negative 
external  repercussions  for  all participants.  A bank  that accepts 
a  payment  and  allows  the  payee  to  us~  th~  rund~ prior  to 
settlement  incurs  not  only  the  (private  or  internal)  cost 
connected  with  the  risk  assumed  vis-a-vis  the  counterparty,  but 
also  the  (external)  costs  stemming  from  the  arrangement  whereby 
the  finality  of  clearing  depends  on  the  settlement  o£  the 
balances  of all  the  other participants. 
The  presence  of  "external  costs"  can  m~k~ the  system more 
unstable.  The  size  of  such  costs is magnified  by  the  fact  that 
they  are  not  necessarily borne  by  the  persons  who  have  created 
them,  so  that  the  latter  have  no  economic  incentive  to  control 
their  own  net  positions vis-a-vis  the  whole  system. 4 
The  multilateral nature  of  net  settlement  systems,  which 
gives  rise  to  operating  and  liquidity economies,  is itself  the 
source  of  "systemic"  risks,  or  the  risk  that  the  illiquidity or 
insolvency  of  one  institution  and  its consequent  inability to 
meet  its obligations on  time  may  cause  illiquidity or  insolvency 
of  other  institutions.  Against  a  background  of  "global"  markets, 
3. 
4 . 
While  lending of last resort  by  the  central  bank  makes  this 
unlikely at the  national  level,  it is a  significant 
possibility in international  clearing  systems. 
See  D.L.  Mengle,  "Daylight  overdrafts  and  payments  system 
risk",  Economic  Review,  May-June  1985. 
• c • 
, 
25. 
systemic  risk  is linked  to  the  tendency  of  net  settlement  systems 
to  transmit  exposures  suddenly  from  one  participant  to  another 
and  from  one  market  to  other markets,  thus  making  the  management 
and  reduction of  exposures  more  difficult  for  all participants. 
What  needs  to  be  safeguard  is  therefore  the  stability of  the 
payment  system as  a  whole  rather  than  that of  the  individual 
clearing system. 
Stability,  moreover,  is inextricably linked with efficiency 
and  operating  security,  which  depend  on  the  technical  and 
operational  abilities of all participants  and  the  reliability of 
infrastructures. D
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Annexes 1.  Introductory 
The  telecommunications infrastructure  is  vital  to many sectors  of any 
modern economy. Every  country's economy, security,  and quali1y of life now 
depend  largely on  the  state  of Its  telecommunications.  It  is  because 
telecommunications are a fundamental resource, actively spurring and stimulat-
ing the economy and the defense network, that from the outset they have been 
managed or controlled by government run  as  a  monopoly, an instrument to 
ensure that the development of the telecommunications industry was consistent 
with national economic policy objectives. 
Today some financial services depend for their very existence on tele-
communications services.  In  banking, for instance, there are the "circular" ser-
vices, notably POS terminals, in  which the service itself Is  indissolubly linked with 
the telecommunications facility, itself an indispensable element in any would-be 
worldwide system of authorizations. At the same time the rapid advance of in-
formation  technology and  microelectronics  has  profoundly transformed  the 
telecommunications industry as  a whole (the impact of satellite N  broadcasts 
from the Gulf is  a sufficiently striking instance) and made the arguments on be-
half of monopoly much less persuasive than formerly. 
A turning point in this regard is  certainly the antitrust ruling in the United 
States forcing AT&T to divest itself of many units and break up its monolithic struc-
ture -- a de facto monopoly -- into operationally independent sections. 
Since then international views have gradually focused on a single, clear 
option: namely, possible acknowledgement of a preminent public interest only 
for carrier technology infrastructure, given its strategic character but above all 
the enormous investment required, which justifies monopoly. In  all other areas, 
liberalization  and  competition  need to be strongly  encouraged, from  those 
based  on  radio waves (cellular telephones and satellite communications, for 
example) to those centering on the provision of value added network services. 
The state of telecommunications in  Europe has been surveyed in recent 
years by the Telecommunications Committee of the European Banking Federa-
tion. The results of the comparative analysis are found in the synopsis attached 
as Annex 1.  Subsequent more thorough examination and study led to the draft-
ing  of the "Memorandum  on  International Telecommunications" (letter of the 
European Bonking Federation, 28 May 1991) (Annex 2). 
For our present purposes, Annex 1 constitutes an admirable survey of the 
situation of telecommunications in the countries of Europe, highlighting the dif-
ferences, and most particularly as concerns the abandonment of the monopoly 
principle by which telecommunications were once ruled. 2 
An  accurate quantification of this  factor on a  European scale would 
clearly require a special study. At least for Italy, though, where we are naturally 
more familiar with the situation, we can use the data from an annual survey of  " 
EDP costs.  The report, Issued In September, covers 1990, and supplies compari-
sons with the data from 1987 and 1989 as well. The survey covers the eight major 
banks. on the hypothesis that these ore representative credit Institutions that use 
telecommunications facilities  most extensively,  owing to their farflung  branch 
networks, the  numerous cross:-border  services they provide, and their greater 
maturity as telecommunications users. 
What the report reveals Is a stabilization of the incidence of spending for 
telecommunications hardware and services. In these major banks 1he percent-
age of overall EDP spending was virtually unchanged from 1989. In the smaller 
credit Institutions, however, telecommunications spending is  still  rising  sharply In 
relative terms. even though it remains notably less significant than in the major 
bonks. 
This  "asymptotic" pattern suggests  that the incidence observed  In  the 
major banks represents a limit (In relation to total EDP spending, of course) In the 
present market situation, one toward which all the other banks are moving. 
The overall figures for the eight survey banks Indicate that the incidence 
is  around 30 ·percent on hardware spending (the costs  of the transmission  sys-
tem, including equipment and lines, as a ratio to total hardware costs) and just 
under 20 percent overall (the total cost of the transmission system and telecom-
munications services as a ratio to total EDP expenditure). 
This order of magnitude Is  confirmed by analysis of the fees charged by 
the Interbank Society for Automation (Societe lnterbancario per l·Automozlone, 
SIA)  for  withdrawals from  cash  dispen  sers  using  Eurocheque cards.  The  Inci-
dence of telecommunications is about 20 percent of the total. 
The  European Community has clearly indicated that the proper path Is 
deregulation. This position has been formally set forth, in operational terms, with 
Its "Guidelines on the opp/icoton of  EEC competition rules in the telecommunica-
tions sector- C(91) 1437 fino/' (Annex 3). 
The European Bonking Federation is also studying a code of conduct for 
the operators of data transmission services, listing the points that should be kept 
in mind by government monopolies in providing data transmission and telemotic 
services to users. The points have been grouped Into three broad areas: techni-
cal, financial and commercial (Annex 4). 
~ 3 
2.  Deregulation 
The  total abolition of monopoly will·permit, over the years,  the healthy 
development of competition in the market for networks, services and so forth. 
Realistically, however, for a  considerable time to come elements of monopoly 
will  certainly persist,  especially for certain  basic  services  (private telephones, 
etc.).  Competition will develop more swiftty in the field of value added network 
services. 
To fully grasp the reasons for the tariffing policies followed in the various 
countries, a brief historical excursus on how we have reached today's state of 
incongruencies and discrepancies will perhaps be helpful. 
Obviously, any study of tariffs (the prices for the supply of services to cus-
tomers) and costs (the expenses met by the supplier to provide the services re-
quested)  in  telecommunications  must take  account of a  multiplicity of 
interacting factors, not only technical but also social and economic; and all the 
more so considering the great lncide~ce of these costs and tariffs on every as-
pect of a country's economic and social development.  · 
Such  an analysis  Is  essential for any study which, given a  monopoly re-
gime, seeks to offer solutions that must in  any case make the prices of services 
commensurate with the real cost of supplying them (inlcuding research and de-
velopment expenditure). 
With  the transition  to a  fully  competitive system,  on  an international 
scale, prices would be determined first and foremost by the marketplace. 
Four conceptual models may be referred to: 
1.  the traditional European model of telecommunications administra-
tion (for simplicity,  let us call it the "PIT); 
2.  the US model before deregulation; 
3.  the economic and social model; 
4.  the radical economic and social model. 
Two new models are beginning to supplant those older ones: 
5.  the administrative model; 4 
6.  the operational model. 
We now turn to examining each of the models In some detail. 
The first model, characteristic of most European countries, consists in the  · 
assignment of responsibility  for telecommunications to a  govemment ministry, 
administration or agency, generally designated PTT- Post, Telephone, Telegraph  " 
- or the equivalent. In 1hls scenario the state as such takes full responsibility for all 
activities related to telecommunications and accordingly handles all operation-
al activities as well. 
It follows that the telecommunications Industry Is  legally protected, and 
Its monopoly status is viewed as the natural consequence. 
These systems stress the service supply side, and waiting lists ore the norm. 
New services are developed only when demand Is pressing enough to impose it. 
It Is  recognized that services ore not supplied uniformly throughout the 
country either geogrophlcqlly or socially, and the consequent necessity to reor-
ganize public services in more egalitarian fashion Is accepted. 
Technological development Is qualitatively appreciable but slow. 
The supply of services is not very diversified, In port 'for the considerations 
of egalitarianism cited above. 
In this context the determination of costs and tariffing policy ore normally 
based on considerations of the following sort: 
The main emphasis Is on the amount of total Investment, which Is consid-
ered, In and of Itself, -to Imply sufficiency. 
The monopoly enjoys privileged tax treatment with respect to other eco-
nomic operators.  · 
Capitol is generally supplied in the form of on endowment fund, with no 
requirement that It be remunerated; or else equity Is  raised  In  the market, but 
always on privileged terms. 
Measurement of the cost of any single service is totally Irrelevant. 
Any gains in the supplier's productivity thanks to the handling of a larger 
volume of traffic ore not translated into corresponding reductions in the prices  ._ 
charged to business customers. 5 
* * * 
The second model was that present In the United States prior to the anti-
trust ruling ordering the break-up of AT&T.  The govemment monitored and pro-
tected AT&T's monopoly. 
Private enterprise decided which services to offer on an operational ba-
sis and saw to the development of the transmission infrastructure at a pace that 
was acceptable to customers but commensurate with the time required to re-
cover the investment. 
AT&T's overwhelming technological. Industrial and financial power alone 
was enough to discourage end turn back ell efforts by competitors, in practice 
preventing diversification on the supply side. 
This situation generated th~  following pricing policies. 
The monopoly's operating profits were limited by a ceiling on its return on 
assets. 
Services to households were subsidized, in order to expand the customer 
base, at  the expense of business customers. 
The pace of investment was relatively constant with no surges or sharp 
declines. 
There was no government capital grant to the company, nor any other 
form of privileged access to finance. 
The ceiling on the return on capital was applied to all 
the services provided taken as a whole. 
Here again, there is  no need for an exact determination of the cost of 
any single service. 
Both of the first two models -- which are substantially analogous - began 
to lose credibility In the 1960s with the. first emergence of a demand for private 
data transmission  networks,  which  differed radically from the traditional tele-
phone network. The links were relatively few and of very high quality (much high-
er than for voice transmission), and customers were prepared to pay very well. 
The telephone service, by contrast, sought the widest possible diffusion of tele-
phone use, lowering transmission quality and limiting the range of services avail-
able. 6 
* * * 
In the 1970s some transitional models began to arise, resulting In only ml- .. 
nor modifications of the legislative process governing the telecommunications 
industry. 
In  the 1980s new models emerged, approaching the Industry from the 
economic and social standpoint. 
Such  models sprang, among other things, from the general agreement 
that the Industry was a natural monopoly owing to Its strategic economic Impor-
tance. Further, free competition was perceived as a risk to be avoided, for fear 
that In  certain unattractive economic situations the supply of telecommunica-
tions services  might shrink  below the desired level,  diminishing resources avail-
able for Investment. 
Moreover, basic telephone service now appeared to be quite satisfacto-
ry, and the first efforts to diversify dotoJronsmlssion services began to be mode. 
In this context a need emerged to solve the problem of the relation be-
1ween the supplier's costs and the charge to the customer that could reconcile 
the traditional approach with the increasing speed of technological change. 
The  solutions  found  consisted  Initially In  tariff adjustments for particular 
customer problems, in  particular data transmission  and long-distance services. 
The distance factor was accorded priori1y in tariff determination. Fixed monthly 
charges were reviewed, harmonizing them with financial forecasts. And finally, 
an approach was made to cost analysis for individual services and there was a 
normalization of tax treatment as well as of the possible sources of finance. 
In some countries the economic and social aspects of the scenario were 
much more marked, with stronger stress on the industry's status as a public ser-
vice, which In and of itself justified monopoly. Consequently a primary role was 
accorded to planning, and the development of the telecommunications Indus-
try was entrusted to the central government, operating~  with a view to the social 
benefits to be derived, aport from strictly economic considerations. 
The consequences of this approach on the cost-price front were a slow-
down in  the development of consistent tariffs,  a tendency to the confusion of 
models and concepts In pricing policy, virtually no contribution to the measure- ~ 
ment of costs,  and the formulation of financial development plans based on 
cooperative schemes. • 
• 
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In the United States the completion of the break-up of AT&T in  1983 and 
1984 marked the culmination of a critical phase. The process highlighted the In-
trinsic defects of the telecommunications industry as well as the ways in which 
they had retarded development thus far and would continue to do so  in  the 
years to come  . 
Everywhere the development of telecommunications depends heavily 
on the pace of technological change, which in  turn  is  governed by financial 
factors. For instance, in the early 1970s both the old and the new technologies 
yielded the some results for voice transmission.  The most significant technologi-
cal developments were the shortening of the time needed to establish the con-
nection,  a  generic  improvement in  transmission  quality,  the reduction  of 
production costs, and so on -- in essence, refinements to a technologically ma-
ture product. 
However, with the burgeoning demand for transmission  capacity from 
EDP centers, with their need for facilities for digital transmission and optical fiber 
technology, the necessity  of a  new model for  the new industry  arose.  And 
technology mode its own contribution, offering alternative solutions to the tradi-
tional  ones.  These  new methods,  bqsed  essentially  on  broadcast techniques 
(satellites,  cellular telephones) make it possible to form a  telecommunications 
network without laying cables (a requirement which in the past Inhibited the cre-
ation of any sort of network not linked with the basic public infrastructure), so 
that large-scale customers can develop their own lines without compe1ing with 
the public sector and then adapt these private networks (via satellite, for exam-
ple) to their specific needs. 
* * * 
This is where the last two models arise, one providing for a regulatory au-
thority and the other based on the operating firms. 
The regulatory authority model is marked by the residual hold of the con-
cept of natural monopoly. In  any case it clearly separates the regulatory from 
the mangement functions, and also makes the former no longer the exclusive 
preserve of government but calls for the participation of economic and social 
forces. and In particular user groups  . 
The  network operators become the possible targets of restrictive legis-
lation, while at the same time the introduction of new technology is to be facili-
tated and every effort made to accelerate technological change. 8 
The role of the state should be reduced under this model, If possible, to 
that of a  sort  of referee  In  a  free  market,  with  the function  of harmonizing 
technologies and access to basic services. 
The final outcome is  that the development of telecommunications and 
the diversification of the various services are subject to the play of free market 
forces. 
In this scenario, market prices are set by competition between services, 
while services that continue to· be supplied by monopolies may corry higher tar-
Iffs.  · 
A need arises  for controlling the prices of Intermediate services to pre-
vent unfair competitive practices on the part of the suppliers of value added 
network services. 
From the standpoint of the regulatory authority the effective cost of the 
single service can be Ignored, as long as there is a concomitant general reduc-
tion in the tariffs charged to customers permitting a better return on investment. 
Ultimately, however, the best way to develop a consistent tariff structure 
consists In the rigorous measurement of the effective cost of providing each ser-
·vice. 
The other model, based on the operating firms, refers to the specific fea-
tures of telecommunications operators In the emerging free market. 
First of all, we ore witnessing the rise of strategies designed for competi-
tion.  The  firms  see  their strengths  as  the range and extension  of the services 
supplied and the advanced technology of the networks, which entails a sudden 
Increase In the need for financing to sustain the processes of extension, modem-
izatlon and diversification. 
The  old business methods become obsolete, even though a substratum 
of public service may remain. 
In this picture it is indispensable to anchor prices to the effective cost of 
the service, though this may be tempered by considerations of average cost, at 
least for basic services. 
For new services, new tariffing standards must be developed. 
The foregoing, all in  all, outlines what may be termed the economics of 
telecommunications. This  has changed radically In  the course of the last three 
decodes and shows no signs of stopping. 
• • 
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Present-day telecommunications systems naturally consist of a combina-
tion of elements from these different Ideal-type models.  For example, a feature 
traceable to the older models Is the present obligation to supply, in any case, o 
public service, albeit limited to basic equipment and networks, as well as the 
persistence of outdated desires for monopolistic administration and the attribu-
tion to government of the regulatory function, perhaps limited and distinct from 
management functions. 
The elements deriving from economic and social models are the theory 
that the market determines the development of services, special tax treatment, 
and the acceptance of some cross-subsidies for social or political purposes. 
Finally,  elements characteristic of the last two models are first and fore-
most the acceptance of free competition in the market for telecommunications 
services, the need for rapid technological advance and modernization, the di-
versification of services piloted by private initiative, and last, but crucial, the ab-
solute necessity of establishing the real cost of services. 
Cross-subsidization Is very widespread in those systems  based on "admin-
istered" prices,  which usually apply social and political rather than economic 
criteria criteria while seeking to alleviate the resulting economic difficulties of the 
firms  providing the service by allowing them to recoup the "losses" on some of 
their business with a more or less explicit "surcharge" on other services and cus-
tomers. 
In telecommunications the most evident areas of subsidization are home 
telephones and postal services. There is also substantial cross-subsidization in the 
field of public transport. 
As a rule, home telephones enjoy special price treatment both in month-
ly fees and in  the charge for message units.  This  pricing policy Is  actually anti-
economic for the telephone companies, and In fact highly effective antibodies 
have developed, namely the commonplace long wait for a new phone. Though -
Latin American levels are not in the picture here (in Venezuela the prospective 
home custom~r must tolerate an eight-year wait or else pay a bribe of $ 5,000, 
according to Data Communications), In the fairly recent past Italy has reached 
waiting times of many months in congested metropolitan areas. 
Another way in which costs may be curbed involves the overall quality of 
the service, as companies postpone replacement of obsolete plant and cables 
and cut down on maintenance. 
Obviously, however, such loss-cutting measures can never make possible 
the growth and development of the service. There is  a consequent need to in-10 
crease earnings, which Is  ordinarily done at the expense of business customers, 
or In  charges for additional services.  The  result Is charges for data transmisston 
links that are sometimes as much as five times higher, often thanks to surcharges 
for third-party traffic. Not to mention the development of cellular telephone net-
works, In which charges bear llffie or no relation to the effective cost of providing 
the service. 
~~ 
For the postal service as well, the price charged for the basic service (the 
delivery of letters) Is  probably too low to cover costs,  but with few exceptions 
quality Is generally very poor Indeed. To  obtain acceptable quality, businesses 
must·tum to supplementary services  (from Insured  moil to special courier ser-
vices),  at substantial  additional cost that helps offset,  albeit only In  part, the 
postal system's losses on ordinary letter delivery. 
On the other hand certain postal services (the telegraphic money order, 
for Instance) are unquestionably competitive with the comparable services of-
fered by bonks, If not actually superior in speed, reliability and possibly cost as 
well.  In this case, though the service Is  certainly an attractive one, the charges 
do not appear to be augmented by cross-subsidization. 11 
3.  The  situation  internationally 
In the "frontierless" Europe soon to be realized, banks will more and more 
commonly find it Indispensable to equip themselves with an internal telecommu-
nications network extending to several different countries. 
A primary problem for an operator wishing to link  branches located in 
different countries is where to put the hub of the network. The choice is heavily 
conditioned, both technically and economically, by different fiscal  and tariff 
structures as well as by the quality of the services, particularly their dependabil-
ity. The right choice, taking due account of lntemationol differences, can gener-
ate substantial savings and also appreciable improvement In  the qualify and 
range of services provided. 
At present there can be little doubt that the best location, both In terms 
of costs and service quality as  well as  in  the relative freedom from constraints 
and restrictions,  is the United Kingdom, though the British advantage has some-
what dimished over the years as con9itions evolve in the other countries, owing 
principally to Community guidelines for deregulation and the competitive Im-
pulses thus unleashed. 
In  terms of service quality, cost,  and absence of regulatory restrictions 
Denmark and Sweden are also very attractively placed, but they are hampered 
by their peripheral geographical position. 
Another attractive location is the Netherlands, most particularly in terms 
of tariffs and the specially good treatment of business customers. 
At the other extreme we find Spain and Italy, the former owing to high 
prices, severely restrictive regulations and a comparatively scanty supply of ser-
vices,  the latter for the poor quality of the services provided (Including at the 
commercial level,  as  suppliers  are incapable of assisting  customers'  planning 
with any sort of acceptable forecasts), the high costs and the presence of mo-
nopolistic residues. 
The key to the choice, in any case, is the quality of services. Private net-
~..  work managers generally agree that faults  and broken connections are any-
thing but rare everywhere, though of course their frequency differs substantially 
from country to country. 12 
3.1  Tariffs 
This  is  a topic of prime Importance not only for banks but also for their 
customers, to whom the banks· own costs are passed on. This applies especially 
to Interbank funds transfers, in which there Is a charge for each transaction that 
Is dlrectiy related to the prices charged banks by the data transmission service. 
3.1.1  Networks with leased lines 
A study by Logica Consulting Ltd. has calculated the costs of two typical 
configurations, based on the prices charged by British Telecom In 1990: 
1)  a nationwide network consisting of 8 local lines  and 2 long-distance lines; 
calculating 1  I  60 of the Installation cost plus the monthly line charge, divided  by 
10 and converted Into US dollars; 
2)  an International  network consisting  of 8 lines  inking  up with  neighboring 
countries and 2 transat1antic lines, costs calculated as above. 
Overall costs for a typical network have been calculated. An overall In-
dex for all the countries considered has been devised. 
The  differences  between domestic  and International  tariffs  obviously 
make the presentation of this sort of ranking questionable, In that It must refer to 
a basket of services whose makeup cannot but have a large If not decisive ef-
fect on the outcome. 
The table drawn up by Logica Consulting Is based on a basket of 36 local 
lines,  9 notional long-distance lines, 4 International lines to bordering countries 
and one transat1antlc  line.  The  costs  Include installation,  amortized  over five 
years, and the Indices use Denmark as the base. 
• 
The first two columns are also based on particular baskets. The first con-
siders 8 local lines and 2 domestic long-distance lines, while the second covers 8 
International lines to borderin_g countries and 2 transatlantic lines. Total monthly 
leasing charges have been divided by ten In  both cases (an artifice whereby  .~ 
each .. baskef' con be considered as  a  single network, 8/lOmade up of local 
lines and 2/10 of long-distance lines). Installation costs have been divided by 60 
•  (amortization over five years). I' 
• 
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The  composition  of the sample networks and the valuation standards 
adopted, while not In general use, nevertheless seem quite object1ve and can 
thus serve as the basis for an init1al comparison. 
Country  Configuration 1  Configuration 2  Index 
US$  US$ 
Denmark  114  1.164  100 
United Kingdom  109  1.283  104 
Luxembourg  163  1.803  111 
Belgium  131  1.703  133 
Ireland  159  1.567  137 
Sweden  129  1.842  138 
Netherlands  170  1.717  148 
France  245  1.374  161 
Norway  234  1.716  173 
Finland  182  2.218  177 
Australia  218  1.982  180 
Portugal  170  2.442  183 
Swi1zerland  396  1.982  250 
Greece  151  3.995  250 
Italy  320  3.011  268 
Germany  514  1.793  286 
Spain  953  2.853  507 
Note that the prices used for the UK are those of British Telecom. Howev-
er,  services  are also provided by Mercury Communications Ltd.,  at tariffs that 
average 10 to 15 percent lower. Using those charges, the United Kingdom would 
be the most economical location  . 
By far the worst location is Spain, where tariffs are five times as high as in 
Denmark, overall~ owing principally to the very high domestic tariffs. The situation 
in  Germany is similar, in that domestic charges are relat1vely much higher than 
international charges. 14 
3.1.2  The use of switched lines 
Another interesting ranking for business customers, apart from the cost of 
leased lines for data transmission,  is  the cost of an International telephone call.  .. 
The costs given here apply not only to voice calls but also to telefax transmission. 
The following table (based on OECD doto) gives the cost of a three-minute tele-
phone call to and from Italy, using an exchange rate of 1250 lire per dollar. 
Country  to  Italy  from  Italy  Difference 
US$  I  Ut  US$  I  Ut  % 
Belgium  3  3.750  2,84  3.556  +5 
Denmark  1,71  2.138  2,84  3.556  -40 
France  2,09  2.613  2,5  3.121  - 16 
Germany  1,82  2.275  2,5  3.121  -27 
United Kingdom  2,41  3.013  2,84  3.556  - 15 
Greece  2,22  2.775  2,5  3.121  - 11 
Ireland  2,58  3.225  3,26  4.080  -21 
Luxembourg  1,59  1.988  2,5  3.121  -36 
Netherlands  2,04  2,550  2,84  3.556  -28 
Portugal  2,77  3.463  3,26  4.080  - 15 
Spain  3,08  3.850  2,84  3.556  +8 
Austria  1,95  2.438  2,5  3.121  -22 
Finland  3,97  4.963  3,26  4.080  +22 
Norway  2,5  3.125  3,26  4.080  -23 
Sweden  2,3  2.875  3,26  4.080  -30 
Switzerland  2,06  2.575  2,5  3.121  - 17 
Turkey  5,35  6.688  3,26  4.080  +64 
Australia  4,04  5.050  11,9  14.875  -66 
Canada  5,96  7.450  8,81  ll.Ql3  -32 
Japan  9,84  12.300  12,29  15.367  -20 
New Zealand  5,44  6.800  12,29  15.367  -56 
United States  4,02  5.025  8,81  11.013  -54 
• •  .. 
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3.1.3  Different pricing policies 
The very substantial price differences underscored in the table can gen-
erally be traced to their historical sources. 
In  Britain, for instance, policy has been to keep the charges for leased 
lines very low, thus encouraging business customers to develop their own private 
networks, in response among other things to the mediocre quality of public lines. 
French policy has been diametrically opposite, with massive Investment 
in the construction of a high-quality and relatively low-cost public packet switch-
ing network (TRANSPAC). 
Germany has followed a third course, investing in public services and dis-
couraging the formation of private networks by raising the cost of leased lines. 
The result Is that Britain has far more private networks than the other Euro-
pean countries. It now counts some 5,000 private, 2-Mbps networks, as against 
1,000  in  all the rest  of Europe.  Abouf the same proportion obtains for 64-Kbps 
data transmission lines (source: Enotor, Sweden). 
3.1.4  A future scenario 
Be that as it may, tariff revisions are now under way. In Germany, for In-
stance, a 20 to 30 percent reduction is  expected by the end of this year in the 
cost of lines leased from the Deutsche Bundespost & Telekom (source:  Thomas 
Hubner, DB7). 
Another crucial factor is the bargaining power of the customer, at least 
in the case of networks spanning more than one country, where pressure can be 
brought to bear by a threat to shift the hub to another country to exploit the 
better terms offered. 
For  ex.ample  Vice-President  Edward  Fopemma  of SWIFT  (Society for 
Worldwide  Interbank Data Financial  Telecommunications) has stated that his 
company is  capable of moving half of its  lines  from its  Dutch hub to another 
country within six months (source: Data Communications International). This ca-
pability for moving from one hub to another enables SWIFT to obtain appreci-
ably better terms, including prices, for multiyear leasing contracts. 
SWIFT's  hub is  in  the Netherlands,  with  secondary hubs  in  London and 
Brussels. At first the network operated with just the Amsterdam and Brussels hubs, 16 
suffering difficult relations with the telecommunications administrations of various 
countries,  which  were  reluctant to see  third-party  messages  transmitted  on 
SWIFT's leased lines and consequently set rates by the volume of transmission. 
At the end of the 1970s lines began to be offered In the United States at  ~ 
. fixed, low cost rates not based on traffic volume, which led SWIFT to establish 
another hub there. 
In  the early  1980s  the g,.ater openness of the Dutch telecommunica-
tions admlnlstra11on, compared with that of Belgium, induced SWIFT to center its 
European operations In Amsterdam, while Brussels become one of five second-
ary hubs. This greater openness is shown, for Instance, by the fact that volume-
based rates were eliminated two years sooner In  the Netherlands than In  Bel-
glum. 
Certainly we con only hope that this revision of tariffing policies to abolish 
volume-based tariffs contir')ues and is ever more widely followed In future. This Is 
unquestionably one of the best ways to encourage and facilitate the broadest 
and most correct use of telecommunications facilities. 
Reuters, with a network of 450 leased lines linking 200,000 terminals world-
wide, has also used the threat of moving its hubs from one country to another to 
win better terms.  Most recently the company shifted five international networks 
from Hong Kong to Singapore (source: Tony Cornish on DotoPro). 
..• ·-
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3.2  Taxes 
The OECD also offers data concerning the tax treatment of telecommu-
nications products. 
Country  Tax treatment 
Belgium  190k VAT extra 
Denmark  190k VAT included 
France  18,6% VAT included 
Germany  1  ~k  VAT extra if PTT competes with private firms 
United Kingdom  15% VAT extra 
Greece  16% VAT extra 
Ireland  no tax 
Italy  90...6 VAT for households, 18% for business customers 
Luxembourg  no tax 
Netherlands  18% VAT extra if PIT competes with private firms 
Portugal  8% VAT included 
Spain·  1~k  VAT included 
Austria  no tax 
Finland  16% sales tax included 
Iceland  24,5% VAT extra 
Norway  20% VAT extra 
Sweden  23,46% VAT extra if PIT competes or sells 
Switzerland  no tax 
Turkey  10% VAT Included 
Australia  no tax 
Canada  90...6 provincial tax + 11% national tax for tong-distance 
Japan  3% sales tax extra 
New Zealand  12,5% VAT included 
United States  3% federal tax + state taxes 18 
What emerges most clearly is  the enormous variety of tax treatment. In 
Europe, the most favorable fiscal treatment of the telecommunications Industry  1( 
is found In Austria, Switzerland, Ireland and Luxembourg. 
Elsewhere, where value added tax Is levied Its Incidence varies depend-
Ing on type of economic operator. For some agents It can be wholly or partially 
recouped. For  others,  and this Includes Italian banks,  it cannot be recovered 
and thus becomes a net additional cost. 
In any case, the worst situation Is Iceland, with Its 24.5% across-the-board 
VAT and no possibility of reimbursement. 
_t 
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4.  Standards 
The key considera1ion concerning the issue of standar_Q; Is that the pres-
ent machinery for their adoption, requiring the unanimous consent of the various 
national agencies and authorities, to be obtained by letter through the circula-
tion of proposals and leaving enough time for votes and so on, is simply too slow 
and cumbersome to enable the European Community to generate a body of 
common, fungible European standards by 1993  when the single market goes 
into effect. 
The first obstacle is the sheer numbers. The member countries hove each 
developed tens of thousands of standards (e.g., Germany has 20,000,  France 
13,000 and the UK 10,000); they are mutually incompatible and some date as far 
back as 70 years. 
Even limi1ing ourselves to the absolute, bare necessities, at least a thou-
sand  European-wide  standards  need to be developed by  1993.  But  even 
though several thousand persons are working on the problem, a scant 150 stan-
dards had been finalized by 1989. 
This situation necessitated a change in modus operandi, first doing away 
with the unanimity rule in favor of majority rule and supplanting the circulation of 
letters followed by a vote with that of ad hoc groups working full-time on a single 
standard. Next came the idea of delegating powers to sector organizations -
the Associated Standards Bodies (ASB) -- to develop the relevant standards. The 
ASBs are to be fully independent as regards planning, funding and the prepara-
tion of European standards, without prejudice to the rules set by the European 
standardization system or formal agreements with national bodies. 
In  drafting standards  the ASBs  can call  on  external  planning  groups, 
funded and coordinated by the ASBs themselves, but they remain responsible to 
the Community for compliance with its direcnves, in such fields as safety, health, 
and consumer protection. 
This new procedure was tested in  1990 in the development of telecom-
munications standards,  managed by the European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute. The success of the process led to the drafting of a Green Paper 
on "The development of European Standardization: action for foster technolog/-
col integration In  Europe".  The  conclusion of the paper is  that ASBs  should be 
constituted for all other sectors  . 
Looking more closely at standards in banking, we can distinguish among 
three major types: technical standards, application standards, and operational 
standards. Illustrative examples of the three types will help clarify the distinctions. 20 
4. 1  Technical standards 
These consist In technical specifications, which may be national in scope, 
applicable to a selected group of nations, or global. The scope of application 
depends on the agency that has developed and Issued the specification, which 
may be national (UNIIn Italy, DIN In Germany, ANSI In the United States), regional 
e.  g., CEN/CENELEC for Europ~), or global (ISO). 
There  are also agencies Issuing  standards on specific matters, such  as 
CCITI (global) and ETSI (European) In the telecommunications field. 
Some such standards have been widely and commonly applied In bank-
ing:  for  Instance,  those  mandating machine readable print,  such  as  CMC7, 
OCRA,  OCRB,  and El3B,  which were developed and specified by ISO, though 
use has varied from country to country (the codeline on cheques being printed 
In CMC71n Italy, France and Spain, while Britain uses OCRB and El3B). 
Technical standards applicable to telecommunications comprise X25 for 
packet switching data transmission  as  well as  protocols Vl, V22,  V22  bis,  V28, 
V32,  etc. When Issued at the European level such protocols may differ In some 
respects from the equivalent American standards, sometimes resulting In subtle 
Incompatibilities that can prove very hard to locate and resolve. 
The  second sort  of standards  that arise,  generally but not exclusively 
when official standards are lacking, are de facto or industry standards, when the 
dominant position of a single supplier makes Its technique and equipment the 
obligatory point of reference for other market participants. The obvious case In 
point Is the series of IBM-originated SNA and similar protocols. 
Self-evidently, however, such standards are a kind of transverse piatform, 
on which the particular applications of the Individual Industries must find their 
support. It Is hard to see how any single industry, such as banking, could modify 
them on its own, unless it happens to be the sole user. 
In  short,  these technical standards are essentially  the province of the 
manufacturers or suppliers themselves,  which must also  provide the technical  , 
support for their use. The prime task of the banking industry Is simply to keep In  · 
close touch, so as to be able to anticipate the likely course of the market on the 
technical side. It Is imperative to avoid blind alleys, where large-scale Investment  • 
Is hard to amortize. One Instance Is the choice of CMC7, which as a result of the 
restricted geographical area in  which it is  used has not enjoyed the technical 
improvements  made on other,  far  more  widely  used  technologies,  such  as '-
• 
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OCRB.  Even the latter, however, is at a distinct disadvantage compared to the 
bar code technique used  In  virtually  all  other applications.  This  relatively re-
stricted development entails, among other things, a distinct Increase in cost; an 
OCRB reader, for example, may cost from five to ten times as much as a com-
parable bar code reader. 
4.2  Application standards 
These are the standards developed within and for the use of a particular 
sector. They can accordingly be developed freely, with the sole objective of en-
suring inter  operability for members of the sector itself. 
They ore generally built upon the basis of existing technical standards, so 
that the hardware will be readily available on the market. These underlying stan-
dards are then supplemented with superstructures, such as the standard formats 
of the codeline and of track 2 or 3 of magnetic credit and debit cards. 
Application standards In  different areas ore not Infrequently incompat-
ible, at various levels, and optimal interoperabllity of payment systems will require 
substantial future unification. 
4.3  Operational standards 
Operational standards  comprise  those  agreements and conventions 
that are needed to make the relative services operational in  practice. Some 
such  agreements may be reached independently by the contracting parties, 
while others need to be devised in advance in accordance with legal or other 
constraints. 
The  areas covered by such  agreements may be procedures, levels of 
service, regulations, supervision and control by the authorities, requirements for 
participation, emergency procedures, and so on. 
Many of these areas, and in particular general procedures, levels of ser-
vice, emergency procedures and regulations, ore strictly related to the use  of 
telecommunications, which constitute an essential component. 
Hence these operational standards must be continuously reviewed In the 
light of possible technical innovations, to exploit successive technological ad-
vances to optimize investment, and ultimately to lower costs and improve the 
quality of the services provided. 22 
Moreover, some programmes already introduced on a European scale, 
such as EUFISERV, a company formed by European savings bonks to permit deb-
it card holders from any of the participating bonks to withdraw cosh at any oth-
er participant throughout Europe,  have demonstrated that European-wide 
Initiatives are fully feasible as well as advantageous. 
4.4  Actions by EuroQean banking Sector 
\. 
For banking, the Federation has called on its member associations to in-
tervene with position papers on the role of the Federation in the standardization 
work of Interest to the banking sector and asking for the requisite funding, dis-
cussed at  the Lisbon meeting of the Central Committee on 15 February 1991. 
The  Financial Sector Standards  Coordination Forum,  constituted  under 
the European Council for Payment Systems but with a financial contribution from 
the three federations, was to be Included as  the ''technical executive organ" 
and its future activities to be carried out under the control of the Joint Commit-
tee tor European Bonking Standards formed by the present Ad Hoc Group on 
Standardization  Structures.  The  latter includes  representatives  not only of the 
Bonking  Federation  but of two other groups (savings  banks  and cooperative 
banks). 
Together, the Joint Committee and the Forum should certainly qualify as 
an ASB, delegated by the Commission to draft standards for the banking sector. 
Obviously this  body's activities should be carried out In  close coordina-
tion and Integration with developments worldwide in order to ensure lnteroper-
abllity, which Is vital to modern bonking activities. 
A view narrowly limited to the confines of Europe (even extended to EC 
associates) would certainly be dangerous, with the risk  of failing to protect In-
vestments. 
However, this  "window on the world" cannot be direct, In  that the In-
ternational Standards Organization does not now provide for association by any 
body other than individual national organizations (UNI, for Italy). There are clear 
organizational reasons for this rule, in that the ISO Itself proceeds to the creation  , 
of consensus by exchange of letters and requires unanimity. 
• '-
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5.  Impediments  to  the  extension  of  telecommu-
nications use 
5. 1  Planning problems 
The planning of infrastructural development for the telecommunications 
industry is considered to be an internal matter, the business of national agencies. 
Information on future developments in technology and services as  well as on 
pricing policies is  consequently lacking, so that banks find It Impossible to draw 
up reliable medium or long-term plans. 
Planning  difficulties,  evident enough at the national level,  are exacer-
bated the moment multinational problems are tackled, with additional problems 
and the risk  of wasting the investment made in  one country when its utilization 
depends on the availability of services in other countries. A useful initiative in this 
field would be Community-wide coordination to harmonize the development of 
telecommunications transmission infrastructures with a view to joint planning. 
One of the most commonly encountered phrases in the telecommunica-
tions administrations· commercial literature is "as available". This refers to the scar-
city and limited territorial coverage of such advanced services as 64 kbps and 2 
Mbps networks. 
In  the case of International networks, the phrase often means that the 
service is actually available only via satellite, notoriously inefficient for interactive 
uses  given the transmission  delays inherent In  the technology (long distances 
and store and forward techniques). 24 
5.2  Conversion from analog to digital transmission 
The OECD also offers data from which to compile a ranking of the vari-
ous telecommunications services in  terms of digital transmission  (excluding ser-
vices via satellite). 
% digitalization of public networks 
Country  Transmission  Swltch'g  Centers  Investment 
local  long  1.987 
-.. 
distance  US$/cop. 
United Kingdom  100  42  90  48,6 
Netherlands  95  35  15  35,3 
Denmark  85  23  40  57,6 
France  70  70  75  73,7 
Ireland  70  65  85  37,2 
Belgium  50  . 
29  75  39,4 
Sweden  50  33  50  75,6 
Germany  50  10  22  118,8 
Italy  45  25  36  41 
Portugal  70  20  20  4,1 
Spain  47  5  45  19,7 
Luxembourg  35  8  10  24,5 
Greece  30  8  40  1,3 
According to Nick Leo, operations manager for British  Telecom Interna-
tional (reported by DotoPro), outside UK,  Denmark and the Netherla.nds digital 
data transmission networks are not immediately available. 
France is  clearly In the vanguard In the digitalization of the entire Infra-
structure, Including switches, and this primacy Is reflected In Its hrgh Investment, 
on area In which Greece brings up the rear. 
Spanish policy has changed lately, with a notable increase In investment 
but this Is not reflected In the latest available data, which ore for 1987. 
.. 
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The  waiting period to obtain services varies considerably, from a  mini-
mum of 13  weeks  for  British  Telecom  International to a  three-year period re-
ported by SIT A (Societe' lnternotionole de Communications Aeronautlque). 
Lack  of coordination  among telecommunications  administrations  also 
seriously undermines the reliability of their estimated delivery times for intemo-
tional lines. 
In this context Italy is  renowned for Its undependabllity. Unes ore some-
times made available months ahead of schedule, sometimes months late, with 
neither notice nor explanation. 26 
5.3  Tariffs, subsidization and unequal tax treatment 
As we have seen, there is  absolutely no uniformity In the setting of tele-
communications tariffs, with differences that can range up to 500 percent (Italy 
and Spain are the costliest countries, Denmark and the UK the most economl- • 
cal). 
The  problem Is  exacerbated by the very widespread pracflce of subsi-
dization, whereby tariffs are not set on the basis of the effective cost of a service 
but according to an assessment of Its "attractiveness" to business users (higher 
price) or its "social importance" (provision of services below cost). The direct con-
sequence  Is  that business  customers  are penalized  In  absolute terms,  being 
forced to contribute to some extent (variable, but In some cases very substan-
tially) to cover the costs of services to households, whose tariffs are held down 
for political considerations  .• 
Another factor that affects costs in highly disparate fashion from country 
to country Is taxation, as tax rates are quite strongly diversified. 
The objective should be to develop a uniform tariff schedule for the vari-
ous countries, corresponding In transparent fashion to the structure of costs for 
Individual services, and totally divorced from "social" considerations. 
~· 
• • 
27 
5.4  Third-party traffic 
Today,  PTTs  generally make additional charges If a  customer does not 
keep its leased data transmission lines for Its own exclusive use but also carries 
third-party traffic by reselling or leasing transmission capacity. The best example 
of this is SWIFT. This tariff policy, which might conceivably have been justified un-
der the old monopoly regime, when such  a  practice could have been con-
strued as the illegitimate diversion of traffic from the legal monopoly, Is no longer 
justifiable today and must therefore be rooted out. The  OECD supplies the fol-
lowing data concerning the rules on utilization of leased networks for carrying 
third-party traffic. 
Country  interlink  to  Third- Trans  mission 
public  nets  party  capo city 
not'  I  infl  traffic  sharing  I  resale 
United States  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
United Kingdom  cond'l  cond'l  yes  yes  yes 
Japan  cond'l  cond'l  yes  yes  yes 
Canada  cond'l  cond'l  cond'l  cond'l  cond'l 
An land  cond'l  cond'l  cond'l  cond'l  cond'l 
France  cond'l  cond'l  cond'l  no  no 
Belgium  cond'l  cond'l  cond'l  no  no 
Netherlands  cond'l  cond'l  cond'l  no  no 
New Zealand  cond'l  cond'l  no  no  no 
Norway  cond'l  cond'l  no  no  no 
SWeden  cond'l  cond'l  cond'l  no  no 
Turkey  cond'l  cond'l  cond'l  no  no 
Austria  cond'l  cond'l  no  no  no 
SWitzerland  cond'l  cond'l  no  no  no 
Denmark  cond'l  no  cond'l  no  no 
Iceland  cond'l  no  cond'l  no  no 
Greece  no  no  cond'l  cond'l  no 
Italy  no  no  no  no  no 
Portugal  no  no  no  no  no 
Spain  no  no  no  no  no 28 
Clearly, the worst situation is found in Spain, Italy, and Portugal. The rules 
allow neither interlink  age with public networks nor the carrying of third-party traf-
fie.  There  are nevertheless a  fair number of exceptions to the norm, generally 
with very substantially Increased tariffs. 
The most flexible of the European countries Is the UK, where there only a 
few residual  technical rules  concerning interlinkage between public networks 
and notional leased-line networks. 
~.R. 
The resale of carrying capacity on lntemational leased lines is still prohib-
Ited under principles laid down in the past by the Series D recommendations of 
the Comite Consultatif International Telegraphlque et Telephonique, which re-
flected the rules and tariffs accepted by the various PTT s for the use of Interna-
tional services. 
The Committee itself now recognizes the obsolescence of these recom-
mendations, according to its  director, Theodor lrmer, and now notes that their 
revision Is  required to avoid accounting distortions and to second the evolution 
of a number of countries towards more liberal policies concerning the provision 
of services. 
In the lost two years, for example, Germany has dismantled its restrictions 
on the resale and reuse of leased lines. So hove Britain and Sweden. 
In many countries, however, the circumvention of the public service, and 
in  particular voice transmission,  which  is  generally still  a  monopoly, is  discour-
aged by the use  of punitive tariffs (corresponding, In the table, to "condT'). A 
good example Is  Italy, where SWIFT,  for carrying third-party traffic, Is  obliged to 
pay volume-based tariffs that turn out to be as much as four or five times as high 
as those of similar customers that do not carry third-party traffic (source: Dote-
Pro). 
Other countries that levy this kind of additional charge on SWIFT Include 
Austria,  Germany,  Greece,  Luxembourg.  Portugal,  Spain,  Australia,  the Baha-
mas. Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, and all developing countries in gener-
al.  The  dividing line  between  users  subject to this  surcharge  and those  not 
subject is rather a thin one. For example, Reuters avoids paying the charges be-
cause It uses its lines for the delivery of information to subscribers rather than for 
the interchange of Information among them, as is the case with SWIFT.  ~• 
• '-
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5.5  Approval of equipment 
Today the use of any piece of equipment linked to the transmission infra-
structure of any country is  subject to authorization,  certification of the equip-
ment's conformity with national norms and standards. 
Since norms differ from country to country, there is  a bureaucratic and 
technical procedure to be followed in every case, and the process is ordinarily 
lengthy, complex and costly. 
This obviously affects both time and cost and could well be eliminated 
by a provision for reciprocal recognition of approvals, so as to minimize red tape. 
Such a step, however, presupposes the issue of common standards. 
Pending the achievement of this self-evidently crucial but difficult objec-
tive, action to simplify and streamline the approval procedures in each country 
and make them transparent would  be welcome,  seeking  where possible  to 
adopt uniform criteria and thus avoid the competitive distortions generated by 
the present system. 
Another table derived from OECD data shows the approval situation In a 
number of countries, referring to the number of days estimated for the process-
ing of applications according to official sources and according to the manufac-
turers of telecommunications equipment. 30 
Country  Noof days  estlm  ated  % 
Mf.  Off'  I  rejec  tJons 
1.988  1.988  1.983  11.988  1.983 
Japan  61  25  60  0  2.1 
Australia  76  120  120  0,4  2 
New Zealand  88  .  14  0  28,9 
Co  node  89  49  .  1,9  . 
United states  94  .  49  .  0 
SWeden  ..  98  28  60  0  0 
Spain  100  .  .  .  . 
ltoty  103  0  0  0  3,7 
Finland  111  105  120  0  1,3 
Austria  111  98  35  0,4  2 
SWitzerland  114  75  .  16,7  . 
Belgium  116  135  135  3,5  0 
Norway  118.  154  49  16,7  31 
Portugal  119  .  270  - 9,1 
United Kingdom  131  .  90  .  39,7 
Ireland  134  105  .  0  -
Germany  135  105  180  5  3,2 
Denmark  136  10  .  2.2  -
Netherlands  140  40  75  6,7  48 
Fro nee  149  140  365  5,2  48 
Not all countries' authorities responded to the survey on which this table 
is based (US,  UK, Spain, and others). Nevertheless a ranking has been drawn up 
on  the basis  of equipment manufacturers'  estimates.  Japan emerges  as  the 
promptest, requiring just 61  days to complete the approval process. The best In 
Europe Is Sweden, with Its 98 day average. 
t 
The case of France is a most Interesting one. Official sources speak of a 
process taking 365  days, but the effective time required,  as  Indicated by the 
manufacturers,  Is  a  much  quicker  149  days.  Furthermore,  the rejection  rote  -' 
dropped from nearly half In  1983 to just 5.25 percent In  1988, o perfect demon-
stration of how the need to make the new technology operational helps over- • 
come preconceived bureaucratic barriers. 31 
5.6  Administrative  relations  in  the  management of 
international networks 
.  Right now, the management of a telecommunications network operat-
ing in more than one country is seriously complicated by the involvement of mul-
tiple administrative agencies. The firm interested in running such a network must 
accordingly establish  direct contact with  each of the administrations  con-
cerned, first and foremost for problems of maintenance but also to deal with 
accounting and administrative problems in general. 
The objective is a single interface, otherwise known as one-stop shopping 
and one-stop billing. Preferably, this should be the administration that operates 
the service in the user's country of residence, which should then be responsible 
for accounting, administrative and operational interaction with its foreign coun-
terparts. 
5. 7  Service quality 
The  efficiency and quality of the telecommunications infrastructure va-
ries substantially from nation to nation both in reliability (percentage of up time, 
mean time to repair, mean time between failures) and in performance (through-
put, response time, additional services). 
Moreover, not all the national service administrations provide emergency 
assistance twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week. 
This lack of uniformity severely limits a  carrier's ability to offer top-quality 
service, as  no more than the minimum provided by the worst of the countries 
served (the weakest link) can be guaranteed. 
Making a  global comparison of the quality of telecommunications ser-
vices is no easy matter. unless one simply limits the ranking to single services and 
thus compares homogeneous quantities. 
One study is an examination of the quality of public data networks con-
ducted by the European Association of Information Services,  an association of 
providers of on-line data banks. The data here must be read with caution, be-
cause they are chiefly concerned with international calls and any disruption of 
the call  is  "debited" to the country from which the call  is  made, regardless of 
where the problem actually arose. Moreover. some countries failed to supply o 
statistically significant sample of responses. Even so, the raw data for 1989 sho~ 32 
clearly enough that the highest quality Is  obtained by Germany's X.25 network, 
followed by the Netherlands, Sweden and France. 
There  Is  probably also  some distortion  In  the figures  for France,  con-
nected with the different composition of the responses,  domestic calls largel'{ 
outnumbering International ones. 
By far the worst performance Is that of Portugal, with a failure rate of 62.9 
percent. Spain, Ireland and Greece are also poor in quality, with failure rates of 
over 30 percent. 
Country  Total  lnt•t  Failures 
No of  calls  % 
calls  % 
Germany  175  56  8 
Netherlands  929  85  9,3 
Sweden  1.218  73  10 
France  777  34  11,7 
Austria  345  100  11,9 
Norway  790  81  13,9 
Luxembourg  57  96  15,8 
Switzerland  131  75  16 
Belgium  265  92  18,1 
Finland  800  85  18,6 
Denmark  123  98  19,5 
United Kingdom  1.427  91  24,7 
Italy  588  71  26 
Spain  959  92  30,5 
Ireland  65  100  32,3 
Greece  15  100  33,3 
Portugal  35  94  62,9 33 
SIT A maintains that the reliability of leased data transmission lines is  sub-
stantially below their claimed 99.5 percent availability, which would correspond 
to down time of just 3.5 hours a month (source: Data Communications lntema-
'  ..  tiona!). 
•  In  April  1990 only 62  percent of SITA's  leased lines  performed up to this 
level, It was reported, and in the past the figure had gone as low as 50 percent. 
Another common complaint Is that assistance is often available only dur-
ing regular office hours rather than around-the-clock, which is Indispensable to 
an international network that may cover any number of different time zones. 
The  low level of assistance Impinges directly on  costs,  In  the end, be-
cause it requires provision for more back-up lines. 
5.8  Security and privacy 
This is one of the areas in which the need for uniform, clear and universal 
standards is  most strongly felt.  Unfortunately, this  Is  very far from the case, and 
much remains to be done to reach an acceptable degree of uniformity. 
The services related to transmission security (cryptography, key manage-
ment access checks,  message authentication, etc.) are generally left to the 
user, which must bear the cost of checking the correctness and applicability of 
such services and see to overall management of relations with correspondents. 
Until a satisfactory degree of uniformity of standards Is reached, the best 
solution is the direct supply of such services by the neiwork managing institutions. 
Dictated by the practical need for a solution to problems of technology 
choice, which the user  is  ordinarily reluctant to make independently, as it de-
mands an effort disproportionate to the problems of any single firm, this consid-
eration should act as a stimulus for progress in the development of standards. 
Only clear and broadly accepted standards can enable users to move 
independently. and economically, attenuating service  providers·  character as 
the purveyors of merely technological offers. 34 
5.9 
vices 
Lack of uniformity in  new technology and ser- , 
This Is most evident In the area of the services grouped under the umbrel~ 
Ia of Integrated Services Data Networks (ISDN), whose level of development dlf· 
fers  enormously from country to country despite the Impulse Imported by the 
European Community, which s~s  these services as o powerful tool of Integra-
tion.  ··· 
"' 6.  Potential threats to banking intermediation 
One such threat Is the launching on the market of payment Instruments 
that can to some extent cut out the banking system. 
Some of the lnsfltutions that operate national and lntemational networks 
have developed, and proposed to the European  Telecommunications Stan-
dards lnsttMe, chip cards that they Intend to Issue to their. users for access to 
their services.  These cards Identify the user with a satisfactory degree of security 
(they generally use RSA-type algorithms or public keys).  And their use In cellular 
telephone systems Is also envisaged. However, they have one particular fea1ure, 
namely their Incompatibility with the magnetic cards currentty used In 1he pay-
ment system. And these cards are used not only to control access to the system 
but also for the debiting of charges. If they were Introduced on a large scale, In 
view of their security features they· might make possible the creation of financial 
circuits outside the control of the bonks. 
A system of this kind, but using the traditional magnetic band technolo-
gy, which is  less aggressive from the s'ecurity standpoint Is being offered In Italy 
by SIP. 
The  sort of chip card posited by ETSI  would differ from the traditional 
cards in dimensions as  well, generating conflicts in terminal design. 
This  issue  needs to be followed  closely,  and the question must be re-
solved by the introdcution of standards, a field in which the management lnsfftu-
tlons  of telecommunications systems  have a  clear advantage, thanks to 1he 
strong commitment and substantial resources  devoted to study groups for the 
development of norms. 36 
7.  Conclusions 
The  foregoing considerations point clearly enough to a  number of re- ~l 
qulrements for the Improved operation of banks In providing services using ad-
vanced telecommunications technology over a large territory, usch as the single  • 
European market, and with a view towards confronting non-European countries 
as well. 
Essentially, these elements are the following: 
1)  the need for the ongoing process  of deregulation to be lnsttMed In 
practice, In the near future, In all the member countries of the Communl1y, al-
lowing the rules of competition to evolve along with the market. This should result 
In always appropriate levels of technology at economic prices. 
2)  The Importance of narrowing the serious disparities In tariff and tax treat-
ment, which distort proper mechanisms of competition and Impose additional 
technical and organizational  costs,  obviously to the detriment of the services 
that can be provided by banks. 
3)  The  need for closer coordination among telecommunications adminis-
trations, with the final goal of achieving one-stop shopping and one-stop billing, 
I.e.  a  single  Interface not only for administrative mortars but also  for mainte-
nance and assistance. 
4)  The  urgency of a sharp acceleration in  the definition and adoption of 
common standards. From this standpoint the changes In decision-making proce-
dures  proposed by the Communl1y  deserve  wholehearted support and are 
probably the only way to achieve anything like a satisfactory situation by 1993. 
This problem also embraces that of approval procedures for equipment  where 
the aim Is a single procedure. 
5)  Close attention needs to be paid to the activities of the telecommunica-
tions system management InstitUtions, whose control of technological· resources 
could tempt them to constitute systems that could cut the banking  system out. 
6)  VIgilance Is also required to ensure that providers of services and manag-
ers of systems do not acquire dominant market positions In  violation of Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EEC Treaty. 
7)  The  ultimate objective Is  full  application of the Open Network Provision 
scenario, along the lines set forth in Directive 90/387, adopted by the Council on  " 
28 June  1990 and based on Article  lOOA of the Trea1v.  This  shoulrl  rA~••It In +hA 
formation of an open ne1work In all the member countries, "open" being under-
stood as a public, Interlinked, lntematlonal network based on ONP rules. 